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Jesus Christ and the Human Quest

Suggestions Toward a Philosophy of the
Person and Work of Christ

By

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To
My STUDENTS
AT
DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
1916-1924

WITH WHOM IT HAS BEEN MY GREAT PRIV-
ILEGE TO DISCUSS, IN THE INTIMACIES
OF THE CLASSROOM AND STUDY, THE
DEEPER MEANINGS OF OUR COMMON FAITH.

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PREFACE

THE character and purpose of this book will be the better understood if I state briefly the extent to which I am indebted to the suggestions I have received from a number of men interested in theological education. It was at their solicitation that I first projected the book, and I have consulted them very freely as to how it could be made useful to that large number of persons, especially the younger ministry, who are conscious of the changing emphases in theology, but who are perplexed as to the bearing of these changes on religious faith itself. As a result of these consultations, a few guiding principles were worked out, and these have been followed in the construction of the book.

(1) Style. It is assumed that the reader will already have some familiarity with the general question, that of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. The treatment is therefore not elementary. On the other hand, the book is not written for experts: therefore an attempt has been made to avoid a purely technical treatment. I perhaps ought to add that I had not originally intended to introduce the material found in certain of the earlier chapters. But I became convinced that it is impossible to treat the subject of the Person and Work of Christ as it is done here without at least indicating the general philosophical standpoint from which the treatment is being made. If personality is to be regarded as the supreme category of both thought and being, and if Christ is to be construed according to his power to carry on and complete the personal process, then it seemed to be necessary to state the reasons for giving personality this determinative significance. Such a discussion is of necessity somewhat technical. I can only hope that the

reader will not be discouraged by it and refuse to read on to the place where the traveling becomes easier.

(2) Method. The book is intended to set forth a possible method of dealing with the Christological problem. I felt that this end could best be attained if in the main body of the text I presented the case in my own way, and without too much attention to other points of view. The number of books on the subject is so large that it seemed difficult to justify another one if it were to be merely a compilation and discussion of the traditional theories. Few may agree with what I have written, but I have at least tried to think my way through the question with a view to satisfying my own mind—to do which is, I take it, every man's privilege—and I have herein set down my conclusions for what they are worth.

(3) Notes, References, and Collateral Reading. Nothing, however, is more inexcusable in a theological study than for a writer to assume the finality of his own findings. I should pray to be delivered from such arrogance. We are to be helpers of each other's joy, not keepers of each other's opinions. I have therefore appended to each chapter a number of notes and references, intended to confirm or illustrate something in the text, or to indicate a different view. I have followed the suggestion of making these notes fairly copious in amount, while basing them on a strictly limited number of books, written in English or found in English translations, those most frequently referred to being easily obtainable. The chapter divisions and the suggestions for further reading have been determined with reference to the possibility that some may wish to make the book the basis of a winter's study. A brief annotated bibliography will be found in the appendix.

(4) Spirit. I have endeavored to heed the suggestion that due regard should be had both for the modern mind and for the great evangelical emphases of historic Christianity. My experience has taught me that there are many people who

believe that these two are necessarily antagonistic. I am myself very far from sharing that belief. The two can, of course, be made to appear antagonistic, but that is because the proper claims of one or the other are ignored. I desire nothing other than to exalt Jesus Christ as the one hope of the world's salvation. It is surely better to *utilize* for that purpose the modern sciences, psychology, sociology, ethics, philosophy, and biblical criticism, than to say that one must *choose between* these things and Jesus Christ. In spirit, this discussion is intended to be irenic, not polemic; constructive, not destructive; positive, not negative. If I have anywhere failed to maintain this spirit, no one will regret the failure more than shall I myself.

A brief description of the general course of the discussion may be helpful. The opening chapter seeks to discover the actual practical significance of Christ as that is attested in human experience. The next three chapters deal with human nature in its end-seeking capacity, the claim being made that the ends sought are determined by the individual, social, and religious needs which are elemental in every man. The conditions of life, especially in their harsher aspects, are then described (Chapter V), and it is argued that man's task is to organize and control these conditions in such a way as to wrest from them a value (Chapter VI). This is followed by a preliminary study of Christ himself, as he is revealed to us in the Gospels, with a view to ascertain how he solved the problem of his own life as respects the relation to the world, the relation to God, and the relation to men (Chapters VII and VIII). The question of sin in its various aspects is then introduced, the subject being considered in its relation to the man himself, to his fellows, and to God, the standard of judgment being the true self and the true end of life as these were revealed in Christ (Chapters IX and X). This naturally raises the question of redemption and what it means and must include, and there is a brief survey of the typical methods whereby

men have sought it (Chapters XI and XII). A detailed consideration of the Christian method follows, that method being shown to proceed by way of revelation, forgiveness, empowerment, and redemptive service, and to have upon it therefore the stamp of permanence (Chapters XIII, XIV, XV, XVI). The remainder of the book deals chiefly with the question of Christ's own Person as a problem naturally arising out of what he has done for men. The right of reason to deal with this problem in its own way is contended for (Chapter XVII). The specific data of the problem are classified as—the Gospel Portrait itself, which it is claimed criticism has not destroyed; the facts of Christian history; and the facts of Christian experience (Chapters XVIII and XIX). The difficulties in the Kenotic theory—the theory of an eternal separate Divine Person who became Man by a Supernatural Conception—are frankly pointed out, but full recognition is made of the dramatic and emotional value of the theory (Chapter XX). The question as to what is the characteristic New-Testament claim concerning Jesus Christ is answered by the affirmation that he is there set forth as one who manifests or reveals God: it follows that if we find God in him and through him we are in the true Christian succession (Chapter XXI). Emphasis is laid on the reality of Christ's humanness, and the difficult questions of the Virgin Birth and of his Moral Trial or temptability are considered from that standpoint (Chapter XXII). His mediatorial work—his work of "reconciling" the Divine and the Human—is treated as arising naturally out of his moral and spiritual uniqueness and his universality, this latter term meaning that he is every man's "true Other" (Chapter XXIII); and this, together with that quality of "timelessness" which belongs to what he revealed and made possible, is regarded as at once the basis and the sufficient warrant of faith's affirmation of his Divine Sonship (Chapter XXIV). The closing chapter shows the nature of that personal and social and religious challenge which confronts

any man who accepts the understanding of Christ set forth in this book. There is a brief Epilogue which summarizes the controlling principles which have appeared throughout the discussion.

While the book is written primarily with reference to the needs of the average minister who has had some theological training, it is hoped that it may be not without value to the interested layman who is perplexed about the modern situation in theology, and to students of the subject in college and theological seminary classes.

I desire to express my gratitude to all those who have encouraged me in the preparation of this book, and in particular to Professor Harris Franklin Rall, of Garrett Biblical Institute. Professor Rall read the entire manuscript and made numerous helpful suggestions of which I was happy to avail myself. The positions set forth are, however, entirely my own, and for these I am alone responsible.

EDWIN LEWIS.

Drew Forest,
Madison, New Jersey,
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YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS: Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*; Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, new and revised edition.

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY: J. S. Mill, *Essay on*

Nature; Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. trans. by Mitchell.

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E. L.

CHAPTER I
THE SERVANT AND HIS LORD

The Christian Religion has never existed except as a religion giving Christ a place which is all his own in its faith; it has never existed except as a religion in which Christ was both to God and to man what no other could be, and determined all their mutual relations. . . . We can all have, with a clear intellectual conscience, the same religion—the religion preached by the apostles, and answering to the self-consciousness of Jesus—the religion in which Jesus holds the place he has held from the beginning, the only place he ever consented to hold—the religion in which we recognize him as the only Son of God, our Lord and Saviour: we can all have the same religion—provided that the intellectual questions it raises are left for the free consideration of Christian intelligence [pp. 407, 408]. . . . We believe in him as Son of God, as Lord and Saviour, because it is so only that he manifests himself to us, and the consciousness that our faith raises numberless questions which we may never be able to answer does not shake its security or diminish its power. It is not open or unanswered questions that paralyze; it is ambiguous or evasive answers, or answers of which we can make no use, because we cannot make them our own. And it is not the acceptance of any theology or Christology, however penetrating or profound, which keeps us Christian; we remain loyal to our Lord and Saviour only because he has apprehended us, and his hand is strong.—JAMES DENNEY, *Jesus and the Gospel* (G. H. Doran Co., New York), second edition, pp. 407, 408, 410, 411.

CHAPTER I

THE SERVANT AND HIS LORD

Is it possible to give a simple description of the Christian attitude toward Christ, meaning that attitude which constitutes a person a real disciple of Christ, irrespective of any acceptance or rejection of a formal creed? Amid all the diversity of opinion and belief which characterizes Christian history, is there a common element which may be regarded as essential, and to which all else is but incidental? Would it be possible to select at haphazard a group of Christian men and women, and ask them the ancient question, "What think ye of Christ?" and get answers which would have in them, either expressed or implied, a fundamental identity of content?

It is clear that unanimity would not be difficult to obtain if the selected group had all been subjected to the same general theological training. If, for example, they should belong to one of those Christian bodies which emphasize catechetical instruction, there would be an inevitable similarity—one might say a suspicious similarity—in the replies. But in such a case the questioning would have but little real value. An identity that was evident throughout much diversity would be vastly more significant than superficial mechanical likeness.

We would need, therefore, a group that was truly representative. Suppose such a group were composed of Saint Paul and Saint James, Athanasius and Arius, Augustine and Pelagius, Luther and Socinus, Thomas à Kempis and Calvin, Wesley and Toplady, Newman and Charles Kingsley, Edwards and Channing, Theresa and Mrs. Booth, Harnack and Loisy, and we were to put to them the ques-

tion, "What think ye of Christ?" would the diverse answers—and how diverse they would be hardly needs to be said!—yield what could in any fair way be called a common element? And would that common element be precisely what Christ himself, judging from the Gospels, would regard as primary, and would the wide range of differences be what we have every reason for believing he would regard as only of secondary importance?

Plainly, a great deal would depend on the meaning to be assigned to the question. Is the question intended to test the theology, or is it intended to test the devotion and faith? Is it to mean, What do you believe concerning the ultimate constitution of the person of Christ, and concerning his metaphysical relation to God, the moral law, the world, and the human race? Or is it to mean, What place do you seek to give Christ in your own life, and what place do you believe he ought to have in the life of the world? Is there a real difference there? There is such a difference that only as it is frankly recognized and its significance truly appreciated can we ever hope that some day Christ will be Lord of all. It is the difference between a practical attitude which expresses itself in love and obedience and service, and a piece of intellectual activity, which, however justifiable it may be in itself, necessarily cannot be either universally authoritative or determinative of moral status. Not that the intellectual activity and the practical attitude can ever be completely disparate. The attitude is itself the evidence to a decision, and a decision is a rational act.¹ Nevertheless, it is necessary to insist on the legitimate character of the distinction here suggested between assigning to Christ the place of supremacy in life as we live it, and attempting to say positively what he must be in his own essential being to whom that place is assigned.

Already, then, we meet the distinction between Christ as object of living faith and Christ as subject of ordered thought. It is only as we recognize the validity of the

distinction that we are able to talk about that common Christian attitude to Christ which, because it is the one condition to discipleship, is also the one condition to salvation in the Christian sense. The common and saving element in that attitude is not in the assertion that Christ is the Second Person of the Trinity, or that from eternity he lived a personal life in the glory of the Father, or that on the human consciousness with which he began his life on earth there was gradually superimposed a consciousness of absolute divinity, or that in his Death he offered to God and God accepted an exact equivalent in suffering, or a constituted equivalent in suffering, for all the penalty properly due to sinful men. All these statements may be true enough, but then, again, they may not, and to make what is necessarily doubtful and must always remain so a condition to salvation is to suppose that God is exceedingly arbitrary. The statements in question, and many more of like tenor, labor under the handicap of not being experimentally verifiable. It is true that they are constructed from various data which we have good reasons for accepting. Yet while the data are given these constructions by some men, other men, whose devotion to Jesus Christ is undeniable, have given the same data quite different constructions. The inference would seem to be clear, namely, that these various constructions, meaning theological statements, are neither demonstrable nor inevitable and that, therefore, assent to them or dissent from them may have little bearing on actual discipleship.

If, then, we take our representative group and ask the suggested question in what might be called its theological aspect, we should be confronted with a collection of answers that would be simply chaotic. Indeed, one could very well emulate Abelard and compile a modern *Sic et non*—let it be hoped without equally disastrous results.² Concerning the “cosmic” significance of Christ, it is simply impossible to show that Saint Paul and Saint James occu-

pied a common ground. He would be a bold man who should deny to Athanasius and Arius, to Wesley and Toplady, the name of Christian, even though he were entirely familiar with the asperities of the controversies in which they engaged.³ But he would be even more bold if he should undertake to show that they were entitled to the name because of their common acceptance of a series of carefully worded propositions concerning the "nature" of Christ, or the "nature" of the atonement. It is probable that Kingsley on more than one occasion expressed his faith and hope in singing Newman's hymn, "Lead, Kindly Light!" and yet it was an attack by Kingsley that brought to a climax Newman's growing purpose to write an *Apologia*.⁴ If the use of the technical terms "Christology" and "Soteriology" may be indulged in, the one meaning a scientific theory of Christ's Person conceived as in some way at once human and divine, the other meaning a scientific theory of his work conceived as in some way achieving the redemption of mankind, one may affirm that it is a simple matter of fact that there is no such thing as a Christology or Soteriology universally accepted by Christian men.⁵ The so-called "historic faith," the "faith of our fathers," was not a theology, it was—a *faith*. The historic belief *about* Christ is something very different. Men who have committed themselves absolutely to the domination of Jesus Christ, and have desired nothing greater than to serve him well, have ranged themselves on opposite sides of many important questions which have been raised by that very devotion. Schleiermacher, indeed, suggests that much of the bitterness of controversy has been due to the disputants confusing interest in personal theological opinion with interest in religion.⁶ Christ, in his great prayer, plainly anticipated a very real oneness of all his followers, and Paul's noble conception of "The body of Christ" represents not merely an ideal but a fact. Yet, surely, we know enough of the mind of Christ to be certain that he did not base the

unity of his disciples on the power to follow and accept a reasoned conclusion in a sphere essentially non-religious because theoretical; and the very vehemence with which Paul expounds his conception of Christ and his body, which is the church, is fair evidence that he feared that not all his readers shared it with him—those same readers, be it observed, whom he yet greets as “the faithful in Christ Jesus” (Eph. 1. 1), and “the saints and faithful brethren in Christ” (Col. 1. 1).

We turn to our question, therefore, in its “practical” aspect: What place do you seek to give Christ in your own life and in the life of the world? At once we find that we are now dealing with something definite and tangible. There is not a man of our representative group but would answer, “The place of complete moral and spiritual lordship.” Any man who recognizes and exhibits that lordship is a Christian. In the very nature of the case, there can be no dispute as to that. If we can get men wholly committed to the service of Jesus Christ, “testing their lives by his,” all the related intellectual questions may safely be left, as Denney puts it, “for the free consideration of Christian intelligence.” What makes the unity of Christendom, better still, what makes the unity of the body of Christ, is not the intellectual assent to a formula but the free surrender to a common purpose of service and love. The public repetition of a creed may have—and, indeed, does have—very large value, and to give up the practice would be to perpetrate a serious blunder.⁷ But the public recital of a creed can no more guarantee the practical expression of the Spirit of Christ than the public recital of the American Constitution can guarantee loyalty. If it be said that complete surrender to Christ involves the surrender not only of the will and the affections, but of the mind as well, the point is readily yielded: in fact, it is precisely what is now being claimed. But in what proper sense may a man be said to have yielded his mind to

Christ, who, against every deduction of his reason so far as he is able to make it, assents to some statement *about* Christ, merely because it is authoritatively prescribed for him?⁸ "We don't try to think; we let others do our thinking for us: we simply believe."⁹ Exactly so, and the incubus of a dead tradition continues to throttle the free life of those who so lightly part with their birthright. If there is anything upon which we may believe Christ to set supreme value, it must be personal sincerity, and personal sincerity extends to the integrity of the intellect. It is difficult to see how Christ can be honored by the man who, under a false sense of the function of authority, surrenders so precious a possession. It were infinitely better that all our creeds, considered purely as intellectual formulations, should be consigned to oblivion than that they should become a stumbling-block to the continued activity of that very spirit of freedom of which they were originally the expressions.

"What think ye of Christ?" In view of what has now been said, it would seem to be desirable that the question be taken to mean, "What will ye *do* with Christ?" It is not to be denied that the doing will be determined by the thinking. Some kind of mental activity is necessarily involved in all our volitional activity. That is the justification of the specific teaching function of the church. The presentation of Christ is the prerequisite to Christ being accepted. How shall they believe unless they be taught? But more and more must we come to the recognition of this most significant fact, namely, that substantially identical volitional and emotional results may rest on radically different intellectual foundations.¹⁰ In the realm of physics the equation of cause and effect may be absolute enough. No one will dispute that here like causes produce like effects. But the transfer of a law valid in the realm of physics to the realm of personality, with the supposition that it is equally valid there, is just one more of those numerous errors which live an affluent life by claiming a scientific character. There

is an element in personality which we cannot classify. It is that elusive factor that so often defeats our calculations. The result which we think we had every right to expect does not appear. Christ came to get something *done*, and there is more than one approach to that end in which his work found its reason. Yet what he came to get done men will perish without. A man is truly "saved" in precisely the degree in which the Christ-spirit is regnant in him, and the spread of the Kingdom of God in the world is identical with the spread of that spirit. Men will assign different reasons for yielding to that spirit. How many "theories of life" and "philosophies of loyalty" could one have found among the volunteers on the battlefields of France? Yet all manifested themselves in a like devotion. Many are the reasons why men crown Christ as their Lord: what matters, so he be crowned?¹¹ The task now as always is to bring men to the place where the spirit of Christ can possess them utterly. Where that is effected, we believe that we meet the realization of the Father's purpose, the justification of creation, the whole why and wherefore of existence. How may we bring men and Christ together? It is part of the purpose of this present discussion to show that, as in John's vision, there are many gates into the Kingdom. But this, in general, we may hold to be true: that men will surrender themselves to Christ in just the degree in which they are brought to realize that in him and through him are the promise and the power of the satisfaction of their moral and spiritual needs, of the solution of their social problems, and, therefore, of the fulfillment of that final purpose which appears as the reason for their lives.¹²

He, then, may be said to have the saving attitude toward Christ who assigns to him complete moral worth. There is properly involved in such an estimate of Christ the surrender to him as Lord and trust in him as Saviour. The real evidence to such surrender and trust is the possession and the expression of the "spirit" of Christ. The spirit of

Christ consists essentially in perfect sonship to God and perfect brotherhood to men. The Christian, therefore, is one who cooperates with Christ to make his spirit supreme both in his own life and in all the affairs of the world. He is one who accepts Christ's estimate of God, and man, and the world, and who sincerely endeavors to give that estimate practical expression in a life of loyal discipleship and service. Of necessity, there will be differences in the understanding of what is herein involved as to a final philosophy of things, but in the nature of the case there cannot be, and there never have been except sporadically, any differences concerning the fundamental fact, namely, that Christ is Lord with a lordship which admits of no compromise, wherefore it follows that a Christian is entitled to the name according as he meets lordship with service.

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

(1) Cf. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Chaps. V and VI. Hocking discusses more particularly the relation of feeling to idea in religion, but his principle, that feeling and idea are inseparable, is equally true of what is here called "a practical attitude" and idea.

(2) The allusion is to Abelard's famous effort to discredit the authority of the early Fathers by compiling their opinions on various subjects, and leaving it to be inferred by the reader how often they contradicted each other. He entitled his volume *Yes and No*. The more immediate effect of the book was the condemnation of the compiler by the Council at Sens, 1140. Its final effect, however, was to help prepare the European mind for the Reformation.

(3) For samples of these asperities, see Tyerman, *Life and Times of John Wesley*, vol. ii, pp. 487ff., vol. iii, pp. 54ff., 81-83, etc.

(4) Newman states the circumstances in the *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, preface, edition of 1865.

(5) The Apostles' Creed is probably the nearest approach to

a universal Christian *symbolum*. It is a curious fact that the Creed has nothing whatever to say directly on the relation of Jesus Christ to man's salvation. See McGiffert, *The Apostles' Creed*.

(6) *Discourses on Religion* (Oman's trans.), p. 55.

(7) On the significance of a common creed see Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, Chap. III, §§ B and C.

(8) "The spirit of Protestantism demands that the door to the free investigation of religious experience, its basis and its results, shall always remain open. Its traditions and examples must be subjected to an historical and critical inquiry; psychology must examine whether its constituent experiences are natural and immediate; logic has to investigate the consistency of its postulates; while it is for ethics to discuss the integrity of its values. Were this process of testing to be abandoned, we should relapse into barbarism or into spasmodic attempts to hold fast to that which is absurd. The religious consciousness is always inclined to drag about with it traditions which have neither religious, intellectual, nor ethical significance; dead values which no human being can really experience, but which it does not dare to throw away for fear lest in their fall they should tear away something more with them" (Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Chap. iii, A, (b), close of paragraph 42).

(9) These words were actually spoken to the writer by an educated man, a member of one of the great Christian communions.

(10) This is not meant as approving "anti-intellectualism" in religion. See Hocking, *ibid.*, Chap. iv, *The Retirement of the Intellect*. Rather it implies that the so-called "rationality" of an act is to be judged by more than the "reasons" alleged for it.

(11) Cf. Garvie, *Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, Chap. v, § 3. "It must be recognized that there are many to-day who are attracted by the earthly ministry of Jesus, and find it difficult to accept the apostolic gospel. We must beware of denying their share in the Christian salvation" (pp. 134 and 135).

Those who are familiar with the teaching of the late Professor Olin A. Curtis may be surprised to learn that on one oc-

casion he publicly made the following statement: "I once believed that no man could become a Christian without such a faith in the Saviour as amounted, practically, to a confession of his deity; but I dare not be so dogmatically sweeping now. As my relations with men have widened, exceptional cases have been discovered. Apparently, there are men whose life has been transformed by their trust in Jesus, and yet they have no clear view of our Lord's person, and are not even interested in the Christological question."—*Personal Submission to Jesus Christ*, p. 29 (Matriculation Address at Drew Theological Seminary, September 28, 1910).

(12) For a discussion of the principle that Christ is to be understood through the work he does for men, see Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, bk. iii, Chap. iii. For a discussion of religion in relation to intellectual freedom, see Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, Chap. xiv.

CHAPTER II

MAN AS SEEKER OF ENDS

There are many difficulties in our way when we begin to draw conclusions as to the purposes of others, but there is certainty in regard to our own. We have direct experience of a clear outlook toward the future, of making plans, of desiring ends, of deliberately willing to realize an idea, of bending a multitude of means, often with some difficulty, toward a definite result. We cannot think of it without the concept of purpose. It is not merely that we put this finalistic interpretation on our conduct. Among the conditions of our conduct we recognize ideal anticipations as dominant. . . . We must admit, then, the reality of purposeful self-determination. It is not that a psychical entity, called a purpose, functions; it is, rather, that our whole organism bends its bow in a particular direction and that we know this on the experiencing side as our conscious purpose, and strengthen it in knowing it. We see, then, that in the human realm of ends the concept of purpose is essential.—J. ARTHUR THOMSON, *The System of Animate Nature*, vol. i, pp. 332 and 333.

CHAPTER II

MAN AS SEEKER OF ENDS

WE are to seek to ascertain the significance of Jesus Christ for the human quest. This purpose seems to call for a preliminary discussion of a somewhat technical character. There are certain psychological and philosophical considerations which, if they can be validated, go far toward confirming the Christian idea of Christ. These considerations will be presented as simply and as briefly as possible.*

It is necessary that religion be given a permanent basis. Such a basis can be not in any external authority but only in the very nature of man. Analyzing that nature, we shall find that man is characterized broadly by what we call end-seeking activity. Within this broad characterization we shall find more definite traits, namely, individuality, sociality, and what, for want of a better term, must be called ideality. By the first is meant that every man is different in some respect from every other man, and that much that he does he does because of this basic peculiarity. By the second is meant that every man is so related to other men that much that he does he does because of this social relationship. By the third is meant that every man possesses the power to conceive an ideal or end, to give to that end a certain value, and then to allow it to control his activity. We shall then see that out of all this grows the demand for an end of absolute worth or value, in the pursuit and realization of which the individuality, the sociality, and the ideality may all be realized and satisfied. This will prepare the way for the claim that the true end of the human quest is revealed in Jesus Christ. If

*This and the next chapter may have some importance for the student, but will hardly interest the general reader. A summary is given at the close of each chapter which will suffice to indicate the drift of the discussions.

the completion or fulfillment or redemption of human nature can be shown to be thus dependent on him, we shall have all the reason we ever can have or ever need to have for assigning to him the place of absolute lordship and finality.

What, then, characterizes man throughout his entire existence? "The end of man is not a Thought, but a Deed." That was Carlyle's text for many a sermon.¹ In his well-worn "Conduct is three-fourths of life," Matthew Arnold would seem to be in agreement.² But Arnold classified people as "Hellenists" and "Hebraists," meaning by the first those who are most concerned with thinking, and by the second those who are most concerned with doing, and he himself belongs with the Hellenists.³ On the other hand, Browning puts in a single line much of his own distinctive message when he makes the youthful David say, "'Tis not what man does which exalts him, but what he would do."⁴ The familiar quotations suggest a problem that is as old as intellectual history. It is the problem of the fundamental aspect of human nature. Is there in human nature a constant factor, an integral element of life itself, present in all else, so essential to all else that without it the rest would not be?

The question has very great value for the final validity of religion. The reason for man's religion must be found in man's own nature. It is only as that is done that we can really understand religion, explain its universality, make it independent of all arbitrary supports, and have faith in its persistence. The more men have devoted themselves to the philosophical consideration of the nature and significance of religion, the more they have felt this to be the case.

Kant, for example, conceived religion as inseparable from morality, although morality itself could exist independently of religion. He held that the two did not differ really in content at all. They differ only in their point of view, and in the motive that lies behind them. If you do right for right's own sake, with no other thought than that this is duty,

and duty must be done—that is morality. If, however, you do right because you believe that God wills it, and because you desire to obey the will of God—that is religion. In either case, therefore, the emphasis is on the doing: morality is doing one's duty; religion is doing God's will. Why could Kant state the case that way? Because he had already reached a certain conclusion as to human nature. And his conclusion was, first, that man is essentially an acting creature, whose primary impulse is *to do*; and, secondly, that with the growth of consciousness there emerges another impulse, the impulse *to do as he ought*, or to do the right. For Kant, therefore, religion is essentially a doing because man is essentially a doer.⁵

Schleiermacher did what Kant had not been able to do: he broke away from the dry rationalism of the German Enlightenment. At the same time, he came under the influence of the spirit of the contemporary Romanticism. Add to this his deep reverence for Plato and Spinoza, his early training in the Moravian schools, his native intellectual originality, and his deep personal piety, and "The Father of Modern Scientific Theology" is in large measure explained. There was a touch of the pantheist in Schleiermacher, which opponents were quick to recognize. He thought of God as the World-Spirit, or the Whole, and of man as one with him. Yet he persistently held that every man is a self-conscious spirit. His problem was therefore to account for the identity and the difference. He accounted for it by his analysis of the process of self-consciousness. Self-awareness is the I distinguishing itself from the not-I. But Schleiermacher held that such a differentiation necessarily presupposed and rested upon a prior identity. In the very effort to grasp that identity, however, it disappears. Why does it? Because the identity is constituted through "feeling," and can only so continue. Feeling is, so to speak, the universal continuum which makes all things one. In self-awareness, however, the I rises above the level of feel-

ing, and *thinks itself*, and in the self-differentiating act the pure feeling disappears. It is, then, in the undifferentiated continuum of feeling that the I and God or the World-Spirit are identical—the Whole. It is through the differentiating activity of thought that the whole falls into its parts.

Now, asked Schleiermacher, what is religion? And he answered, not as Kant had done, that religion is doing, but that religion is *feeling*. It is the feeling or the sense or the consciousness of dependence. Dependence on what? On God, on the World-Spirit, on the Whole. All those ideas and activities and institutions which we describe as religious are the outgrowth of reflection on that feeling or consciousness and on all that it implies. But it is the feeling that is the religion, not the ideas and the activities. In a word, then, for Schleiermacher feeling is the basis of personal life and is also the fundamental psychological state, and since religion is in essence feeling, religion is grounded in man's very nature.⁶

Hegel assigned the place of supremacy to thought. His entire metaphysic was an attempt to reduce everything to thought and its inherent laws. The world of things so-called is grounded in Primal Thought. What we call cosmic history is but the necessary unfolding of this Primal Thought, the temporal explication of the eternally implicit. The law of the process is a purely logical law. It follows that what we know as things are in reality thoughts, and that the laws of nature are the laws of thought. Man himself, being part of the whole, is thought. But he is thinker as well, since he consciously participates in the process, and in his fundamental characteristic of rationality stands, as it were, at its nexus. As an absolutely necessitated "moment of the process," he is thought. As seeking by the exercise of his rationality to understand the very meaning of the Whole, he participates in the process in a more intimate and personal way. Insofar as he does this, that is, insofar as he truly thinks and truly understands, he is most truly man.

Now, that is a very subtle kind of philosophy. The air is thin, and one finds it difficult to breathe. Hegel himself recognized the fact and he found in religion a way of accommodating the truth to the comprehension of the common man. His general principle, we have said, is that true being is identical with true thought. But true thought, as an exercise of finite minds, may be expressed in one of two ways. It may be expressed either philosophically or religiously. Thought expressed philosophically gives the concept or the pure idea; thought expressed religiously gives the symbol or the picture. Thus philosophically creation is a dialectic process, or the unfolding by logical steps of Eternal Thought; religiously, creation is the definite and purposeful act of a personal God. Philosophically, the Divine Trinity is an affirmation, or Being; a denial, or Non-Being; and a reconciliation, or Becoming. Religiously, it is Father and Son united in the Spirit. For Hegel, therefore, religion is grounded in man's essential *rationality*, and is his attempt to make real to himself the final being and meaning of things under pictorial or symbolic forms.⁷

Here, then, are three typical and well-known efforts to treat religion in a large way. Our probable disagreement with the respective constructions must not lead us to lose sight of what these men were trying to do. It is obvious that their main purpose was to show that religion had its foundations in the very nature of man. David Hume, writing in the eighteenth century, had undertaken to discredit religion just on the ground of its diverse and chaotic history, and the possibility of finding a psychological explanation of its ideas and customs. The fallacy of Hume has been repeated often enough—that the description of the surface facts of a process is at the same time an explanation. Hume wrote what he called "The Natural History of Religion," and even if he did not say as much categorically, he at least implied that anything with such a history had small claim to serious attention. What Hume apparently

did not see was that that which had the history was of vastly more significance than any particular detail of the history.⁸ The very fact that man is the kind of creature he is would lead us to expect that his religion would have just the history it has. In this respect it is like his art, his literature, his industry. Not the history is the important thing, so much as is that which creates the history. The men whose work we have so briefly reviewed made an unerring judgment when they saw that the very thing which guaranteed the permanence of religion was the fact of its connection with elemental human nature. The moment that religion is shifted, for its ultimate basis, to something other than this—to custom, to an institution, to a book, to external authority of any kind whatsoever—that moment it is shifted to a basis which must eventually crumble.

It is the conclusion of the most satisfactory modern biology that all sentient life is end-seeking, and that the ends sought have their correlates in the life itself. Psychology justifies the extension of this to human life in the entire range of its expression. The thesis of our immediate discussion is, therefore, that man is fundamentally a seeker of ends which are determined from within himself, and that his religion has its final ground precisely in his fundamental end-seeking activity.⁹

For all that we do there is a reason. That, however, is anything but a self-evident statement. Beginning, therefore, where disagreement is impossible, we may safely say that there is a reason for at least a part of what we do. That reason is in a purpose which we have more or less clearly defined to ourselves. It belongs to us to be able to prewise a certain end. We may project it, so to speak, before our thought. With that in mind, we begin to do various things. It is very clear why we are doing them: we are doing them because of that end, or ideal, or purpose. If, for example, it is a boy who entertains the purpose to graduate some day from college, certain forms of his activity will be determined

with reference to that end. He may mow lawns, take care of furnaces, wait on tables, seek private instruction, work long hours with no aid at all except his books. Whatever reason he may assign to others for his doing all this, the real reason is obvious enough: it is in that end which he has set before himself. All the hard work, the late hours, the shabby clothing, the insufficient food, the steady mastery of books, is controlled by one purpose, and that purpose gives meaning to all that the boy does and coordinates the most diverse activities. In a word, there is end-seeking activity, and the end-seeking is consciously and purposely so.

There can be no question as to the principle operating in cases of this type. The real problem is, rather, with those other forms of activity whose reason lies beyond the range of clear consciousness. All sentient life is characterized by the impulse to reach forward—to seek for something. It is a grave question as to how much conscious intellection there is below the level of man. To what extent are ways and means patiently considered? To what extent is there the clear representation of an end, and then the devising of a method of realizing it? Everyone can give examples of animal behavior that would seem to prove definite and purposeful intellection. It is a place where opinion is bound to differ, but, on the whole, it will be agreed that most activity below the human level proceeds without any clear representation by the actor of the reason for the activity. But we must also allow that a great deal of human activity is of this type. This yields the real heart of the problem, namely, Is there any proper sense in which activity can be called “end-seeking” when the end itself is not clearly represented by and to the active agent?

It is because all free activity must have its ultimate reason in the nature of the actor that the question calls for an affirmative answer. Some activity is in pursuit of a clearly conceived end. But the end in question is one that we ourselves projected, and the very fact that we projected

it bears witness to something in our own nature as its *real* cause. A similar cause must be allowed in the case of activity whose end is not defined or understood. It does not matter what we call it: instinctive, impulsive, mechanical, unconscious, subconscious, or anything else. It is our response to a situation, and the situation could not evoke that response unless we were that kind of creature. The activity of any organism, therefore of human life, has its final ground in something internal to itself. Perhaps the best single word by which to describe that ground is the word "need," although it may easily be misunderstood. Briefly stated, the present contention is that all our free activity, whether it springs from an end that we clearly perceive or whether it does not, has its origin in a need in our own nature. But for this elemental need, there would be no activity. The need is therefore the reason for the activity. The purpose of the activity is therefore to satisfy the need. All activity, whether the reason be clearly perceived and represented or not, is therefore end-seeking activity. That is to say, it is a quest.

A further question is now necessary: If all action is based on need, and if need is not always clearly perceived, by what means does need promote activity? It is here that we find the function of "desire." What we have said so far is that ends and needs are necessary correlates. If there were no need, there would be no end to seek, and therefore no activity. Whether, therefore, the need is consciously apprehended, or whether it is not, the activity is based in either case on the fact that the man *wants something*. He may not know exactly what he wants, which is the chief reason why desire is so utterly lawless, but unless he wanted he would never do. In all his free self-activity he is seeking the satisfaction of native wants or desires. The philosophy of the Cynics was, indeed, "cynical" enough: they suggested that the gods were happy because they had no unsatisfied desire; that it was desire which caused all human unhappi-

ness; and that, therefore, the sure way for men to be happy was by reducing their desires to the minimum—a crust to eat, a rag to wear, and a tub for shelter. Related to this is that Oriental speculation which finds the secret of human misery in the “desire to live,” and the secret of human bliss in the destruction of it. A similar speculation was introduced into modern Europe in the pessimism of Schopenhauer. The entire speculation is based on a profound misapprehension of the true function of desire and of the significance of the elemental self-assertiveness of life. Infinitely nearer the truth are Aristotle, with his principle, “Desire moves the world”; Goethe, with his maxim, “Love and hunger make the world go round”; and Bergson, with his conception of life as a restless forward urge. Where there is no desire there is no effort, and it is where the effort is greatest that the prizes are richest.

Introspection would seem to show that desire, like need itself, is elemental and underived. It is true that the desire for a particular thing may be the result of rational reflection, but what is it but desire that lies back of the chain of reflection and accompanies its steps? It is to be questioned if it is possible for a person deliberately to desire. The truth, rather, seems to be that he finds desire already existent—a psychic condition which he may be able to control but which he did not create. Just as the “will to believe” involves the will to will to believe, so the purpose to desire involves the desire to desire. If these considerations are valid, they mean simply that desire as the consciousness of need is an indispensable attendant on all our free activity, and if we attempt to find the origin of desire *per se*, we find it in life itself. In the end we want because we want, and because we must want in order to do. The very fact that the truth has to be expressed in that way is the evidence to the ultimate and underived character of desire. In a given case the presentation of an object may arouse specific desire, but then again it may not. The final reason, therefore, which

accounts for the fact of desire must be in our own nature—more particularly in a consciousness of need sometimes clearly understood and sometimes not. The conclusion would seem to be clear. If human life is in any sense purposive, if man is constituted with reference to an end, if he is really meant to be something, then a necessary condition to that end being sought is that he shall be possessed of an “urge.” The “urge” can be related to the whole scheme of things only as it is conceived as pointing in two directions: backward to man’s essential incompleteness and therefore to need, and forward to the existence of an end in which that incompleteness may be overcome and that need satisfied.

SUMMARY: Man is fundamentally a seeker of ends. End-seeking requires activity. Free activity is never without a reason. The reason may or may not be clearly defined to the actor. Whether it is or not, its final reason must be found in the nature of man as seat of need and subject of desire. Desire for something may follow representation, but desire *per se* is a native concomitant of man’s native needs, and the evidence to his essential incompleteness. Being eminently lawless, the principle of its control must be sought. We can rationalize it only by regarding it as related to an end which man is designed to realize. Ideally, therefore, the life-process is a process of self-realization, determined solely from within, although contingent on the nature of external conditions. Man is then fundamentally a creature who must do, who must do because he desires, who desires because he has native needs seeking satisfaction, and whose doing will be affected but not wholly determined by clarity of mental representation.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

(1) Cf. *Sartor Resartus*, bk. ii, chap. vi, the closing paragraphs. Carlyle intimates the Greek origin of the saying. So

Aristotle: "The end is not that we should know, but that we should act." *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. i, chap. iii.

(2) *Literature and Dogma*, chap. i, p. 18.

(3) *Culture and Anarchy*, chap. v. See *Matthew Arnold*, W. H. Dawson, chap. iii.

(4) *Saul*.

(5) One of the best ways to approach the study of Kant is with the help of Watson's two books, *Selections from Kant*, and *The Philosophy of Kant Explained*. Selections germane to religion and ethics are given in Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pt. vii. These selections are prefaced by a brief but good introduction, and there are references to the literature. Fuller than Caldecott and Mackintosh, but not so full as Watson, are the selections in Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*. One of the best books on Kant is Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant, His Life and Doctrine* (Eng. trans.). Briefer and not so difficult is the volume entitled *Kant*, by Wallace, in Blackwood's *Philosophical Classics*.

(6) See Caldecott and Mackintosh, *ibid.*, pt. viii, for significant selections from Schleiermacher's *Addresses on Religion*, and a note. The *Addresses* have been translated by John Oman, who prefaces his volume with an account of Schleiermacher's life and an estimate of his work. Oman has an admirable discussion of Schleiermacher in *The Problem of Faith and Freedom*, Lect. V. Cross, *The Theology of Schleiermacher*, contains the substance of Schleiermacher's system of theology (the so-called *Glaubenslehre*), and the exposition is sympathetic. There is an excellent discussion in W. A. Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*. Perhaps the most readable account, however, is the volume *Schleiermacher*, by W. B. Selbie.

(7) Hegel of all men needs expert exposition. His significance for religious philosophy is most easily understood through the so-called Neo-Hegelians, e. g., the Caird brothers. Cf. John Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, and Edward Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*. Mackintosh, *Hegel and Hegelianism*, is an excellent criticism. A. Seth, (now known as Pringle-Pattison), *Hegelianism and Personality* (out of print), is interesting as the work of a former Hegelian who greatly modified his position. Watson, *The Phil-*

osophical Basis of Religion, is distinctly Hegelian. The religious philosophy of Josiah Royce is in marked sympathy with the Hegelian point of view, but is much truer to the individual. Rand, *ibid.*, contains selections from Hegel's *Logic*, and from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

(8) In fairness to Hume it should be said that *The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* must be construed to mean that he was a Theist. The characters of the Dialogues are Demea (an orthodox dogmatist), Philo (a skeptic), and Cleanthes (a philosophical Theist). Philo says finally, "To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step toward being a sound believing Christian." The words remind us forcibly of Kant: "I was obliged to destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith." A useful exposition and criticism of Hume is James Orr, *David Hume*, in the World's Epoch Makers' Series. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, lect. i, gives an excellent review of the *Dialogues*.

(9) This is the point of view of, e. g., J. Arthur Thomson. Few books in the field better repay careful reading than his *The System of Animated Nature*, 2 vols. (the Gifford Lectures, 1915 and 1916). Less technical is the little book, *Evolution*, by Thomson and Geddes (Home University Library). A very useful review of biological theories in relation to theology is Micou, *Basic Ideas in Religion*, chaps. iv and v, and Notes in Appendix. For a clear and simple statement of the combined biological and psychological standpoints, see McDougall, *Psychology* (Home University Library), especially chap. v, "The Study of Animal Behaviour." For a masterly defense of "finalism" there is still nothing better worth study than James Ward, *The Realm of Ends*. The student, however, who would "begin at the beginning," should become acquainted with the views on this question of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom were "finalists." Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy* (Eng. trans. by Cushman), is an excellent guide for this purpose, and for the further elaboration of all allusions to ancient philosophy in this volume. Either his larger *History of Philosophy* (Eng. trans. by Tufts), or Höffding, *Brief History of Modern Philosophy*, may be used for allusions to more recent thinkers.

CHAPTER III
THE INDIVIDUAL-SOCIAL RECIPROCITY

Until very recently, individuals were taken for granted, with little thought of a possible evolution of individuality itself. . . . Genetic psychology has shown, however, that individuality itself is achieved in the social process and not elsewhere. In other words, one and the same movement produces society and the individual [p. 141]. . . . It is by differentiation from what may be called a protosocial consciousness that the individual self arises. The first consciousness is "we" more than it is "I" [p. 142]. . . . One who should grow up entirely without human companionship would never become a self at all, would never have a rational as distinguished from an instinctive mind. Thus man is by nature social. Self-consciousness is *per se* social consciousness, and individuality is itself a social fact. Conversely, society, as distinguished from herds, arises in and through the individuating process, that is, through the increasing notice that one takes of another as an experiencing self. Neither term, then—society or individual—is static; neither merely imposes itself upon the other, but the two are complementary phases of one and the same movement.—G. A. COE, *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 141-143.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIVIDUAL-SOCIAL RECIPROCITY

WHAT was written in the preceding chapter may have seemed to imply that the individual is to be conceived as more or less self-contained, and wholly a law unto himself. But if anything has been made plain by modern psychology and the social sciences generally, it is the fact of the essentially social character of personality.¹ The present discussion will emphasize two points: one, that there is in every man an element profoundly original; the other, that every man is part of a larger social whole, from which he necessarily takes, and to which he necessarily gives.

There was an ancient Greek Sophist named Protagoras, who worked out a maxim which has since become classical. His maxim was: "The individual man is the measure of all things, since the existence of things is determined with reference to him alone."² Working from a quite different standpoint, and in the interests of a quite different purpose, Nietzsche has sought to revive the doctrine in our own day.³ But neither the ancient Greek nor the modern German could make out his case. There is, of course, a very real sense in which personality is an active factor in the creation of its own experience. That is the most satisfactory philosophy, especially from the standpoint of the Christian religion, which holds that "the world" is constituted in and through personality. In that case, the interpretation of the meaning of the world becomes the interpretation of the meaning of personal experience.⁴ But that is a very different kind of philosophy from the rank individualism of either Protagoras or Nietzsche. To do as the Sophist proposed, take the individual man, isolate him from the very condi-

tions without which he could not even have existed, and then elevate him to the dignity of an absolute standard by which all things are to be judged—this is to deal with a pure fiction. There are two errors against which, in the interests of clear thinking, we need to be always on guard. One of them is the denial of the reality of the self. "Among all the errors of the human mind," wrote Lotze, "it has always seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own existence, of which alone it has direct experience; or to take it at second hand as the product of an external nature which we know only indirectly, only by the means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence."⁵ The other error is the denial of the reality of the Not-Self. Every affirmation of selfhood proceeds from the recognition of the other-than-Self. The one is possible only because of the other. They are not to be identified yet they do not exist apart. *What* the one is apart from the other, *whether* the one could be apart from the other—these are quite useless speculations.⁶ We know them only in conjunction. The Not-Self is a necessary factor in the production and determination of the Self, and the Self is a necessary factor in the production and determination of the Not-Self as this is actually known in experience. Subject and object are to each other as the concave and the convex of the same arc.

Studies in anthropology have brought to light two principles as operating through racial history and experience. The two principles are dependence and initiative. We have learned to how large an extent racial characteristics have been determined by geography, climate, and other features of the physical surroundings. We have learned that mountaineers do not choose to live among the mountains because they are hardy of frame and emotional of temperament, but, rather, that they are hardy and emotional as a consequence of the conditions of their life. We have learned that it is proximity to the ocean that to a degree determines a

people as sea-faring just as it is proximity to great natural resources that to a degree determines a people as industrial. What a long story it is, and who is competent to tell it?—the story of the extent to which the great conflicts of human history have grown out of differences of racial dispositions and aspirations, which in their turn were determined by differences of natural environment.⁷ But, on the other hand, we have learned something from the facts of migration. Whole nations or small groups or individuals have deliberately sought a new environment and have rapidly adjusted themselves to radically different conditions. That is suggestive. It is the evidence to the presence in man of a certain native originality, independence, and creativeness, which saves him from being nothing more than a mere echo of what surrounds him.

These same principles, dependence and initiative, are equally operative in the relations of the individual and his society. Let us lay this down in the frankest and most uncompromising manner possible—that the individual is a social deposit. He is a part not only of every man whom he has ever met, but of many whom he has never met nor even heard of. But just because others live in him he also lives in others. He is at once receiver and transmitter, and he is both to a degree that baffles exact description. He is literally the "racial nexus."⁸ It is very easy to carry out this thought to an extreme that renders it incredible. To do that is to destroy the force of one of the most deeply significant aspects of personality. Even when the fact is stated with moderation, it is startling enough. Physical resemblances between parent and child we might expect, but what about resemblances of disposition and character? On the other hand, what about equally striking differences? How many lives have had their current deflected by some apparently trivial circumstance! And one life cannot be so changed without many other lives being changed also. But, again, there is the fact that a human life may refuse

to be profoundly affected by, say, a great appeal or a great cause, and the effects of such a refusal cannot be confined to the particular life concerned. *Suppose that shot had not been fired in Sarajevo* in the summer of 1914, or suppose that the assassin had missed his aim! Such speculation may be useless, but who can resist it? But the shot was fired, and before the reverberations it awakened passed away ten million men had laid down their lives, countless millions of others had been involved in suffering, homes and families that might otherwise have sprung into being became nothing but a dream for broken-hearted women, and the end is not yet, nor ever shall be. The imagination recoils from the impossible task of trying to trace all the implications of that single deed: one may hope even that the omniscience of God does not involve so tragic a task. But there is still another question: *What lay back of that shot?* Of what social forces was an impassioned youth at once the result and the expression? Who had prepared the avalanche which awaited only the fall of a pebble to begin its devastating descent? It is only as such questions are asked and to some extent answered that the full measure of the individual-social reciprocity begins to be apprehended. Without such an apprehension we cannot understand life, we cannot understand some of the deepest currents in contemporary thought, certainly we cannot understand the ways and the purposes of God. So far as the reality of our own experience is concerned, the first great fact is "I," and the second is like unto it, "Thou." And the "I" faces the "Thou," and the "Thou" the "I," as component parts of the same totality, and each says to the other in self-explanation: "All things come of thee, and of thine own have I given thee."

But if this is all that we could say, there would be nothing more to do but to accept the determinist conclusion. It was said just now that the individual translates his physical surroundings without being wholly their victim. So also

is it true that he is more than a merely passive exponent of his social heredity and environment. Few studies have been more fruitful than those that have brought to light the social nature of personality. It is to be questioned, however, whether there has been a sufficient recognition of this feature of originality.⁹ In the end, there is seen to be that in every individual which is not wholly explainable either by that which went before him or by that which is around him. There is that in him by virtue of which he may initiate. The fact would seem to be too obvious to need elaboration, and yet it is often overlooked, namely, that if there were not that initiating power in the individual, then social progress would be impossible. A very little reflection ought to make it plain that if the individual is a social deposit *and nothing more*, then history would become simple repetition. Every individual is a potential creator of new reality. He is a true cause in his own right, hemmed in though he may be by limiting conditions. Where do new suggestions come from if not from the individual? The radical element in social progress is the individual; the conservative element is the group. Now it is just this creative characteristic of individuality that we must not lose sight of. It is that which constitutes the basic peculiarity of the Ego. It is that which makes both possible and intelligible such intensely personal acts as deliberation, choice, and repentance. And it is that which accounts for that element of "surprise" which is being continually flashed upon us by even the most passive victims of things as they are. Carlyle's philosophy of history was really an attempt to explain history by its great personalities—by mythological divinities like Odin, Thor, and Balder; by prophets like Mohammed; by poets like Dante and Shakespeare; by priests like Luther and Knox; by men of letters like Johnson, Rousseau, and Burns; by kings like Cromwell and Napoleon.¹⁰ That is well enough, but how explain the great personalities? Carlyle's own explanation—that they are unheralded outburst-

ings of the Universal Life—is suggestive, but is not agreeable to the modern temper.¹¹ The disposition is to explain the Great Men and the Nation by each other, and this is hardly convincing. An element is needed which the reciprocity alone, greatly potent though it be, cannot account for. It is the element that we are calling the possibility of novel action, rooted in that uncalculable factor to which life owes its persistent freshness, and because of which the individual is able to be not merely an imitator but a creator as well.

The modern danger, it was said above, is that this potential independence of the individual may be overlooked. Indeed, there is every indication that a fierce intellectual struggle is to take place around this point. Formerly, freedom was denied to man on the ground that he was controlled by eternal divine decrees, or on the ground of prior metaphysical theory. To-day the denial is based on the ground that he is absolutely dominated by his social and physical heritage.¹² The modern denial is much the more serious because it can muster a great show of scientific evidence. What we need, and what we may hope will eventually appear, is a philosophy, supported by an adequate sociology, psychology, and ethics, that will embrace the undoubted truth contained in both extremes. The facts in the case require us to believe that there is in the individual a potential independence and a certain peculiarity of selfhood, but that that potentially independent individual is inextricably embosomed in the social *milieu*. We cannot believe that the individual is wholly explained by his social heredity and environment, but neither can we deny that he is explained by it in great measure. If we conceive the situation under the familiar figure of the Potter and the Clay, we may say something like this: that society gives to the individual the clay wherewith he must work, of a texture and color which he cannot alter, the pattern according to which it is expected he will shape his material, and such instructions as

may make him either a skillful or an unskillful workman. But that is not all we must say. We must say also that there is always that in the finished product which could not have been anticipated. There is something which is there because this particular man wrought at it and no other. Out of the unfathomed depths of a creative soul has come forth a hand with a certain power of self-guidance, and it has added a touch which stamps the work forever as the work of *one man*. Nobody else could have done it just this way. No two deeds by two different men can be wholly similar. Every individual, to use Lotze's expression, is a microcosmus, a complete though miniature world, and in every microcosmus there is an element of uniqueness. The influence of others will be apparent in many ways on individual activity and in individual disposition and character, but always on the completed work is one name, and one name alone—the name of that man who at the consummation of the ages must stand forth solitary to face his record, and confess, "I did it." And what no theory of pure determinism, whether biological, sociological, or psychological, can ever quite account for is the fact that sometimes what is done is so much more splendid than could have been foreseen, and we have an Abraham Lincoln, and sometimes it is so much more reprehensible, and we have a Judas Iscariot.

Summary: The general contention of the last Chapter, it will be recalled, was that all action must have a reason, that this reason is in an end, that the end is sometimes more or less clearly defined and sometimes is not consciously apprehended as such at all, and that in either case the end is the correlate of a need which, revealed in desire, is an integral element of the nature of the acting individual. We may now add to this the findings of the present Chapter. There is that in every individual which is peculiar to him alone. In this aspect of him he cannot be duplicated; he cannot be "explained" by reference to anything beyond himself;

and he will not have fulfilled his destiny while this original peculiarity of his remains unsatisfied. He is the way he is *in order that*. But there is also that in him which is there because of his necessary articulation with the social fabric. Being, therefore, social as well as individual, much of his action must necessarily have a social reference. The ends that he seeks he will seek in part because he must act in a social capacity. There will be in him needs which, because they belong to his nature as social, must have as their correlates social ends. Much that he does without his having a well-defined reason for doing will be his response to social pressure. The social heredity, or the social environment, will command, and there will be an imperative note in the command which he will be quick to obey. A social voice rings through the corridors of the being of every individual, and much that he does or refrains from doing, much that he is and can be and much that he is not and cannot be, is to be attributed to the influence, whether consciously or unconsciously felt, of that voice. If, then, we would ascertain the significance of man's fundamental characteristic as seeker of ends, whose activity is prompted by desire, and whose desire points to need as the original source whence all else flows, it is necessary that we do full justice to man's individual-social nature. An irresistible urge toward self-realization, or self-fulfillment, and therefore to self-satisfaction, drives him on. In a word, the individual-social man, with his individual-social needs, points to an individual-social end as the true correlate of this complexity of the fundamental nature.

It will suffice here simply to suggest what appears as the significance of these facts for ethics and religion, namely, that that which has its origin in essential personal need must eventually bring the individual, if he is to discover and realize the full meaning of himself, to altruistic action in which, while self is forgotten, self is deeply satisfied and greatly enriched.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

(1) The popular idea, that this recognition of personality as social is exclusively modern, is utterly erroneous. It is treated at some length in both Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*. Cf. Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 210-215; 287-291.

(2) Windelband, *ibid.*, p. 118.

(3) An authoritative and detailed exposition of Nietzsche is W. M. Salter, *Nietzsche the Thinker*. Chap. xxix deals with "The Ideal Organization of Society," with especial reference to "The Superman." Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, is much less detailed, and as coming from "The Community of the Resurrection" is surprisingly sympathetic.

(4) For a brief bibliography on personalistic philosophy, see note (8), chap. xvi. "The key of all mysteries is man. The first and last, the highest and the surest thing in nature, is the thought which explains nature but which nature cannot explain. And the thought which nature embodies has been progressive, has moved upward to Mind, and a mind that feels its kinship with the Source, the Secret, and the End of all this mysterious system" (Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, bk. i, chap. i, p. 60).

(5) *Microcosmus*, vol. i, p. 263.

(6) Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, *passim*, but especially the opening paragraphs of Lect. VI, "Man as Organic to the World," and the summary in Lect. IX, pp. 176 and 177, where we read: "All through our discussion we have had to struggle against the tendency to treat the world of nature as a fact complete in itself, a system finished without man. . . . Man is organic to nature, and nature is organic to man. It is a false abstraction to try to take the world apart from the central fact in which it so obviously finds expression."

(7) This is a commonplace of the modern histories, especially those written from a sociological standpoint, e. g., Wells' *Outline of History*. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, suggests its fruitful thesis in its title. There is a concrete and suggestive chapter on "Hay and History" in Simkhovitch, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*. "The introduction of grass seed and

clovers marked the end of the dark ages of agriculture. It is the greatest of revolutions, the revolution against the supreme law, the law of the land, the law of diminishing returns and of soil exhaustion" (p. 161).

(8) A very full use of this principle is made in the stimulating and virile volume of Olin A. Curtis, *The Christian Faith*. Professor Curtis' position is stated in chap. x.

(9) Cf. the quotation from Coe at the beginning of this chapter. Coe can be criticized for, if anything, overemphasis on the social factor. A passionate appeal for the fuller recognition of the power of social heredity is Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, chap. x. For a sane discussion of the point in its religious bearings, see J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, chap. iv, "Society and the Individual." Pratt says: "The inborn nature of the individual determines what might be called the *form* of his religious life. The *matter* is chiefly the contribution of society" (p. 74). "Once we have recognized the original psychical endowment of the individual, the influence of society in making him what he is can hardly be exaggerated" (p. 75).

(10) *Heroes and Hero-Worship*.

(11) "A messenger he [the Great Man], sent from the Infinite Unknown with tidings to us. We may call him Poet, Prophet, God—in one way or other, we all feel that the words he utters are as no other man's words. . . . It is from the heart of the world that he comes, he is a portion of the primal reality of things" (*Ibid.*, lect. ii, introductory section).

(12) The literature on this question is endless. A typical recent statement of what amounts to scientific determinism is Sellars, *Evolutionary Naturalism*, which, together with other recent books of similar tendencies, is trenchantly criticized by Pratt, in *Matter and Spirit*, chap. i. "My conclusion can only be," says Pratt, "that the New Materialism has failed to bring forth a single consideration that makes the materialistic hypothesis really easier of acceptance than it was at the time when nearly every thinker gave it up, twenty years ago" (p. 47). Bergson, notwithstanding his great emphasis on the spontaneity of life, can hardly be claimed for freedom. Cf. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 44-55. For a criticism of Bergson, see Flewelling, *Bergson and Personal Realism*, chap. v. An able attempt to

find a *via media* is Everett, *Moral Values*, chap. xii, "The Ethical Interpretation of Freedom." James defends freedom from the pragmatic standpoint in *Pragmatism*, pp. 115ff. G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (Home University Library), chap. vi, attempts to show how freedom is consistent with the principle of causality. The discussion of heredity in Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, vol. ii, lect. xv, should be read by everyone who is perplexed by the facts of heredity. "There is a fresh unification at the beginning of each individual life—a fresh unification that implies some measure of unpredictability and freedom from the past" (p. 499).

CHAPTER IV
MAN AND THE SUPERNATURAL

Thou madest us for thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in thee. Grant me, Lord, to know and understand which is first, to call on thee or to praise thee? and, again, to know thee or to call on thee? For who can call on thee, not knowing thee? . . . And how shall I call upon my God, my God and Lord, since, when I call for him, I shall be calling him to myself? and what room is there within me, whither my God can come into me? Whither can God come into me, God who made heaven and earth? Is there, indeed, O Lord my God, aught in me that can contain thee? Do, then, heaven and earth, which thou hast made, and wherein thou hast made me, contain thee? or, because nothing which exists could exist without thee, doth therefore whatever exists contain thee? Since, then, I too exist, why do I seek that thou shouldest enter into me, who were not, wert thou not in me? Why? Because I am not gone down in hell, and yet thou art there also. For if I go down into hell, thou art there. I could not be then, O my God, could not be at all, wert thou not in me; or, rather, unless I were in thee, of whom are all things, by whom are all things, in whom are all things. Even so, Lord, even so. Whither do I call thee, since I am in thee? or whence canst thou enter into me? For whither can I go beyond heaven and earth, that thence my God should come into me, who hath said, I fill the heaven and the earth?—AUGUSTINE, *Confessions*, bk. i, chaps. i and ii.

CHAPTER IV

MAN AND THE SUPERNATURAL

A CERTAIN type of scientific thought supposes that it has finished with man when he has been zoologically classified. He may be finished with for the purposes of science, but he certainly is not for other purposes which are just as legitimate as those of science. The same charge of incompleteness is to be made against many of the individualistic and socialistic theories of man. It has been made plain, in our discussion so far, that there is in man a unique personal element which has large determinative influence over his action. The fullest recognition has also been made of the significance of the infinitely diverse social entanglements of individual life. The ends that man seeks have been referred to these personal and social factors for their origin and explanation.

But the analysis is not complete. It has left us with a certain "unexplained residue." A man is more than an animal; more than a self-contained individual; more than a fragment of a social whole. The largest possible realization of purely personal ends, and the largest possible realization of purely social ends, would still leave the whole man unsatisfied, and unsatisfied, too, in that aspect of him which is, after all, most distinctively human. Over against the man stands all that which is represented by the term "God," or some other term of like meaning. The rejection of any or all of these various terms, or the explanation of their linguistic origins, is by no means equivalent to rejecting that for which the terms stand.¹ The last word on the idea of God has not been said when its history has been described, or when its changing content has been brought to light, or

when the probable psychological origin of that content has been ascertained. Among the total human actions are those which spring from a need which has its correlate in the "supernatural." All the numerous efforts to trace such actions to baseless superstition, or to the avarice of the priesthood, or to social custom, or to education, or to the desire to explain things, are quite beside the point because they miss the one thing which is really significant. For what is significant here is the fact that man has the *initial capacity* to make responses of this kind. As we have seen, there is an uncalculable element in human nature which is to be traced to the fact that every man possesses a certain uniqueness of native character which makes him what he is—different from every other member of the race. There is an element in human nature which is to be traced to the fact that a man is more than a mere individual: he is a *socius*, finding many of the conditions of his existence determined for him by his necessary articulation with the social amalgam. The individuality and the sociality are equally fundamental, and they point to the existence of ends of which they are the correlates. Without those fundamental qualities to begin with, there could not be the congruous forms of activity. Every actuality must have its ground in a prior possibility. A thing "is" because it "can be," and that "can be" is of the largest value in any attempt to find ultimate meanings. The very fact then—and it is with this that we are immediately concerned—that there are forms of action which are directed to the "supernatural" has evidential value in witnessing to man's possession of a certain capacity. He is able at least to entertain the idea of a "plus" or a "beyond." Religion, and all that goes with it, is rooted in that ability. Man can think of himself as at once dependent upon a reality greater than himself and obligated to it, and he can seek in some way to enter into personal relations with it. It is surely more than mere irrational credulity if one believes that this universal power on man's

part to conceive a "beyond" is an infallible clue to the ultimate nature of man and the ultimate purpose of his existence.

This clue will be even more helpful if what is admittedly a "can" permits of being changed into a "must." Are there undeniable facts which justify the change? To state the question quite baldly: *Must* a man seek after God?—"God" being used here as the equivalent to that super-sensible reality which man is at least able to think about. The question depends upon another which is still more searching: Is there in man not only the power to conceive God but also an elemental "need" which only God can satisfy because God is its correlate, so that while the need remains unmet the man does by that much come short of complete self-realization? It is not difficult to reach an affirmative answer.

(1) The term "God" is always a symbol, and what it represents depends upon a variety of circumstances. The term may connote the personal, or it may connote the impersonal. It may stand for a bare oneness, or it may stand for plurality, or it may stand for unity in plurality. What is represented by the term may range all the way from the grossest materialistic anthropomorphism to the most attenuated idealistic pantheism. Men may be led by their thought of God to the forms of activity so divergent as to be mutually antagonistic. All that has no power to destroy our main contention, which is that man necessarily has the concept of a "something more," and that this is required to complete the circle of ends to which the needs of his very nature give rise. It is probably too much to say that man "necessarily has the idea of God" when the term "God" is given—as it usually is by the ontologists—a definite content.² The great truth that the ontologist is concerned about may be protected, and the questionable features of his claim may be avoided, by one who is satisfied to say no more than that there is native to man "the sense of a beyond"—using the term "beyond," of course, not in

a temporal and spatial sense but in the sense of an adequate and authoritative Power. So integral an element of human nature is this, that if one cannot take it as an index of reality, witnessing at once to an infinity within man and an infinity without, then the only alternative is such a profound distrust of a characteristic human quality as justifies the most ruthless skepticism.

(2) But the sense of a beyond is never that and nothing more. Not only is it inevitable that a man shall have that sense as a constituent element of his nature: it is equally inevitable that he shall do something about it. If in the interest of a proud self-sufficient rationalism he shall decide that that sense of which, in common with all other men, he finds himself possessed, is nothing but a delusion, he has none the less done something about it, and in the very act of rejecting its validity he has at least recognized its insistent presence. But much more than that may be said: no matter on how lofty an ethical plane the man may continue to live who makes that rejection, he has by the rejection debarred himself from certain forms of activity and from certain phases of possible experience which, on any reasonable theory of human life, must appear as every way desirable. We must not lose sight of the principle that has already been emphasized—that widely different “reasons” may lead to substantially identical practical results, just as “reasons” which appear to be identical may lead to quite different consequences. But there is a limit to the application of the principle, and the absolute rejection of “the sense of a beyond,” or “the consciousness of dependence,” or “the idea of God,” or “the categorical imperative” conceived as the divine voice, or however else it may be described, cannot be made without making a difference elsewhere which cannot be justified from the standpoint of the highest human welfare. Briefly, some kind of personal attitude is demanded by the very presence in man of this native quality, and that attitude, whatever it may be, makes a difference in

the personal and social and moral worth of the life concerned.³

(3) The fact of conscience has very great significance in this connection. A common theory of conscience is that it is but the accumulated deposit of race experience as judged by a "pleasure-pain" standard.⁴ We must undoubtedly accept this as a fair account of the origin of much of the accepted *content* of conscience. But the presence in man of the sense of the ought is a quite different thing from the judgment as to *what* ought to be or ought not to be. The actual judgment rests back on the power to make it, and that power is not accidental, it is not something that a man may please himself whether he have it or not: he can no more help having it than he can help having the power to judge that one is not two. Indeed, it would be far from fantastic to define man as "a being who ought and who knows that he ought." The thinking act presupposes the thinking capacity, and it is infinitely more significant as an index to man's true nature that he is able to think than that his thought takes this or that direction. So with conscience and its pronouncements. We judge, "This is right, and I ought to do it." That presupposes not a ready-made infallible standard by which the judgment proceeds, but rather the prior idea of "right." We must agree with Kant that it is incredible that the notion of "right" should be an elemental and indestructible factor of human personality and at the same time have nothing that answered to it. If we can stand in the presence of so ultimate a fact as the intuitive sense, "I ought," and not feel with how great a solemnity it invests human life, we have become sophisticated indeed. Of all the so-called "arguments for the existence of God" this is the least open to the charge of false analogy. "The universe *must* have a cause." At the best that is only an induction from our own limited experience, and it is always possible for one to say that to derive an Uncaused Cause from our experience of cause is to sur-

render the principle we begin with, and that what we experience is never causality proper but only the fact of *connection*, either necessary or fabricated. "Adaptations imply design, and design implies a Designer." But from the time of David Hume's classic attack until William James in our own day the fatal objection has been made: if there is one designer of all, then his Moral Nature and his Beneficence are at once impugned, seeing that natural evil is so universal a fact. "We necessarily have the idea of Infinitely Perfect Being, and such an idea in finite minds requires the existence of such a Being." Kant replied to this that since an idea, as an idea, was none the less perfect when the existence of its object was not included, the idea of a Perfect Being did not necessarily involve its existence. It is a question as to how far Kant was really just to the ontological argument, but apart from that, the ontological reasoning is of a kind that appeals only to minds of a certain type. That something necessarily exists—this we can readily assent to; but what may be the *nature* of this necessary existence is revealed, if at all, not to immediate intuition but only to patient thought. It is a conclusion rather than a postulate.⁵ But the "I ought" provides an essentially different basis from that provided by causality, or teleology, or ontology. It is so utterly inescapable. It is so insistent. It points with such unvarying unanimity in the same direction. The writers of tragedy, from Sophocles to Ibsen, have found it a fruitful theme, and no philosopher worthy of the name, from Socrates to Kant, has ignored its testimony. The "I ought" declares the essentially moral nature of personality. It is a mold into which experience may run all manner of alloy, but the mold itself is indestructible. In any proper sense it belongs to man alone. It not only makes moral progress possible, but it is the guarantee that man will continue in that progress as a condition of his happiness and peace. No sophistry can ever quite destroy its regal quality. No psychology can "explain" it entirely to the vanishing point. It

is there, and it is there because it is there—an absolute, underived, integral element of consciousness. It is there to bear witness to God. It is the evidence to man's divine origin and destiny—the proof that he came from God, needs God, and is meant for God. The orbit of the planet, "leashed with longing," bears no truer witness to the invisible force whose attraction it cannot escape than is borne to the invisible God by the "I ought" in the "abysmal depths of personality." The one condition to moral peace for every created soul is that somewhere, at some time, it shall find its true self in coming to terms with God. Conscience guarantees that that condition will be met, or in the event of failure that the soul will confess itself as *lost*.

Our original question is therefore answered. The question was not only whether there is in man a *capacity* to an end beyond anything which can properly be included in the term "nature," but whether there is in him the *necessity* to such an end. Does man imply God? We answer that if man does not, nothing does. He has an elemental and inescapable sense of a beyond, and the fact of conscience is the final attest that he is obligated to that "beyond," which is therefore to be vested with absolute moral authority. Then *can* man get to God? Let certain forms of religious experience be the answer. But *must* he? Not if "must" is used in the sense that there is no choice in the matter. But he must, if—if the deepest possibility that is in him is to come to its realization. Man is meant for God, and short of God he is not wholly man: Augustine's classic words have expressed that truth for all time. It makes no difference at this point whether God is conceived as a self-sufficient Being wholly distinct from man, or whether he is conceived as nothing more than a necessary constituent idea of human consciousness. Men may bow God over the frontier of their thought, politely thanking him for his provisional services, while they close the gates behind him, but the dismissal is a pure formality, and represents nothing

in actual fact save a delusion. "God created man in his own image," and the satirist rewrites it, "Man created God in his own image," supposing that this banishes God to the realm of the fictitious. But why does it? If man creates his own God, and then worships him and seeks to please him, that only shows how great are man's powers and how deep his needs: it does not show that "God" stands for nothing real and imperative. Whether God creates us or whether we create God makes no ultimate difference to the unchangeable conditions on which alone our moral peace and our lasting blessedness are to be secured. Those conditions are that in intention actually and in achievement ideally the whole course of our life shall be determined with reference to the very highest that we can know or think. "Thy soul and God stand sure." The human involves the divine. God is in every man, "the master-light of all his seeing," and his authority the man must at last recognize, or be broken on the very law which makes him what he is.

"I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
 I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
 I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
 Of my own mind; and in the mist of tears
 I hid from Him, and under running laughter.
 Up vistaed hopes I sped;
 And shot, precipitated,
 Adown Titanic glooms of chasmèd fears,
 From those strong Feet that followed, followed after.
 But with unhurrying chase
 And unperturbèd pace,
 Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
 They beat—and a Voice beat
 More instant than the Feet—
 'All things betray thee, who betrayest Me.'"⁶

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

(1) An admirable review of Theistic discussion covering a very wide range is Beckwith, *The Idea of God*. A greater reliance on the traditional arguments is manifest in Micou, *Basic Ideas in Religion*. In view of the tendency of much modern psychology of religion to explain God "subjectively" (cf. Ames' little book, *The New Orthodoxy*, pp. 48-53; Bridges, *The Religion of Experience*, chap. iii), the chapter on "Belief in God" in Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, is significant. "Through all the ages," says Pratt, "men have truly meant by 'God' something more than the idea of God, something truly transcendent" (p. 209).

(2) Cf. Descartes, *Meditations*, iii and v, and *Discourse on Method*, pt. iv. Descartes states his position concisely in *Principles of Philosophy*, pt. i, prop. xiv. "When the mind afterward reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them—that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in this idea there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought manifestly to conclude that this all-perfect Being exists." For discussion, see Beckwith, *ibid.*, especially chap. x, and Micou, *ibid.*, chap. ix. One of the ablest of living American philosophers, W. E. Hocking, declares, in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, that the ontological argument, so far from being discredited, is the only proof of God there is. See chap. xxii. "This same ontological argument is the only one which is wholly faithful to the history, the anthropology, of religion. It is the only proof of God" (p. 307).

(3) James Orr, in *The Christian View of God and the World*, appendix to lect. ii, gives a collection of testimonies by skeptics

as to the effect on them of the surrender of positive religious belief. Thus Renan, having surrendered the "ancient dreams," confessed: "Candidly speaking, I fail to see how, without the ancient dreams, the foundations of a happy and noble life are to be relaid."

(4) Cf. Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, chap. iii. Much more satisfactory, from the Christian standpoint, is Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Re-Making*, chaps. xiv and xv. "The 'you ought' . . . appeals to a strand of self-judgment which is original with every individual, and in this sense belongs to original human nature" (p. 94). See also his *Meaning of God*, Appendix ii, § iii, pp. 551ff.

(5) These remarks on the three "arguments" are only intended to emphasize their necessarily inconclusive character, not to imply that they have no worth at all.

(6) Francis Thompson, *The Hound of Heaven*, first stanza.

CHAPTER V
THE FACTS OF LIFE

In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's everyday performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives; and in a large proportion of cases after protracted tortures such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures. . . . Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this Nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest and worst; upon those who are engaged in the highest and worthiest enterprises, and often as the direct consequence of the noblest acts; and it might almost be imagined as a punishment for them. . . . Next to taking life (equal to it, according to a high authority) is taking the means by which we live; and Nature does this too on the largest scale and with the most callous indifference. A single hurricane destroys the hopes of a season; a flight of locusts, or an inundation, desolates a district; a trifling chemical change in an edible root starves a million of people.—JOHN STUART MILL, *Essay on Nature*, pp. 28-30 (Holt & Co.'s Uniform Library Edition).

CHAPTER V

THE FACTS OF LIFE

IT is customary to look with a certain good-natured contempt on the disposition some people manifest to glorify the past. But the disposition bears witness to a very real problem. Men have felt the incongruity that exists between what is and what ought to be. They have not always been satisfied to put the ideal in the distant future, and rest in the hope that at last the ideal and the actual will coincide. They have viewed the present state of affairs less as an introduction to something better that is yet to be than as a lapse from a condition of blessedness that once existed. Whether the Genesis tradition of the Garden of Eden represents sober history or not, it certainly represents a very genuine instinct in the human mind—the instinct for the ideal. The Greek form of the tradition of the Golden Age—a tradition practically universal—has the same significance. As Hesiod tells it, the earth and all it contained was then fresh from the hands of the gods; men lived long, and died as peacefully as a child falls asleep; no ills afflicted the bodies of men and no anxieties harassed their minds; truth and good will everywhere prevailed because men of their own freedom did by each other as they should; and all the needs of men were met by nature spontaneously: “the rivers flowed with milk and wine, while yellow honey distilled from the oaks.” This, like its various parallels, may in its form be only a poetic fancy, but such imaginations do not spring into being for nothing.¹ They are symbols of men’s protest against things as they are. They are attempts to find a reason for *hope*. Indeed, in the Greek tradition of the origin of the present sad state of affairs it is significant that when to punish man for accepting from Prometheus the gift of fire,

Zeus sent Pandora to earth with a jar full of noxious plagues, which through Pandora's curiosity escaped and spread everywhere, there remained at the bottom of the jar the single blessing of hope which, unknown to Zeus, had been placed in the jar by one of the gods. The blessing was at once a reminder and a promise. Perhaps Plato was not so fantastic as we sometimes think when, in seeking to find a philosophical basis for the facts of life, he propounded the theory of a preexistent heavenly state which men had not been able to maintain, but of which the process of knowledge was the continually growing recollection, as it was also the guarantee that that state would eventually be wholly regained. The famous "myth" of the *Phædrus*, and its modern echo in Wordsworth's great *Ode*, surcharged as it is with the very spirit of Plato, will never fail to awaken a response in human hearts.²

It is not difficult for one to be an optimist in the rather cheap sense which that word has come to have. Leibnitz and Browning seem ready to do service here. From the one may be quoted: "This is the best of all possible worlds," and from the other: "God's in his heaven: All's right with the world." But both statements, taken just as they stand, and with the meaning that is all too often attached to them, may be made to do their authors the gravest injustice. Leibnitz called the world the best possible because he was seeking to defend God's goodness in the face of all the perplexing facts of life. Many worlds were possible, he said, and we must think of God as passing in review these various worlds, and then electing to make real not the best world but the best of the worlds that were possible. But that implies a distinction between the absolute best and the possible best. This world is not the absolute best. It could not be. In the very act of creation God comes into antagonism with finite limitations. The very conditions, namely, finitude and materiality, under which God must create if he create at all, are the same conditions which render evil inevitable. We

may, if we choose, call such a view optimistic, but the optimism is in the belief that the world, evil as it is, is the best that God could make it, not in any belief that a better is neither thinkable nor desirable. In the very world which is held to testify to God's goodness are facts which seem flatly to deny him. Leibnitz did not ignore the facts as he sought to vindicate the goodness.³ So, too, with Browning. Undoubtedly the song that Pippa sang expressed the poet's own deepest convictions; but the song must be considered in the light of *The Ring and the Book*. Who can follow the devious career of Guido, and stand by the death-bed of the saintly Pompilia, victim of her husband's fiendish hate, and listen to the dreadful shriek of agony of the condemned man—not without some hope, for it ends on Pompilia's name—as the Brotherhood of Death enter his cell to prepare him for the end—who can read that, and call Browning's optimism a cheap and easy creed? Browning had hope of the world because he had confidence in a God in his heaven, and in the end it is only through a like confidence that any other man can rationally cherish a like hope.⁴

The true optimist differs from the pessimist chiefly in his possessing a point of view which permits of a more comprehensive survey than is possible to the pessimist. There is a very considerable "Literature of Pessimism," and the dreadful thing about it is that it is for the most part true. It is false only as all misproportion, over-emphasis, and partial statement must be false. "The dramas of doubt," from *The Book of Job* to *Faust*, from *Prometheus Bound* to *Peer Gynt*, are the poignant outburst of men who had watched the solemn scene of "a will in conflict with destiny,"—the essence of tragedy, according to Matthew Arnold.⁵ It is not without reason that men in all ages of the world, looking out upon the

". . . darkling plain,
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night,"

have confessed themselves appalled by what they have seen. The indictment of cosmic equity which such men have prepared cannot be dismissed with an airy wave of the hand and a smile of superior wisdom as the advice is given them to remove their blue spectacles and take better care of their health! There is a natural expectation in the human mind that if Moral Goodness is at the heart of things, the evidence to it will be clear and emphatic. But is there such evidence? It is probable that the streams of fierce invective—like that of Mill—that men have poured out so passionately against the facts of life witness more to a heart-breaking disappointment that things are as they are than to any desire to destroy the faith and hope of mankind.

Many dire consequences have been traced to the influence of the theory of evolution, not always with sufficient reason.⁶ But there can be no question that for a great number of people the detailed description of the cosmic processes has had the effect of creating a profound skepticism concerning the presence in these processes of any underlying purpose or goodness. The millions of years in which the world has been in the making; the certainty that the same "forces" which have made it will at last unmake it; the monstrous and repulsive forms assumed by life throughout vast periods; the unbelievable profligacy of "nature" in the production of life and its equally unbelievable ruthlessness in the destruction of it; the dreadful cataclysms which must again and again have convulsed the earth, to the accompaniment of suffering and death for sentient existence; the bitterness of the struggle which human beings must have had to wage once they emerged on the arena; the animalism, the cunning, the rapacity, the almost utter lack of those qualities that we think of as distinctively human which, by all accounts, characterized our primitive ancestors—who can read the story, even what little of it we have been able to piece together, without feeling that those conditions have been rendered more complicated under which he seeks to

keep faith in a cosmic plan and purpose, faith in himself, faith in God?

Theories of natural evil there have been in plenty, but they cannot change the facts with which they deal. If anything, they only make them the more apparent. "The creation speaketh a universal language," exclaimed Thomas Paine in a famous rhapsody.⁷ Does it? If it does so speak, the man has not yet appeared who can interpret the language to the satisfaction of all. A Turner may interpret for us the quiet beauty of an English landscape; a Wordsworth may interpret for us the evasive mood of a wood, a river, or a cloud; a Händel may sit at his organ and tell us what the storm means to him from its first low moan to its last expiring sigh. That is well enough, and we are grateful, but there is another possible side to the story. The same storm that inspired the musician may have sent the fisherman to his grave. In the "vernal wood," whence come those "impulses" which taught the poet "more of God and man" than he ever learned from the sages, lurk those dangers which may lure to a horrible death the woodsman's unsuspecting child. Over the quiet landscape, with its rain and fog, which ravished the artist's eye, the disheartened farmer may look at his sodden crops, the while he ponders the pitiless irony of things. It is easy to smile at this, and call it fantastic—provided you are the artist rather than the farmer, the musician rather than the fisherman! The man who does not sometimes feel every vestige of his manhood rise up in revolt against nature and nature's ways, is either no man at all, or he lacks imagination, or he is a fatalist, or he is a quietist, or he has through much tribulation reached the vantage-ground of Christian faith.

The problem here raised becomes even more difficult when one introduces into it the ways of man. One may always find a little relief in viewing the somber aspects of nature by falling back on the thought that it is all so "impersonal." After all, nature does not *mean* to do this. Mill's indictment

appears to assume that Nature is personal, and takes a certain fiendish satisfaction in inflicting suffering. That is a grave fallacy to be perpetrated by so keen a logician. One may even believe that much of the suffering of sentient life is really an addition to the facts arising from the activity of the imagination of the spectator.⁸ Every such suggestion of relief is gladly to be welcomed. But we find little such relief as we study the facts of life as these are due to mankind. Men suffer because the "impersonal forces" of nature smite them ruthlessly, and often with no discoverable reason for it in the character of sufferers. This, in a way, we can understand. But the deliberate infliction of injury on one man by another is a quite different thing. To speak of man as nature's child, and then to arraign nature as an unnatural mother—this is to deal very largely in metaphor. But it is not metaphor when one speaks of men as brothers, and then goes on to recount the long and painful story of "man's inhumanity to man." More and more are we coming to see to what an extent the anti-social is of the essence of sin. Indeed, no definition of sin can be adequate for our day which does not recognize its anti-social aspect.⁹ After all, sin is against God only because it is also against man. Blasphemy shocks us far more than oppression, but it is safe to say that God can more easily forgive the blasphemer than he can the tyrant. "Curse God and die!" bade Job's wife. But did not the three "friends" more deserve to die for seeking to render it more difficult for the suffering man to keep his faith? The true evidence to divine sonship is brotherhood, and that man is son of God in no proper sense, greatly pious though he may seem to be, in whose heart there is no love for his kind.

Man alone is dignified by the possession of the sense of a beyond, the feeling that he is potentially greater than all natural forces, and yet he can make the maxim of his life, "Eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die." Man alone possesses the power to plan and execute on a

large scale, involving the relating together of things most remote in time, in distance, and in character, and yet he can put behind his plan a motive of utter selfishness, so that his plan as it is realized entails loss, suffering, and death for many others. Man alone hears a voice, "Thou oughtest," and he answers, "I know that I ought, but I will not." Finite, he can defy the Infinite. Weak, he can defy Omnipotence. Able to choose God, he can spurn him. In him the power to rise, he can choose to sink. Set off from God that so he might at last unite himself to God in a blessed and satisfying fellowship, he can erect between himself and God a barrier as of "brass and triple steel." Meant to be the master of his lot, he can be its slave. Born for a purpose to whose progress all the facts of his life may contribute, he may make for some alien port, "he knows not where, some false impossible shore." O man, what a heaven is within thy reach—and what a hell! What glory—and what shame! What a life—and what a death!

Pain, which is a physical defect; error, which is a mental defect; sin, which is a moral defect; the sense of impotence, which is the inevitable concomitant of such defects—these belong to life. The conditions which make them possible are inseparable from life, as it is at present organized. The whole constitution of things is ordered with reference to their possibility. These are the facts, and we gain nothing by ignoring them. They demand to be faced. But it is possible to face them in such a way as to read out of them a message of pessimism and despair. Epicurus faced them, and asked his famous question: "If God is at once all-wise, all-good, and all-powerful, whence cometh evil?"¹⁰ Lucretius faced them, and could see no alternative to the belief that the world came together by chance, and that the gods were supremely indifferent to its fate.¹¹ Omar Khayyám faced them, and he uttered what may or may not be regarded as a perilous approach to blasphemy: "Do Thou forgive us for having sinned, and we will forgive thee for having made

us so that we must sin!"¹² David Hume faced them, and he said: "I find no clear evidence in either nature or history to the existence of an Infinite Benevolence."¹³ Schopenhauer faced them, and he declared that since pain so greatly and of necessity outweighed pleasure, life was a calamity and death the one boon.¹⁴ Matthew Arnold faced them, and notwithstanding that he wrote, "The aids to noble life are all within," and "There is a Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness," he wrote also what have been called among the saddest lines in the English language, *Dover Beach*.¹⁵ And Nietzsche, racked with pain, verging on insanity, faced them, and he uttered his bitter protest: "The only vice is weakness; the only virtue is strength. Care nothing for anybody but yourself. The race is to the swift, and the battle is to the strong. Be hard! Be a superman! All is yours: take it—if you can get it."¹⁶

Amid our ease and indifference, we hear these men. And they challenge us: "You of the armchair virtues and easy dogmatism, you of the infallible yardstick with which you can measure all things without remainder, we issue join. This is what we say. *How say you?*"

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

(1) See Bullfinch, *Age of Fable*, chap. ii. The various traditions may be read in S. G. Case, *The Millennial Hope*, chaps. i and ii.

(2) In the *Phaedrus*, Plato throws into the form of a "myth," or pictorial representation, his belief in the preexistence and immortality of the soul. "But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form, for man ought to have intelligence, as they say, '*secundem speciem*,' proceeding from many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; and this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw when in company with God—when looking down from above on that which we now call being, and upward toward the

true being. . . . As has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man" (§ 249, Jowett's translation).

(3) See J. T. Merz, *Leibnitz* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), pp. 165ff.

(4) See H. Jones, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*, chaps. iv and v.

(5) Cf. Arnold's poem, *A Summer Night*.

(6) Among the many recent books which in the spirit of Fiske and Drummond challenge Huxley's and Mill's theory of nature as a "gladiatorial show," one of the most readable is Patten, *The Grand Strategy of Evolution*.

(7) "The Creation speaketh an universal language, independently of human speech or human language, multiplied and various as they may be. It is an ever-existing original, which every man can read. It cannot be forged; it cannot be counterfeited; it cannot be lost; it cannot be altered; it cannot be suppressed. It does not depend upon the will of man whether it shall be published or not; it publishes itself from one end of the earth to the other. It preaches to all nations and to all worlds; and this *word of God* reveals to man all that is necessary for man to know of God."—*The Age of Reason*, p. 40.

(8) Cf. J. A. Thomson, *System of Animate Nature*, vol. ii, lect. xviii, § 6. He says: "We must beware of anthropomorphic exaggeration" (p. 587). On p. 588, he quotes A. R. Wallace as follows: "The popular idea of the struggle for existence entailing misery and pain on the animal world is the reverse of the truth."

(9) More fully discussed in chap. x.

(10) See Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics*, chap. xviii.

(11)

"E'en though the rise of things I ne'er could prove,
Yet dare I, from the heaven's defective frame,
And many a scene alike perverse, affirm
No power divine this mass material reared
With ills so gross, so palpable to sight."

(*De Rerum Natura*, J. M. Good's translation, bk, v, lines 206-210.)

(12)

"Oh, Thou, who Man of baser Earth didst make
And ev'n with Paradise devise the Snake:

For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
Is blacken'd—Man's Forgiveness give—and take!"

(*The Rubaiyat*, quatrain lxxxi.)

(13) *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. For a discussion of the *Dialogues*, see Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, lect. i.

(14) For a brief statement, see Schopenhauer's *Essay on Suicide*.

(15) "I sometimes think the saddest poem in the English language is 'Dover Beach,' with its despairing last lines" (Oscar Kuhns, *A One-Sided Autobiography*, p. 157). The last lines of the poem read:

"Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night."

(16) For a typical Nietzsche statement, see *Beyond Good and Evil*, chap. ii, on "The Free Spirit," ¶ 44.

CHAPTER VI

THE FACTS AS CONDITIONS TO VALUES

Reflection, however, comes at last to believe that it cannot discover what man is merely from a consideration of his factual nature; or perhaps rather the truth is, that by this very consideration our attention is drawn to many strivings to which his nature prompts, and the object of which is not mere self-preservation but the attainment of some end existing in imagination. It is impossible for the mind which has been roused to reflection to consider human existence without asking, What is its origin, what its place and significance in the world, what will be its end or what its future life? . . . We believe that we are called to be workers together in the construction of a spiritual order, and however obscure its plan and the import of our own share in the work may be, still we feel that everything which seems to us to be a duty has its final ground of obligation in its correspondence not with the conception of our nature as it is in fact, but with the end to which it is destined. And this end consists not in mere self-development, the impulse to which works through the germ and as it were from the past into the future, but in movement toward a goal that is set before us.—LOTZE, *Microcosmus*, Vol. I, Bk. 5, Chap. V, p. 709.

CHAPTER VI

THE FACTS AS CONDITIONS TO VALUES

THE picture that was drawn in the last chapter was true to the facts, but it was not the whole truth. The facts are as described. But we do not exhaust the significance of the world by describing its "facts," or by presenting it as "a system of facts." Besides the facts there are the meanings. Besides the process there is the purpose. Besides that which is there is that which may be. Plato and Aristotle, with clear insight, saw that when we had found the purpose we had found a vital element in the cause.¹ Kant, in his theory of the moral will and its correlate the moral law, introduced into modern thinking the conception of an absolute value whose validity all things could attest and nothing could destroy.² Lotze, seeking to effect a junction of naturalism and idealism, found a clue in the great thought that since what ought to be is the real ground of what is, the system of facts is but the body of conditions for the realization of a system of values.³ Höffding, pondering the significance of the universality, permanence, and indestructible character of religion, found it in the idea of man's abiding sense of value and his determination to conserve it in the interest of his own blessedness.⁴ William James, weary of metaphysical abstractions which nobody could prove to be either true or false, and whose truth or falsity, if proved, could make no practical difference to anybody, found satisfaction in the reflection that since we are living in a world which we do not make but find, and since it is our particular business to "get about" in this very real world in that way which the world itself demands, then those ideas, principles, and actions which best promote this manifest purpose are those

which have real value and truth.⁵ More recently, Sorley has rendered inestimable service to the cause of man's higher interests by restating with telling force the argument that it is in the self-attesting reality of moral values that we find the final reason for the reality of God.⁶

Is there suggested here a principle which will help to transform the facts of life, and make it possible for us to see in them a rich and luminous meaning? And especially do we ask whether we can ally this principle in some vital way with the message and work and character of Jesus Christ?

There are always two possible attitudes that a person may take up toward any "fact." The term is used in its most comprehensive sense, to indicate anything of which we have or may have personal experience. The fact may be regarded as simply one more item in the totality of things. There may be no interest in it beyond the mere recognition of its existence. It could, indeed, be shown that the recognition of the fact is at the same time its creation. From this point of view there is no such thing as "a bare fact." The fact as known has become an element in a human experience, and that involves the activity of the person concerned. That activity is involved so closely that to abstract it is to destroy the fact as represented. In other words, where there is no person there is no experience, and where there is no experience there is no fact in any intelligible sense. But waiving this aspect of the question, we are still justified in regarding a fact from the standpoint of its own intrinsic nature, and from the standpoint of what it can be made to mean for the course of our life. That we live much of our life below the personal level is undeniable, and where the person is submerged in the cosmic flow there is necessarily no consciousness of this distinction between intrinsic nature and possible meaning. There are many reasons why no life is or could be expressive of deliberate personal intention at every moment. But where there is full self-

awareness, there is the possibility of this distinction being made. It is precisely this distinction which underlies Paul's great saying, "All things work together for good to them that love God." He does not mean that there is some inherent virtue in "all things," because of which they automatically convey good to men of a certain character. He means, rather, that things apparently alike in all respects may by different men be made to bear a totally different meaning. Nothing that we can say about a fact, nothing that we can say about some personal experience, can make it any otherwise than it is, in itself considered. But we can so *use* the fact or experience as to compel it to contribute to the realization of an end with which, apart from this activity of ours, it has no direct relation. A thousand dollars is a thousand dollars: that, and nothing more. But it represents also so much possibility. It has no "intrinsic" value. Its value is in what it can be made to mean in relation to a desired end, and in that case the value is a variant depending on many conditions. Through the same cause, two different men lose their fortune or their health. The event is a loss, and can only be so described. As it stands, it belongs in the scheme of things as a late frost in spring—destructive, but natural. If the antecedents of the loss are traced out, it appears as an inevitable attendant on a series of causes and effects. But, after all, no such loss can befall a man without his giving it some sort of meaning. He must do something about it. If one may use the much-abused term, a "reaction" must be made which will definitely incorporate the experience into the structure of responsible personal character. Now, one of the men in question may become soured by his loss. He may use it as a ground on which to indict the equity of existence. He may ridicule the notion of Providence. The suggestion that there is a beneficent purpose in life may only anger him—may perhaps move him to blasphemy. He has, then, done something about his loss. He has given it a meaning which was not

there of necessity, but which was there when he put it there. Loss, in itself considered, proves nothing at all except the fitness of a certain cause to produce this as its effect. What it may be used to mean beyond this depends wholly on the attitude of the person. And if he wants to use it to prove malevolence, no one can enjoin him from so doing.

But there is another attitude possible, and we will suppose it to have been taken by the second man. It is such an attitude as that of the pioneer who sees in the wilderness a potential home, and by infinite patience seeks to bring forth his vision into reality. He compels difficulties to become his servants. So this man, standing amid what appears to be wreckage, may wrest from it a value. He lays his experience under tribute for the sweetening and strengthening of moral character. "Dauntless the slug-horn to his lips he sets," and peals forth the note of victory. It is easy to be skeptical here, but the skepticism must take note of the testimony of human experience; such testimony, for example, as is so graphically summarized in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The scholars have compelled us to surrender as actually spoken by Job the courageous words: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust him"; but they would be the last to dispute the fact that the incorrect translation exactly expresses Job's real attitude. Jeremiah sees his nation destroyed, but in the darkest hour he reiterates his confidence that the success of a heathen power, so far from defeating God's gracious purpose, will be seen at last to further it. Out of the agony of crucifixion Jesus brings into clearer light the wisdom and power of God. In afflictions oft, Paul does with them as the oyster does with the grain of sand: converts the irritant into an occasion of rarest beauty. Augustine's memory of a vicious youth serves him to magnify the unfathomable grace of the Sovereign God who could stoop to save so vile a sinner as he. Rutherford, by the sheer power of an exultant faith, makes the prison the presence-chamber of God,⁷ and the modern

world's greatest message of man's essential deathlessness was written by Tennyson from out of the very shadow of his staggering loss. The very conditions which create for the soldier the possibility of cowardice are the conditions from which he may none the less wrest the deed of heroism. In a word, what in itself is not a value may be used as an instrument by which value is realized.

The conditions to achievement of this sort in such circumstances are two: an end, and a person conceiving that end and assigning it absolute value.

We consider the person first. Nothing impersonal can possibly yield the clue to the nature and meaning of the world. The person is the *sine qua non* of all "experience." The world is not a great independent reality which thrusts itself on the man whether or no. The Self is very much more than a passive spectator of an ever-changing panorama. There are as many different worlds as there are different persons. The apprehension of the world depends upon the activity of him who apprehends it. Since, therefore, the world exists as experience, and since there is no experience without an experient subject, the destruction of the person involves the destruction of his world. This is not meant to deny the fact of a "given" element in experience: pure subjectivism is as irrational as pure empiricism. But it is saying that that given element is only so much "raw material" which it is the peculiar function of personality to reduce to order according to principles pertaining to both itself and the object. It is just this recognition of the constructive nature of personality which makes it impossible to derive personality from the impersonal. Even the very concept, "impersonal," depends upon the person whose the concept is. To suppose that that which is not personal can wholly account for that which is, when personal activity is the very condition out of which the contrast of the personal and the impersonal arises—this is a supposition which a little clear thinking should quickly dispose of.⁸

Yet this attempt to explain the higher terms by the lower—the organic in terms of the inorganic, life in terms of death, thought in terms of things, spirit in terms of matter, the personal in terms of the impersonal—this attempt has been made again and again in the history of thought, and it is with us still. That without which the fact and the order of experience itself could not be, is treated as though it were a more or less incidental *result* of experience instead of, as it properly is, an active *cause* of it. The world may very well have other significance than that which it has for personal life.⁹ There is a scale of values, and therefore a scale of meanings, and a meaning is still a meaning even although it may not be ultimate. But it still remains that one's interest in the world is in the world as one knows it, and the world as one knows it depends, as known, on the knower.

We consider next the end to which value is assigned. As we have seen, the function of personality is to combine with the "given" elements of experience to produce its orderly world. This must be held to involve also a susceptibility on the part of the "given" to be so treated. In thus creating his experience of the world, the person is controlled both by his own nature as a person who carries within himself the rational principle, and by the nature of "the raw material." It is an achievement concerning which he has no choice, for his very being consists in the fact that he does this. But this is not his greatest power. He is capable also of evolving an order and a meaning out of the facts of his experience which the facts not only do not of themselves yield, but which considered merely as facts they may be just as well held to deny. He can read into things a meaning that is not there except as he reads it in. He can do that because, as a person, he has the power to conceive an end, to assign to that end a certain value, even an absolute value, and then to compel things to contribute to its realization. Still in his capacity as creative personality he can go even further, and say that because these things, diverse, chaotic, and contra-

dictory as they seem to be when considered as separate facts, are by him converted into means to this end, therefore this end and its concomitant value is the final reason why the things are as they are. To put the contention in one single statement: the world of things, or, as Lotze would say, the system of facts, exists as the condition through which personality, as rational and creative principle, may realize an end of such self-evidencing worth as not only accounts for but also justifies this condition to its realization.

What is that end? One is conscious of an apparent temerity in raising the ancient question, but the nature of the present argument demands that it be asked and answered. It cannot be pleasure in the Epicurean sense, for if one thing is at all certain it is that much necessarily enters into every person's experience which can in no way at all be held to make an actual or even a potential contribution to such pleasure. It cannot be utility, even of the exalted kind that Mill advocated, for one would have still to ask: Useful for what or for whom? Useful to what end? and such questions imply that there is something beyond, which the utilitarian answer does not reach. It cannot be blessedness, as Lotze and Carlyle believed, for blessedness is an attendant condition on something. It may be an inseparable consequence, but it is a consequence nevertheless, and not an independent value. That only can be held to be the final reason of things which all things are capable of promoting, and this is true equally for the social as for the individual point of view. And that one thing to which every single fact and circumstance of life may contribute is moral character in personality. The personality in which, as we have seen, the world is constituted, or through which it is construed, is that in which resides also the power to use such a world as an instrument to the realization of another world whose worth is axiomatic—the world of moral goodness. There is no such goodness in things. There is no goodness anywhere except as there is a person who realizes it in

himself. The notion that there is an abstract reality called Goodness, wholly detached from anything else, a self-existent and self-sufficient eternal entity, capable of neither increase nor decrease, which men may, if they will, appropriate, is utterly unphilosophical. Goodness, moral goodness, is never anything but a quality of personality. It may, indeed, exist as an ideal while it is yet unrealized, but its reality is precisely in the degree in which it is made actual in personal achievement.¹⁰

It is sometimes said that the reason why the world is as it is because only under conditions such as these could moral character be produced. But such a statement is going beyond the warrant of the facts. This is not the position being maintained in the present discussion. The most we are justified in saying is not that the assumed end or purpose of the world could not have been realized except through the conditions that now obtain, but that through these conditions man is actually in process of realizing moral goodness which is not implicit in the conditions, but which the conditions yield because man compels them to. This is possible because it is man's very nature to seek ends, because the fact of those ends is revealed to him by fundamental and permanent needs, and because his nature is so big a thing that within the limits of the world itself no end is presented that is capable of wholly satisfying and realizing it. In the interests of his true self he must project an end for which he finds no justification except in the needs from which it springs and the experience to which it leads. The end, therefore, appears as a postulate according to which he endeavors to order the course of his life. The postulate is made, not under irresistible logical necessity but because the deepest needs of life prompt to it. The projection of such an end, so conceived and so evaluated, is an act of faith, and the course of life which it calls for is likewise characterized by faith. Then is it not "irrational"? Rather than being irrational, the making of such a postulate, with

the function here assigned to it, provides for that which must always be the ideal of reason, although reason has not discovered its nature and content, namely, a single unitary principle according to which the course and the meaning of the world may be explained and a common possibility be impressed upon all its otherwise contradictory and chaotic elements. But necessarily faith brings that ideal or end into the world from without: it subsumes the mundane order under a supramundane order. To do this is to give the world a religious conception, and to establish finally the identity of the ideal of reason, the ethical ideal, and the religious ideal. That identity is found, if at all, in an end to which the whole range of experience may be related, and through the relation reduced to unity and given a meaning. Of so comprehensive an end we can confidently say that it has absolute value and constitutes the reason why all things are as they are.

We may now state more precisely the two guiding points which the discussion has revealed:

(1) Man is constituted with reference to moral goodness. This does not mean that he will come to moral goodness whether or no. But it does mean that there is in him such a fundament of moral capacity, and that this capacity is so truly his distinctive mark, that nothing short of an end that will give it the fullest exercise and bring it to complete expression will ever afford him permanent satisfaction. There is in man's own nature an abiding guarantee that he must find in moral goodness all that it is in him to be, or perish, in the sense of missing that one thing for whose sake he exists. A lost man is not a man blotted out of existence, or one consigned at some final assize to everlasting torture. A lost man is one who has deliberately refused to go that way which his whole nature shows that he is intended to go.¹¹

(2) The world is constituted with reference to moral goodness. Here again it must be said that there is nothing

in the nature of the world as such that will bring goodness into being automatically. Moral goodness is always an achievement, and it is achieved by a person through contact with the world. But what the contact shall produce must be determined by something which is contributed not by the world but by the person, namely, an end. Such an end being conceived, the world provides the necessary conditions of its realization. The world may therefore be held to be constituted with reference to such an end. Canvas and colors can of themselves do nothing, but the skillful artist compels them to serve the purpose of his thought. They are raw material constituted with reference to what he can make them do, that is, to the expression and realization of an idea. Man is an artist, and the world is his canvas and colors, having no other meaning than to make possible to him the realization of an end or value believed to be of absolute worth.

But what has all this ratiocination to do with Jesus Christ? Much every way. For (1) he, and he alone, has revealed man's true end, which reason, while pointing toward it, is unable to describe; and (2) he has revealed the secret whereby every man may realize it on his own behalf.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

(1) The philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle was "teleological," that is, sought to explain the process in the light of the "end" to be realized. This is one of the many reasons for the Christian value of these ancient thinkers. Bergson criticizes what he calls "radical finalism" (*Creative Evolution*, Eng. trans., pp. 39-45), but finalism "in a special sense" he accepted (pp. 53-55).

(2) See Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, lect. ii, "Kant and Intrinsic Value." "The process can only be rightly judged in the light of what we take to be the end in view. . . . Kant insisted that the preliminary to all fruitful discussion is to make clear to

ourselves what we mean, or can intelligibly mean, by an ultimate End. This Kant fixes through the idea of *value or worth* which he puts in the forefront of his ethics. This idea is fundamental, I think, in all constructive thought since Kant's time" (p. 27).

(3) See the closing sections of the *Metaphysics*, and cf. Sorley, below, pp. 3-8.

(4) *Philosophy of Religion*, *passim*. Höffding writes: "It will thus be seen that in its innermost essence religion is concerned not with the comprehension, but with the valuation of existence, and that religious ideas express the relation in which actual existence, as we know it, stands to that which, for us, invests life with its highest value. For the core of religion—at any rate, according to the hypothesis which we have been led to adopt—consists in the conviction that no value perishes out of the world" (p. 6).

(5) A popular statement of James' position is in either *Pragmatism* or *A Pluralistic Universe*.

(6) W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. This is one of the great modern discussions in the spirit of Kant and Lotze.

(7) The modern interest in Christian Mysticism could well find a large place for *The Letters of Samuel Rutherford*, edited by Andrew Bonar. It is significant that about one half of them were written 1636-1638, while Rutherford was suffering exile for his religious convictions.

(8) Cf. Bowne, *Personalism*, especially the chapter on "The Failure of Impersonalism."

(9) The strength of philosophical Realism is its insistence on our inescapable sense of the independent reality of the objective world. Certain idealists, especially the so-called Pan-psychists and Monadologists, try to do justice to this sense while still making everything psychical or spiritual. An exposition and defense of this point of view may be read in Lotze, *Microcosmus*, bk. iii, chap. iv on "Life in Matter."

(10) These remarks are not intended as denying the Platonic principle that the "idea" is the necessary *prius* to the forms of its own manifestation.

(11) This is very clearly the meaning of Jesus' three parables, the Lost Coin (out of circulation), the Lost Sheep (away from

"the fold"), and the Lost Son (away from "home"). "The lost life is the life going in the wrong direction, or acting according to the wrong law, or in the wrong way" (F. J. McConnell, *Personal Christianity*, pp. 37 and 38).

CHAPTER VII

THE PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF CHRIST:
IN HIS RELATION TO GOD

If we regard the life of Christ as a mechanism, we not only do away with the distinction between Christ and nature, but give the lie to our own experience of his spiritual personality. Moreover, we should only be justified in relinquishing our recognition of Christ's personal and human independence, if we could permanently, from the Divine standpoint, trace the controlling presence of God, and the special limitations under which it works. But this we are not in a position to do. While, therefore, our religious judgment is to the effect that God is not merely with him (Acts 10. 38; John 8. 29), but in him (John 14. 10; 17. 21), that his characteristic activities are the activities of God, that his love to men, as the motive of all his conduct, is identical with the love of God, yet we are compelled to alternate this judgment with others which express the ethical independence of Christ under the category of human freedom. . . . The older theology betrays how very limited is the interest it takes in the ethical apprehension of Christ, by the fact that the prophetic and kingly functions of Christ are never so much as examined to see whether they too ought not to be interpreted from this point of view; most of all, however, by the further fact that the directly religious functions of Christ, which are of such significance in his life, namely, his habit of prayer, and his submission to the dispensations of God, have received no consideration whatever in the doctrine of his Person.—RITSCHL, *Justification and Reconciliation*, Vol. III, second edition, Eng. trans., pp. 438, 439, 441.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF CHRIST: IN HIS RELATION TO GOD

THROUGHOUT our discussion so far, man has been conceived as fundamentally a seeker of ends. The ends that he seeks grow out of his own nature, and bear witness to the presence in that nature of certain needs. The needs and the ends are therefore the correlates, each of the other. The ends are not always clearly defined for the reason that the needs are not always consciously apprehended. A need is necessarily something "felt" before it can become an object of clear thought or perception. Hence the function and the significance of "desire," an emotional state which points in two directions: backward to a need and forward to an end. The fact is suggestive that the presentation of an end by one individual to another, or even an individual's independent apprehension of an end as possible object of interest and source of activity, is not in itself a guarantee that it will be sought. The end must be "desir-able," and whether it shall be that or not is determined by the whole nature of the individual. It is not enough, indeed, that men shall simply "desire greatly," but unless they do desire greatly they will achieve no worthy result. On the other hand, desire may be the most lawless thing in the world, for it may accompany a nature in which no fundamental harmony has been achieved. Hence man's characteristic end-seeking activity, whether it spring from his deep sense of self, his deep sense of others, or his deep sense of God, needs to be controlled. Self-assertion, social devotion, religious aspiration—all may become lawless. A man has no moral right to think only of himself; he has no moral right to think only of

others; he has no moral right—if one dare say it—to think only of God. In so far as he does one of these at the expense of the others, he is not true to his total nature—to the basic “idea” of him; and the ideal of a complete self-realization cannot be reached. A controlling end of absolute value is called for. Such an end is moral goodness, for when it is fully defined, and its implications completely brought to light, it appears as that one end to which everything in man’s own nature, everything in his experience, everything in the world, may be made to contribute. It has been said already that the true character of that end is revealed in Jesus Christ, who also absolutely realized it. He achieved moral goodness without a flaw, and his achievement becomes at the same time a revelation of the nature of God and of the supreme purpose of God in the world.

We consider first that element of his achievement which was due to the relation he sustained to God.

Much of the real significance of Jesus Christ for the spiritual life of man has been destroyed by a tendency to bring to the study of his moral experience a prior conception of his Person.¹ All too often, he is understood in such a way that his achievement of an unsullied moral goodness was a foregone conclusion. It may not be said in so many words, that Jesus Christ could not but be “good,” but the statement is implicit in the assumptions. It might as well be said now as at any other time: if that is true, then it is the most discouraging fact in the moral history of mankind. If the one Man whose character stands out as the world’s supreme moral achievement was nothing but a Divine-human automaton, fortified by an initial guarantee against failure in every crisis, then—but one hesitates to complete the sentence. If Jesus is our Lord in any proper sense, it must be not merely by virtue of something that he may have brought with him into the world, but by virtue also of what he accomplished after he was here.² In a peculiar sense, moral lordship depends upon the *right* to

exercise it, and no one has the right to exercise it who has not absolutely realized moral worth in himself. The familiar assertion that Christ could not fail is supposed to be necessary to protect his personal dignity and the purpose of God in him. It is a strange dignity and a strange purpose that have to be protected by arbitrary means. To infer from the fact that Christ did not fail God that he therefore could not have failed, is warranted by nothing in the New Testament, and is flatly denied by the very nature of the work that Christ did. It is worth the risk of being misunderstood to have this said, namely, that one of the most wholesome things that could happen for modern Christological discussion would be for students to approach the study of our Lord's work as Mark does, with the baptism and the temptation. And even although Matthew and Luke begin their record with the miraculous birth, all the other facts they tell concerning Christ were publicly known long before the manner of his birth. *They tell first what they learned last.* John begins with the Logos, but in actual experience he advanced from the historical Jesus to the Logos and not from the Logos to the historical Jesus. It is true that even Mark's first words are: "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," and that the title is in substance repeated in the account of the baptism (I. 11). But the very fact that the expression, "Son of God," may bear one of several meanings, still leaves the reader's mind open to ascertain in what sense it is used here, and as he reads on he becomes more and more convinced that it is not a metaphysical but a moral title.³ Nobody, of course, would suggest that it is *necessary*, in reading Matthew and Luke, to bear in mind all the time the story of the birth, for both tell also of the temptation as Mark does (Matt. 4; Luke 4). It is simply a question of stating what the usual custom has been, and the usual custom has been to give the stories of the Birth, like the Prologue of the fourth Gospel, a certain determinative

function which the stories of the Birth at least do not properly possess.

"Do not properly possess." The phrase should be earnestly stressed. The best possible defense for a person's keeping "an open mind" (if he feels that he must) on the question of the Virgin Birth is the fact that it has no vital bearing on that one thing that gives Jesus his distinction and assures forever his place of supremacy in the regard of men. To stamp a person as a "heretic" for no other reason than because the literary evidence to the Virgin Birth does not appear to him as entirely conclusive is to shift the whole basis of discipleship as that is set forth in the New Testament.⁴ A person does not necessarily rob Christ of his divinity, and he does not necessarily destroy the real character of the New Testament, because he refuses to stake the whole moral and spiritual significance of Jesus Christ on so precarious a foundation as the literary narratives of the manner of his coming. If Christ cannot be shown to be the Son of God *apart from* that, then no rigid insistence on the method can finally vindicate his Sonship. What the story of the Virgin Birth appears to indicate on the surface (its deeper significance—for it has one—we shall consider later) is a peculiarity of physical connection between Christ and the race. But that does not guarantee, in and of itself, his moral excellence, and it is precisely on his moral excellence that the question of his Lordship, his Sonship, and his Saviourhood is dependent to-day for an increasing number of men. The world will worship at the feet of that One who can settle the moral problem, and it will ascribe to him without hesitation the highest titles.⁵ But the crucial point is just there—in the settlement of the moral problem, that is, in identifying the moral actual and the moral ideal. If there has ever lived a man who, not merely in personal intention but in the whole reach of his life, inner and outer, has consistently, not occasionally—we can all do that—maintained himself at the full level of the *ought* for love's

sake, there was a man whose achievement was so far forth a divine achievement, for that is what we think of when we think of God under his moral aspect. In such a man, God is manifest in the flesh. No, we will say more than that: we will say that such a man *is* God manifest in the flesh.

This is the claim that we make for Jesus Christ. He was Son of God with power by virtue of his moral achievement. But we have a right to ask whether what he did was done under conditions which made his achievement personal, not mechanical. If it was not, it ceases to have for us a vital moral interest, for Jesus is then put outside the category of truly human, and we do not know what he is. We can tolerate a miracle—can, on occasion, even demand it—but a moral automaton is not a miracle so much as it is a pure anomaly, a contradiction in itself. What we want is something that is intelligible and comprehensible in reference to our deepest needs and the problems they raise. From the beginning men have been haunted by their sin. They have stood in the fear of the God who hid himself in the shadow. In the midst of their revelries a hand has written on the wall. Ever that insistent voice: "Thou oughtest!" and ever that despairing reply: "I know that I ought, but I have not and I cannot!" Ever that hope that by giving of his best in sacrifice man may quiet the fear within and appease the wrath without. And then? And then the story of a Man who maintained his fellowship with God so absolutely, whose consciousness of God was so clear and unbroken, whose life, just because its dominating motive was love, spelled "is" as though it were "ought," and "ought" as though it were "is," and of whom therefore, men were at last constrained to say, "When we look upon him we look upon the very God." Does man need that story? He needs it more than he needs anything else in the world. He needs it because it so utterly humiliates him and makes him feel the magnitude of his own

failure. But he needs it because it fills him with hope. While indirectly it shows him himself, directly it shows him God. And it makes him believe that the moral problem of his own life is not insoluble if such a God as that is at the heart of things, and has shown, in a real human experience, the possibility of gaining the mastery over the world, and the secret of the victory.

But what, now, has too much of the traditional Christology really done? It has taken the human meaning and the human hope out of Christ's great achievement by implying that it was made under conditions radically different from those which confront other men. It matters not how he got his body: what alone matters is that he had one, and that through it he was in contact with the material world. It matters not—just at this point—how he got that “spirit” in which for him, as for all other men, his personality was constituted: what matters is that the relation between his spirit and body, and between that and the world, was not different from what it is in our own case. Not a single recorded miracle shows him as seeking to simplify for himself the conditions in which he was fulfilling his vocation.⁶ There is no suggestion anywhere in the Gospels that Jesus was exempt, by virtue of the method of his birth or anything else, from the possibility of moral trial as that might arise from a physical basis, or from dependence on the world. That is a later idea of a Gnostic and ascetic theology with its false theory of “flesh,” and the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary was at once the climax of that type of theology and its *reductio ad absurdum*.⁷ Nor is there any suggestion that he was so entirely a pawn in the hands of God that his temptations, his struggles, his hesitations, his prayers, were merely surface appearances, witnessing to no underlying personal situation. Our Saviour must be one who has gone through our experience not only in appearance but in reality. The Lord of our life must be One who was first of all Lord of his own

life. It is intolerable that we should be asked to assent to a theory of Christ's Person, either as an axiom or as a corollary, which takes him from the pinnacle where he properly belongs. There is one supreme miracle in all recorded history: the rest is commentary. That miracle is the relation of perfect understanding of God the Father achieved and maintained by Jesus Christ the Son. But what a hollow thing it becomes from our point of view if it was merely a necessitated actualizing of a preexistent blueprint. Moral achievement where the possibility of moral failure is not present is not moral achievement in any sense that can be appreciated by a man. We want to know not only *that* this thing was done, but that it was done notwithstanding the possession of power to the opposite. We will not surrender the challenge and the meaning and the promise and the splendor of this moral miracle in the interests of a piece of speculation which, when it is thought through, is seen necessarily to destroy the very thing it is supposed to account for and protect.

Man is meant for God. The proof of that is not only in his possession of a certain *capacity* for divine worship and fellowship, but even more profoundly in a certain *need* which, while it remains unmet, leaves him to that extent incomplete. The proof of that incompleteness is, in turn, moral distress, either as an actual experience, or as a possibility lying latent in the soul and ready to manifest itself in the appropriate conditions. We do not have to show that a man never finds satisfaction with aught less than God. Indeed, one of his great dangers is in the fact that he can find very deep satisfactions wholly apart from any thought of God or his true relation to him. When we speak of a system of values, we mean that values are graded as to their worth. That being the case, a value whose worth is not absolute may be treated as though it were. But, on the other hand, a man can never guarantee to himself that a situation will not arise in which those satisfactions will be

as ashes in his mouth. There is only one satisfaction which is beyond the reach of any conceivable circumstance to destroy—the satisfaction of the need for God. In that very fact is the evidence to how indestructible that need is. Man, then, is meant for God. He is bigger than the world he lives in. He is more than a transient deposit of race experience. He is more than an increasing sum of necessitated reactions to external stimuli. He is—and now we have come to it—he is a son of God in his very plan and purpose, *and in the realization of that sonship he does to that extent realize himself.*

Jesus was the Son of God because he realized that Sonship on his own account. He began as we begin, and he finished at the place where the whole meaning of human life became as clear as a sunbeam. We may very well do what is done in the New Testament itself, and raise the question of the ultimate nature of Him who did this thing. But to raise that question before we have fully sensed the fact that he achieved perfect Sonship under human conditions is to befog the issue. For the issue just now is that of man's ideal nature—the fundamental meaning of him—the very reason for his being. We ask, "Why is a man?" And for answer we point to Jesus Christ, and we say, "Man is for Divine sonship." We ask again, "Why is the world?" And again we answer, "Christ is why the world is; that is, sonship is why the world is; that is, the world finds *its* meaning in that in which man finds *his* meaning, namely, that sonship of which Jesus Christ is at once the type, the promise, and the potency."

NOTES ON CHAPTER VII

(1) This is in general true of the so-called Kenotic Christology. Cf. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, lect. vi, "Christ the Subject of Temptation," for historical data.

(2) Schleiermacher, on the other hand, explains Christ by an original holiness that he *preserved* rather than by a holiness

that he acquired. Cf. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 250ff. How far Christological discussion has traveled may be inferred by comparing recent discussions, such as those of Lofthouse, Drown, Glover, and Cross, with the fact that no longer ago than Dorner it was proposed to understand the incarnation as the perfect union of the human and the Divine by first of all *assuming the fact*. See Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. iii, § 102. "Everything by preference points us to begin with the union of the natures instead of with the Ego, Divine or human" (p. 313).

(3) There are many accessible discussions of this important question. Cf. Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, vol. i, bk. i, chap. iii, § 7 (other references in index); Stevens, *The Theology of the New Testament*, pt. i, chap. v; Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament*, chap. ix, §§ 1 and 2; Mackintosh, *ibid.*, pp. 25ff. (other references in index); and Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, the section entitled "Mark's History the History of the Son of God" (pp. 303ff.). Denney says: "Mark brings Christ on the stage in the hour in which his divine sonship is proclaimed, and it is in this character that he conceives him living and acting all through. What the sonship to God means is rather to be made out from the gospel—which is, so to speak, a progressive illustration of it—than deduced from the words."

(4) There are some observations on this question in Chapter XIX.

(5) The title "Lord," for example, so often applied to Jesus in the New Testament, has this significance. Cf. Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, chap. x, "The Lordship of Jesus"; Mackintosh, *ibid.*, pp. 369-373. More conservative is Stevens, *ibid.*, pt. iv, chap. vi, a discussion of the Christology of Paul.

(6) Miracle, formerly an apologetic bulwark, is now widely regarded as a liability. That evangelical scholarship may still make out a good case, however, is to be seen in Garvie, *Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, chap. iii, div. iii, and Wendland, *Miracles and Christianity*.

(7) Cf. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, vol. ii, § 178, for data. The question was finally settled, so far as Romanism was concerned, although not without opposition, by a papal bull, December 8, 1854.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF CHRIST:
IN HIS RELATION TO MEN

"We may illustrate the integrity of Christ's manhood; what we cannot do is to prove it by logic. It is impossible to strengthen by demonstration what is self-evident from the first. To all who read the Gospels with an open mind it is plain that Jesus was completely man. Were it conceivable, indeed, that we were forced to choose—as we are not—between the conviction that Jesus possessed true manhood in all its parts, and the assurance that he was the Son of God come in flesh for our salvation, our plain duty would be to affirm his humanity and renounce his deity. Doubtless in point of fact both things are sure to faith; but none the less it is from the primary and fundamental certitude of his unity with us in manhood that we rise up to the truth of his higher nature. He is, at all events, complete man, whatever more. . . . He must choose out his own path, develop his purpose, do justice to his own nature. . . . The story of his soul is no surface uniformly blank and regular, but a varied landscape, a country with an atmosphere. The light and shade of feeling move across it—love, anger, grief, compassion; to all he is humanly sensitive."—H. R. MACKINTOSH, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 395, 396.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF CHRIST: IN HIS RELATION TO MEN

IN an earlier chapter, the fullest possible recognition was made of the social character of personality. It is no less true that men are meant for each other than it is that they are meant for God. The religious nature and the social nature are quite inseparable, so much so that there is a serious modern danger that they will even be identified.¹ It is one thing to regard as ideal that situation in which ethics and religion work together as essential parts of a common whole; it is another thing to suppose that ethics and religion are the same. Religion is concerned with a direct relation of man to God. Ethics is concerned rather with a relation of man to man. While ethics may and should have a religious motive and a religious goal, it must be allowed that a very high ethical level is attainable without a direct religious reference. But it still remains that the need for God is as fundamental as the need for men, and a so intensely ethical passion as that of Comte at last, in spite of its initial assumptions, had to provide for the supernatural reference in "The Religion of Humanity."²

Jesus Christ was true Man. Being a Man, the very plan of his life provided that he should desire and should realize the relation of Sonship. But the same plan, and for the same reason, provided that he should desire and should realize a certain relation to other men. It was said before that he stands out as the supreme moral miracle of history. If the words were not open to being misunderstood, it could be said also that he stands out as the supreme human or social miracle. That is to say, in the same perfect way in

which he realized the ideal relation to God he realized also the ideal relation to men.

Such a statement, of course, raises the question of the fact. We cannot forget that during his lifetime Jesus was criticized for failing at this very point, and the criticism has often been repeated since.³ Attention is called to certain incidents which seem to reveal a strained relation with other members of his family. It might be well enough to rid men of devils by bidding the devils enter into a herd of swine, but what about the rights of the man whose property was thus destroyed? By what right did he call men to leave their lawful and necessary occupations, to follow him from place to place? To what extent was it a wholesome thing to bid men cease to be interested in the affairs of the world, because a new order was soon to be supernaturally inaugurated, and those who gave up everything now would get all back then, and more? How justify the burst of anger and its mode of expression at the cleansing of the Temple, or the long series of "Woes" in Matt. 23. 13-36? The command, "Go, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor," could be obeyed only if there were those who were willing to buy. What then, would be the result of trying to universalize such a condition to membership in the kingdom of God? Those who wished to do so might, without very much difficulty, construct a plausible argument to show that Jesus enunciated principles, and made demands on others, and did things himself which, if they were held to be normative, would destroy the very bases of social life.

Perhaps the best way to meet such an argument is by frankly admitting that there is in the demand and activity of Jesus a contemporary element: an element, that is, growing out of the circumstances of his time. He lived among a people whose life, as compared with ours, was simple in the extreme. He had been brought up and educated among that people, and his mentality had received an indelible impression in consequence. Jesus was a Jew of the first

century, just as Paul was, and it is no more reasonable to suppose that Jesus was wholly untouched by his nationality, his training, and the general time-spirit, than it would be to suppose the same thing of Paul. Nothing is lost, and much is gained, by attempting to relate our Lord to that whole social background by which in part he is to be explained.⁴ It is safe to say that the failure to do that has been one of the most prolific causes of the misunderstanding of many of his words and deeds. All too often it has been assumed that our Lord's earthly experience was something he had to tolerate because his mission involved it, but that his real life was being carried on in a virtual independence of this state of humiliation.⁵ To say nothing of the impossible psychological situation that the assumption would create, it has the serious result of making Christ's humanity an unreal thing. The first manifestation of this was in the early Docetic heresy, so called, and it is in effect with us still.⁶ One of the hopeful signs in the modern study of the life and work of Christ is the conviction that, whatever else he was or was not, he was at least a man. But if there is one thing more than another by which a man is characterized, it is just this of his necessary involution with his kind. He cannot be isolated without ceasing to be. He derives not only a body, but tendencies and characteristics. There is, as we have seen, a unique element in him—that quality of individual peculiarity which makes every man to some extent different from everybody else. But this notwithstanding, a man is not fully known and understood except he be seen in the light of the time in which he lived, for the reason that his time enters into him as truly as he enters into his time.⁷

A recognition of this fact as it applies to Jesus goes far toward removing some of the serious difficulties in the Synoptic record. Many good people have been sincerely troubled by Jesus' approval of the use of wine at the Cana miracle and at the institution of the Supper. Others have

supposed that this approval was equivalent to giving the custom a divine sanction for all time. The minute that Jesus' actions here are seen in relation to the age, and the distinction is made between his underlying idea and purpose and the instruments through which he gave it expression, the actions are seen in a new light. The mentality that can see in the Cana miracle and in the Last Supper nothing but the wine and the problem of its alcoholic content, is the same type of mentality as that which can see in the book of Jonah nothing but the "great fish," and in the book of Daniel nothing but the "times, time, and half a time," and in the book of the Revelation nothing but "the first and second resurrections." So, too, of the phrase, "hell of fire." It is highly probable that Jesus was familiar with the phrase from its use in eschatological descriptions.⁸ The perpetually burning rubbish-heaps outside the limits of various cities—especially the Valley of Hinnom near Jerusalem—afforded a graphic illustration to those who had eyes to see it. That it conveyed the idea of destruction of the useless is undoubted. But Jesus was altogether too skillful a teacher to see nothing but that. The burning rubbish-heap was the sign of a city trying to rid itself of danger. Too often the negative side of that fact is all that is seen in the phrase "Gehenna," or "hell of fire." But surely the positive side—the health of the city—is of at least equal importance. Is it going too far to say that Jesus used the metaphor less to convey the idea of destruction than to convey the idea of preservation? *In the kingdom of God there is no room for the unclean*—this is what Jesus would have us see, and the "everlasting burning" emphasizes that. But suppose that Jesus had lived at some other time, or in a place where the refuse was disposed of in some other way, would he then have spoken as he did? He would no more have done it than Wordsworth would have used some of his figures had he lived on our Western prairies rather than among the Cumberland Lakes.

Another illustration of this fact of dependence on his time is afforded by Jesus' use of the contemporary apocalyptic as it dealt with the passing of the old order and the coming of a new. It is very easy to say too much on this point, as Johannes Weiss, Loisy, and Schweitzer have undoubtedly done.⁹ But this much, at least, must be allowed: if some of Jesus' instructions to his disciples, some of his avowed expectations, and some of his parables and discourses, are not to be explained by his use of current thought-forms as a vehicle for his message, then they cannot be explained on any other ground consistent with his being "a teacher sent from God" and speaking "as one having authority." The possible abuse, for the purposes of destructive criticism, of these principles of dependence and a wise pedagogy as illustrated by our Lord, is no proof that the principles are not as stated. He did his work at a certain time and place. The evidences of the time and the evidences of the place come out again and again in what he said and did. The fact shows how truly he was one with us, and how necessary it is to distinguish between the "spirit" that was his and the forms under which that spirit expressed itself. The spirit—who would have it otherwise? The expression—who would stereotype it in all its details for all time?

What, then, were the characteristics of the spirit of Jesus in relation to other men as this revealed itself in his words and deeds?

I. THE ABSOLUTE WORTH OF MAN. There was on the part of Jesus no confusion of the ponderables and the imponderables. With one stroke, he destroyed all that weight of crushing external requirement which proceeded on the assumption that a man was merely an incident to the maintenance of an institution, the perpetuation of a custom, or the observation of a law. Jesus saw that no institution, and no custom, and no statute law has any inherent right of its own which must be "conserved" or "vindicated" at

no matter what cost. The modern philosophy which makes personality the ultimate form of being and therefore the supreme category of thought and action has unqualified support in everything that Jesus ever said and did. A man is better than a sheep. A man is better than a herd of swine. A man is better than a day. A man is better than a law. A man is better than anything else in the world, for the reason that things get their value from men and not men from things. If that is not fundamental to Jesus' whole message and mission, then what is? But we must not think that he made it fundamental because he was dominated by some philosophical or social or political theory. He made it fundamental because he saw in every man a child of God. Beneath all the accretions he saw the divine image and superscription. In this lost son, in this erring woman, in this distressed mother, in this happy-faced child, he sees one and the same reality—a soul formed by the hand of God and destined for eternal fellowship with God. Of whatever would turn that soul from its true life he was the enemy. Of whatever would keep it on its way he was the friend.

2. SOCIAL OBLIGATION. This is a trite phrase for expressing that aspect of the spirit of the Master which consisted in an unparalleled "other-ness," but it will serve the purpose. If it is true that he had a unique sense of the absolute worth of every man, it is a corollary of that that he had a unique sense of his own obligation by every man. It would probably be going too far to say that this overwhelming sense of obligation by others was the sole cause of his consciousness of possessing a universal significance, but there is undoubtedly a close relation here.¹⁰ Whatever might be the ultimate ground of "the self-consciousness of Jesus" in this regard, the fact is indisputable that he believed that the well-being of all men depended upon his fidelity to his own vocation.¹¹ Again it must be admitted that there are here and there apparent limitations to his horizons—as,

for example, his hesitation before the appeal of the woman of Syro-Phœnicia, and his command, "Go ye rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel"—but nobody can conscientiously maintain that this exclusiveness is the dominant note of the Gospels, and in any case it was finally transcended. What, rather, is dominant is that he believed that he was the Bearer of something on which every man had a claim. Amid all the dispute about his miracles, we ought to be willing to recognize at least this much: that in these accounts he is represented as using *for the sake of others only* the power of which he was possessed. If there is always a divine reference in what Jesus did, it is equally true that there is always a human reference there also. Nobody ever had his Godward reach, and nobody ever had his manward reach. Schleiermacher would explain him on the ground of his possession of a unique "God-consciousness." But surely we cannot leave out of the consideration his unique "man-consciousness." He knew what was in God, so that men, seeing him, saw the Father also. But he knew no less well what was in man, and it was because he saw man as the Father sees him that he could do for man all that he did.

3. SACRIFICIAL LOVE. But we have not wholly accounted for the human relation of Jesus by seeing him committed to the absolute worth of man and exemplifying to the superlative degree the sense of social obligation. Others have taught the inalienable dignity of personality and the claim which all have of right upon each. But unless such a theory be allied with an adequate motive—and this failure has been too often the case—it is but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The supremacy in Him of the spirit of sacrificial love is what makes the difference between Jesus as a Wise Man and Jesus as the world's Saviour. The absence of that spirit elsewhere has been the prolific cause of the collapse of so many Utopias. It is dangerous to try to describe in one single statement all the multiform activity

and demand and expectation of Jesus. But we shall not be far wrong if we say that his whole life was dominated by the spirit of sacrificial love; that he was in the world for no other purpose than to make dominant everywhere the spirit of sacrificial love; that he made the possession of the spirit of sacrificial love the one sign of membership in his Kingdom; and that therefore in the degree in which that spirit comes to prevail in the hearts of men, the kingdom of God becomes a realized fact. The world will never lose its interest in Jesus Christ until it has lost its interest in the problem of adjusting human relationships—which will be never. But it will find no other way of solving the problem than the way of that One Life in which was incarnated and completely expressed the spirit of sacrificial love. No theory of the worth of man, and no theory of social obligation, will ever accomplish anything—as theories. They need to be vitalized, and the dynamic that will do it is here. The church is already engaged in a critical struggle to maintain its “historic faith” of a Divine Incarnation in Jesus Christ. It will lose that struggle if it falsely supposes that the issue concerns the retention of hoary phrases, creeds, and categories. Let God be conceived as the Eternal Spirit of Sacrificial Love from which all things proceed, and let Jesus be conceived as One who absolutely manifested that Spirit under the conditions of a human life, and all the practical and religious and philosophical value of the idea and fact of incarnation may be retained without entailing the burden of an outworn and impossible metaphysic. For such an absolute manifestation of God is at the same time a complete incarnation of God, and if God comes to such a complete incarnation then that life is truly a Divine Life: what that is, God is; what that does, God does; what that suffers, God suffers; and what that makes possible to men, God makes possible to men.

NOTES ON CHAPTER VIII

(1) "Jesus' life of simple, unreserved, neighborly love does, in truth, directly beget faith in a loving God, and this is the tendency of every similar life. Thus in and through the choice of others' good as our own, which may also be called the identification of our will with theirs, the real existence of a common will, and even the personality of it, become convictions. This conviction is the experience of an adequate object for love. It may take the form of adoration, or of friendship, or of rescue from a divided will, or of release from fears and strength to meet the ills of life. But whatever form it takes, what happens is the recognition of the common or social will as God in us, and this 'recognition' is a getting acquainted that corresponds in process with the finding of any friend" (Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 262, from the chapter entitled "Religion as Social Immediacy"). It is difficult to see how such an explanation can cover religious originality as, e. g., in the Hebrew prophets.

(2) Comte, "The Father of Sociological Religion," had at least the merit of sincerity. Having surrendered the idea of God, he did not—as is so often done to-day—continue to use the language of theistic belief, but said frankly that his Deity was "Humanity." How noble his conception really was may best be seen in his own writings, of which a generous extract is given in Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*. There is discriminating discussion of Comte in Boutroux, *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, chap. i. Boutroux concludes his discussion thus: "So it comes about that the principle of Comte, the notion of the positive as union of the real and the useful, leads, of itself (as soon as man sets it in operation), to those superior objects in given reality that Comte had intended to eliminate. The real and the useful are, for us, an incentive toward the True, the Beautiful, and the Good" (p. 81). Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, lect. vii, points out very clearly the strength as well as the weakness of Comte.

(3) See any of the rationalistic "Lives," e. g., Renan, *The Life of Jesus*. "Acts which now would be considered acts of illusion or folly held a large place in the life of Jesus" (from closing paragraphs of chap. xvi). There is much more to the

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same effect in chap. xix. La Touche, *The Person of Christ in Modern Thought*, says, "It is not too much to say that Renan conceives the Lord in terms of a Frenchman of the baser sort" (p. 70). All such strictures are convincingly dealt with by Harnack, in *What is Christianity?* pp. 79-123. "There can be no doubt that if Jesus were with us to-day he would side with those who are making great efforts to relieve the hard lot of the poor and procure them better conditions of life" (p. 100). "A day's work, labor, increase, progress—he sees it all, but placed at the service of God and neighbor, encircled by the light of the Eternal, and removed from the service of transient things" (p. 123).

(4) How such an attempt illuminates the gospel record may be seen in Glover, *The Jesus of History*, chap. ii.

(5) This is the point of view of some of the older Christology, e. g., Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, §§ 132-134. "We are far from imposing the task of conceiving that the Eternal Logos ceased with the incarnation to exist in his general revelation in the world" (p. 264). "It must be allowed that the Son of God leads in the economy of the Father a twofold existence; that he lives a double life in his world-creating and in his world-completing activity" (p. 267). This is a type of Kenoticism characteristic of Lutheran and Reformed theologians. Cf. Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, bk. ii, chap. vii, § 2; chap. viii, § 4; Bruce, *Humiliation*, lect. iii.

(6) Cf. Bruce, *ibid.*, lect. vi, opening paragraphs.

(7) This, of course, is not intended to deny an essential "timelessness" in the message and work and person of Christ. See Chap. XXIV below.

(8) Cf. articles on "Gehenna" and "Eschatology," pt. i, § 5 (c), in Hastings, *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. The more drastic interpretation is maintained in Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, bk. iii, chap. vi.

(9) Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, § 2. The classic statement of the extreme position is Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus*. Schweitzer's position is summarized in the present volume, in Chapter XVIII.

(10) This relation is more fully considered in Chapter XIX.

(11) For a convincing statement of this point, see Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, especially bk. ii, div. ii, § (b).

CHAPTER IX

A MAN AND HIS SINS

Doctor. You see, her eyes are open.

Gent. Aye, but their sense is shut.

Doctor. What is it she does now? Look, how she rubs her hands.

Gent. It is an accustomed action with her, to seem thus washing her hands: I have known her continue in this a quarter of an hour.

Lady Macbeth. Yet here's a spot.

Doctor. Hark! she speaks: I will set down what comes from her, to satisfy my remembrance the more strongly.

Lady Macbeth. Out, damned spot! out, I say! One: two: why, then 'tis time to do it. Hell is murky. Fie, my lord, fie! a soldier, and afeard? What need we fear who knows it, when none can call our power to account? Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much blood in him?

Doctor. Do you mark that?

Lady Macbeth. The thane of Fife had a wife; where is she now? What, will these hands ne'er be clean? No more o' that, my lord, no more o' that: you mar all with this starting.

Doctor. Go to, go to; you have known what you should not.

Gent. She has spoke what she should not, I am sure of that; heaven knows what she has known.

Lady Macbeth. Here's the smell of blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. Oh, oh, oh!

—SHAKESPEARE, *Macbeth*, v, i.

CHAPTER IX

A MAN AND HIS SINS

MUCH that has been written of the significance of Jesus Christ has failed of any great value because it has assumed a rather flattering view of human nature.¹ The belief of Socrates, that if men know the right they will necessarily do it, therefore making knowledge and virtue identical, errs on the side of generosity.² It may be true to say that belief is to be inferred from outward behavior, but to reverse the principle, and say that assent to this or that truth will necessarily produce this or that action, is to go beyond what experience warrants. "When Duty whispers low, Thou must! The Youth replies, I can!" Is that invariably so? "When God has told you what you ought to do, he has already told you what you can."³ Does experience support that? As matter of abstract ethical theory, we may grant that there can be no "must" beyond the range of the possible "can." With Kant, we recognize an equation of which the two terms are obligation and ability. Yet there come moments in every man's experience when he throws abstractions to the winds. He confesses—to himself if to none other—that he feels himself the subject of a certain demand, a demand every way just, a demand wholly inescapable, a demand, however, that he has not met, that he may even be unable to meet, and yet withal a demand that stands over against him unyielding as adamant. "Thou oughtest!" And he answers: "I know that I ought, but I cannot."

If Jesus Christ wrought only for himself, we are of all men most miserable. He achieved a relation to God such as made God to appear in mortal flesh. Having seen him, we have seen the Father also. He achieved a relation to

men such as revealed once and for always God's original thought for every man. He was Son of God and he was Son of man, and he was one because he was the other. If we have here treated them separately, that was for the sake of the emphasis, and not because they can be separated in actuality. Christ never did anything as a Son which he did not do also as a Brother—never did anything as a Brother which he did not do also as a Son. That act which was the supreme expression of his oneness with God—his surrender to death—was at the same time the supreme expression of his oneness with men. In him we see how we ought to bear ourselves toward God and each other, and the measure of our "salvation" or "reconciliation" or "redemption" is precisely in the degree in which we do that. To reveal to us that end or controlling idea with reference to which the whole life might be determined and the deepest needs of our hearts be met—this, surely, is what Jesus did. But if he did not do more than this, it is of little moment that he did this much. If we had no past to haunt us, and if we had no internal contradiction to struggle with, then Christ the Wise Teacher, Christ the Perfect Example, Christ the Ideal Man, might satisfy all our need. But the whole history of religion and religious experience makes it certain that that faith will never be accepted by men as a final faith which does not deal, with complete satisfaction to an aroused conscience at the very peak of its activity, with the problem of a man and his sins.

It would help a great deal toward clarity in discussion if we would at once dispense with the notion that there is any such thing as "sin in the abstract."⁴ We can all be Platonists to the extent of agreeing that any group of like facts get their likeness from their common participation in the same "Idea," without taking the additional step of assigning to the "Idea" a greater reality than is possessed by the facts themselves. We may even agree that in every case the "Idea" precedes the particular fact, so that but for the

prior "Idea" there could not be the fact. Certainly, possibility is always the ground of actuality: a thing must be able to be before it really is. The priority may not be temporal, but logical priority is a rational necessity. All this notwithstanding, the problem of sin is not the problem of a certain abstraction or principle, but the problem of a concrete reality. Something must be good in order for there to be goodness, and something must be bad in order for there to be badness. The philosopher may write Good and Evil with capital initial letters, and treat them either as abstractions or as personifications. But if by some miracle a philosopher should be brought to "conviction of sin," what he would then be concerned about would be not "Sin," but "sins," and those sins his own. A physician discoursing learnedly on the theory of "Pain" has a quite different attitude toward his subject from what he has when he feels a particular pain on his own account. Pain in the abstract never hurt anybody—except by indirection; and sin in the abstract never troubled anybody's conscience, unless it were in the same way. The bundle that Christian carried on his back until he came to the cross represented something quite definite and tangible to him. Otherwise it never would have troubled him as it did. What gave Nathan his power over David, and John the Baptist his power over Herod, and Paul his power over Felix, was that in each case the speaker dealt with concrete facts. It is only a step from sin in the abstract to law in the abstract. Another step, and we have penalty in the abstract, and then atonement in the abstract. But meanwhile, here is a particular sinner, and he is a sinner for a particular reason, and what he needs above all things is a particular forgiveness that will suit his particular case.

When, therefore, we speak of sin, what we refer to is not some mysterious entity that can be detached from human beings and treated accordingly. Sin is either a definite disposition, or, when the disposition manifests itself, a definite deed. When we speak of sin in general—write it "Sin" if

you wish—we can mean nothing but the total body of such dispositions and such deeds. The content of a troubled conscience is always a very definite content: it is “my sins” that evokes the cry, “Against thee have I sinned.” Such expressions as, “in a state of sin,” or “membership in a sinful race,” or “the wrath of God toward the sons of Adam,” should be understood accordingly. Nobody is a sinner merely because he is a descendant of Adam. Nobody is a sinner merely by virtue of his being a man. Nobody is in a state of sin merely because of certain accidents of time and place and circumstance. A person is a sinner because he has committed sin, and he cannot be “constituted a sinner,” as the phrase goes, on any other basis. It may well be that we must so conceive the Divine Holiness as that God stands in unrelenting opposition to sin in all its forms and by whomever committed. But in what sense would that God be a Holy God who regarded men simply as an aggregation, applied to the aggregation the general term “depraved,” and then treated it accordingly, with no reference whatever to individual attitudes and experiences? Certainly the race is sinful; certainly the stock is tainted; certainly the individual cannot extricate himself from the social *milieu*. But after all, God does not deal with people *en masse*. It isn’t an impersonal abstract humanity that has gone wrong: it is men and women. It isn’t this humanity that needs to be saved: it is the men and women who have gone wrong. Ample allowance will be made later for the fact of the social sources and social nature of sin, but just at present it is necessary to emphasize its intensely individual feature.⁵ There is no such thing as an antecedent sinful race because of which men are sinners, for you must have these sinful men before you can have the race. In the interests of clear thinking, and a sound ethic, and a rational theology, let us have done forever with this personification of the abstract, and let us get down to the consideration of William James’ “humble facts.”

What, then, are the humble facts? Simply that men acquire and cultivate sinful dispositions, and manifest them in deeds of like character. The psychology that underlies this is in keeping with our earlier discussion. Man is by nature a seeker of ends. The ends that he seeks have their origin in his own nature. Their presence is indicated by the emotion of desire. Desire in and of itself is lawless; in its pure original form it lacks content and object: it is simply the man wanting something. It needs, therefore, to be filled out, controlled, and directed—in a word, to be rationalized. It is rationalized according as it is brought under the domination of a worthy end, and the rationalization may be regarded as complete when the control is exercised with reference to that supreme end whose absolute worth is assumed just because it makes possible the realization of that one thing for which human life must be held to exist. The sinful disposition may then be defined both absolutely and relatively. Absolutely, it is failure to bring desire under the domination of the supreme end. Relatively, it is failure to bring desire under the domination of the individual's knowable best.⁶ Desire *per se* has no moral character, although desire may serve as a clue to character. The very basic condition to personal action is "to want," and that is why no one can ever wholly guarantee himself against temptation. Desire springs out of "the abysmal depths of personality," and all that is there who shall say? It is already active before we have recognized it, and necessarily so in view of its function. A change in the objective situation may suddenly reveal to the man the fact that there is that in him which has responded to the change as swiftly as the needle flies toward the magnet. Instantly there are created the conditions of possible good and possible evil. What greater humiliation than for him to find that he is dallying with the situation in its evil potentiality, and contemplating action accordingly! What greater tragedy than for him to transform the possible into the actual by deliberate choice!

But what greater triumph than for him resolutely to control the situation in the interests of a moral end! Not desire makes the sinful disposition, but the disposition is shown to be sinful in so far as desire, attaching itself to the known inferior and allowed so to continue, is not rationalized in the way described.

The sinful deed may or may not follow. The term "conduct" has suffered much from being given a too narrow connotation. "Conduct only is of supreme importance."⁷ Clearly, that cannot be maintained if conduct is equated with external behavior. Jesus certainly did not think that disposition was not personal activity when he revised the ancients' "You shall not *do* this," to "You shall not *be willing* to do this, for to be willing to do it is morally the same as doing it." It is true that the actual deed may have a social significance that is lacking where the deed is merely contemplated, or "willed" without being executed. But society is interested also in dispositions, for the very good reason that the disposition belongs inseparably to the man, and sooner or later it will make itself known. Planning a step which, after all, is not actually taken, is just as much "conduct" or "personal behavior" as the consummation would have been had it taken place. Behavior does not mean simply a man's social front. It means the whole of his activity as a conscious being, and he is just as truly active when he is quietly deliberating as he is when he is moving his muscles and limbs. In other words, although we distinguish sinful dispositions and sinful deeds, sin is always a form of personal activity. That, and that alone, is what makes it possible to "convict of sin."

Pushing now the analysis a little further, we see that the very idea of sin involves also will, knowledge, and conscience. If sin is not in desire *per se*, but in the failure to rationalize it, the burden of the failure must rest ultimately on the will. But will is not anything isolated. Will is personality purposively active. Such activity involves knowledge

of some sort, and this knowledge is essential if the volition is to be given a moral quality. Conscience is personality in moral self-appraisal, and the appraisal takes the form of approval or censure according as knowledge and volition do or do not agree. It is discrepancy between the moral ideal, or "the known ought," and the motive and object of volition, which alone creates the situation wherein conscience can speak in protest. The situation may exist without the protest but the possibility of the protest is always latent there.

Now, the condemnatory aspect of conscience never appears until the deed is done. This is necessarily so. Often it is said: "My conscience would not allow me to do that." To make such a statement and adhere to the decision it implies is itself to have the approval of conscience. But there is a deeper side to this. What has really happened has been that the adverse verdict of conscience is anticipated, and that enters very largely into the decision. But, after all, such an anticipated verdict can never have the "uneasiness" that accompanies the verdict proper. Nelson won his battles because he was always fifteen minutes early. How often do men lose their moral battles because conscience arrives on the scene fifteen minutes late! If we could but feel in the prospect as we feel in the retrospect! But the correlate of a disapproving conscience is a personal act that cannot be changed because it has already become history. "I did it, and I ought not to have done it." How much distress can be revealed in such a confession! And yet withal how much promise is there—how much illumination of moral worth—how much revelation of the method by which man is to learn whence he came and why, and whither he is bound!

The sinful deed is always the revelation of a condition. We are confronted with the fact not only that this particular deed was done, but that there was a *reason why* it was done. The protest of conscience in a given case, significant though

it is, is in itself no guarantee that in a like situation there would not be a like result. It is bad enough that men have sinned: what is worse is that they keep on sinning, often enough it would seem in spite of themselves. A great deal has been written about "inherited depravity" that is no longer acceptable. But the facts that the theory of depravity tried to account for still remain as facts. "The good I would, I do not; the evil I would not, this I do." Therein Paul puts into words a universal experience. Human nature is out of gear. It is the seat of an internal dualism. The same man in the same situation both would and would not.⁸ He does as he does, knowing all the while that he will hate himself for doing it. He is morally disorganized. Desire comes and goes with kaleidoscopic rapidity, or it becomes set in one direction, revealing how chaotic is that nature out of which it comes and what dire consequences are possible if it be not controlled.

We claim for Jesus an absolute moral and spiritual lordship. He so bore himself to God and he so bore himself to man as that he always kept the "is" and the "ought" identical. In him God comes to man; in him man reaches up to God. Through him we learn the nature and the conditions of our salvation. But that salvation cannot be accomplished by the mere presentation of the ideal of Perfect Sonship and Brotherhood. There are initial difficulties to be overcome, such as have already been described, namely, the personal record and the personal disposition. There is the fact of past sin for which the man holds himself accountable, and which the most exacting penalty cannot render any less real. No amount of punishment can be morally equated with sin so as to blot it out. And there is the other fact that the man is more or less at the mercy of a lawless nature. He sinned, because he was the kind of man who *could sin*. Conscience protests and condemns, but he still remains that kind of man. The problem is therefore twofold: the problem of the record and the

problem of the disposition. A salvation that does not meet that problem is inadequate. Does the Lordship of Jesus extend so far as to provide for past sin in the only possible way, namely, *forgiveness*? And does it also make the only possible provision for the sinful disposition, namely, *a new creation*?

NOTES ON CHAPTER IX

(1) No such criticism can be offered of Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Re-making*.

(2) Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 131ff.

(3) Landor, *Imaginary Conversations*, "The Maid of Orleans and Agnes Sorel." The words are spoken by Jeanne d'Arc to the mistress of the Emperor Charles.

(4) Reference might well be made to some of the refreshing remarks of Professor Bowne on "abstractions" in, e. g., *Studies in Christianity*, pp. 122-139, 204-209.

(5) See Chapter X.

(6) This distinction has great practical significance, but contains a latent danger, namely, that one will rest satisfied with an inferior standard. The danger is overcome by the Kantian doctrine of "the good will," for the good will requires not only that one shall do the Right, but also that one shall use every possible means to discover the Right.

(7) Matthew Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, p. xxxiii of Introduction.

(8) A firm grasp of this fact would cast light upon all such expressions as "temptation by the Evil One," and would make clear the fact that men cannot get rid of temptation by the device of "bowing Satan over the frontier of their thought." Browning makes Andrea del Sarto say, "Incentives come from the soul's self." That is just as true of incentives of evil as of incentives to good. Temptation that is not felt to be such is not temptation at all. But it would not be felt to be such but for some cooperation from the person concerned. Professor Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 248, dealing with the Temptation of Christ, makes the reality and strength of temptation to depend upon "the consciousness of pressure in motive." The truth,

rather, is that it depends upon the degree of interest in a proposal known to be wrong. No person could be "conscious of motive pressure" to steal who did not *want* to steal. And he could not, in such a situation, be the seat of a moral struggle, if at the same time he did not want *not* to steal. For an exceedingly clear discussion of the psychology of sin and temptation, see Steven, *The Psychology of the Christian Soul*, chap. iv. Steven says: "A temptation is the presentation of an evil to our minds in some form that appeals to us" (p. 119).

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SIN

The doctrine of original sin was meant to bring us all under the sense of guilt. Theology in the past has labored to show that we are in some sense partakers of Adam's guilt. But the conscience of mankind has never been convinced. Partakers in his wretchedness we might well be by our family coherence but guilt belongs only to personality and requires will and freedom. On the other hand, an enlightened conscience cannot help feeling a growing sense of responsibility and guilt for the common sins under which humanity is bound and to which we all contribute. Who of us can say that he has never by word or look contributed to the atmospheric pressure of lubricious sex stimulation which bears down on young and old, and the effect of which after the War no man can predict without sickening? Whose hand has never been stained with income for which no equivalent had been given in service? How many business men have promoted the advance of democracy in their own industrial kingdom when autocracy seemed safer and more efficient? What nation has never been drunk with a sense of its glory and importance, and which has never seized colonial possessions or developed its little imperialism when the temptation came its way? The sin of all is in each of us, and every one of us has scattered seeds of evil, the final multiplied harvest of which no man knows.—RAUSCHENBUSCH, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, pp. 90 and 91.

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SIN

IN the last chapter it was pointed out that sin gets much of its tragic significance from the fact that in the very act of becoming real it passes into history. And history, once made, is made forever. A deed may be forgotten, but the deed itself has entered into the sum of that reality which is by its very nature imperishable. Eucken's suggestion that the present may change the past has a certain value that must be recognized, but it is not true in any absolute sense.¹ Much more fruitful is Bergson's contention that the fundamental psychical function is memory, so that character, as the resultant of all the past experiences, is really identical with memory.² Lotze is right: nothing that ever really existed can ever cease to be.³ Morally, of course, the principle works both ways. If our sinful deeds are irrevocable, so also are our righteous deeds. The principle has been extensively employed in the world's religions. Zarathushtra, for example, employed it in his teaching of "the treasury of good deeds," according to which at last the man is to be judged.⁴ It is not, of course, being suggested here that we can find our place in the moral scale by striking a balance between our deeds as good and evil. No Protestant, at any rate, remembering the pit whence he was digged, could possibly tolerate that. Only, every man is entitled to what comfort he can find in the fact that that same necessity that immortalizes his moral failures immortalizes also his moral successes.⁵ No man's record is either wholly good or wholly bad. Yet it is the indelible character of the record as sinful that most concerns us, especially in moments of moral awakening. Any man who has caught the least glimmer of the

absoluteness of moral demand knows the feeling of helplessness and despair which is engendered by the contemplation of his own sinful past.

This feeling of despair is only intensified by the recognition of the far-reaching results of our deeds. Sin is a form of personal activity. It is a direction of will. It can exist only as a person chooses to have it exist. Apart from persons there is no sin. But a person is not a self-contained isolated unity. He is conditioned on a material order and on a social order. We can speak of "order" here because we can speak also of "law." An order is law at work, and where there is no order there is no law. Law exists only as active.⁶ It is known only in its fruits. Our ignorance of the law can in nowise affect the reality of the order. Comte may have been unduly courageous when he declared that the laws of the social order could be classified and systematized with the same absoluteness as obtains concerning the laws of the material order. There is an element of spontaneity and, therefore, of uncertainty about personality and its action which renders induction in this field exceedingly precarious. Indeed, it is characteristic of the philosophy of some of Comte's most illustrious countrymen that categorical prediction is held to be questionable even in regard to the material order.⁷ But, however this may be, the fact remains that there is a social order which can be called that because in each the *causal relation* prevails. It may not prevail in each in precisely the same way, but unless it did prevail there could be no order.

Now, it is just this fact of the prevalence of the causal relation which secures to sin the certainty of consequences. Not, it must be said, consequences that are invariably apparent and that may always be described. R. W. Dale found a clue to the nature of the atonement in the theory that while it was a moral judgment that all sin deserved to be punished, there was no evidence to show that such punishment always did follow.⁸ Our definition of sin as involv-

ing a disposition which might or might not manifest itself outwardly, would seem to be in agreement with this. But Dale gives too narrow a connotation to the term "punishment." He does not see what Bowne has pointed out so clearly, that sin is essentially a "displacement of will" which in a causal system necessarily yields "organic consequences,"⁹ nor does he allow sufficiently for the fact so solemnly emphasized by Royce, that "a traitorous deed"—Royce's definition of sin—is its own punishment.¹⁰ Skill in avoiding the more obvious and unpleasant results of sin—a type of worldly prudence enjoined by the Cyrenaics—does not change the fact of the sin. Sin is sin, and it entails loss, and the loss is not less real that we cannot catalogue it in detail. It is not visible penalty that establishes guilt, as though the failure of discernible penalty to appear was equivalent to a verdict of innocence. So far as the disposition or the deed is responsible, the guilt is inseparable from it.

It is because we live in a world of order that it is right to describe as organic consequences all the entail of sin. That causal power which in the end we must identify with God operates through prescribed conditions. In fulfilling the conditions we at the same time initiate the consequences. To commit sin is to create conditions that lead infallibly to results, because a sinful act is the act of a person who is inextricably involved in an order determined as to its connections by the Divine Will, and distinguishable as material, social, and moral. The precise relations obtaining between these three, whether the one could be understood apart from the other, whether even any one of them could exist alone, and whether all are not to be traced to a common principle or ground so that the differences are differences in unity—these are questions of a purely philosophic nature which do not concern us here. The important fact is that there is an order whose domination the person can never escape. The order in its *material* aspect makes no allowance whatever for the quality of personal intention, and poison given

or taken by accident is just as deadly as though it had been given or taken with intent. The order in its *social* aspect makes some allowance for intention, but only to the extent of modifying, not of abrogating, the total social consequence of the personal act and therefore the responsibility. It may, for example, not classify as a murderer the blundering statesman whose policy leads to an unexpected war, but the social results of the policy follow none the less—soldiers are no less truly maimed, children are no less truly orphaned, antagonisms are no less truly generated, and conflicting interests no less truly clash. The order in its *moral* aspect does, however, make the fullest allowance for every ameliorating circumstance attending the personal act. It records and judges purpose and volition, whether these manifest themselves only as disposition, or whether they pass beyond disposition into deed, and it does this quite independently of the character of material or social results. The moral order registers its relentless judgment even when to all human knowledge evil volition came and went and left no discoverable trace. In a word, visible consequences do not yield the true measure of sin. Sin may exist in their absence, just as such consequences may be present in a degree apparently out of all proportion to the seriousness of the offense.

The inevitableness of the moral judgment: "I did it, and I am guilty, and the deed cannot be undone," has already been emphasized. The history, as something past and gone, cannot be changed. It may be *dealt with* in a manner that satisfies the moral sense, but changed in its character it can never be. Add now to this the fact of those organic consequences of sin which follow because personality is materially and socially conditioned, and the further fact that the same necessity which gives permanence to personal acts conceived as causes gives a like permanence to the results as they take their place in the order. Results as they rest directly on the sinner afford no great problem. Their con-

gruity is for the most part evident, and terrible though they may sometimes be, they do not often create a feeling of despair. Indeed, they may even be rejoiced in by a tortured conscience and offer a ray of hope.¹¹ No man who is a real man ever protests for long against bearing his own burden. But the case appears wholly different when the results of sin are considered from the standpoint of their social character and significance. The sinner may hope to be forgiven for his sin by that God against whom it is seen finally to have been committed. He may endure without a murmur, as something justly deserved, the weakened body, or the lost opportunity, or the social ostracism. Not here is the deadliest venom of the sting of sin. Rather is it in the fact that there rests upon the sinner the responsibility for a body of social consequence which he can never overtake and destroy. We may trust God to forgive us for our sins; we may pray for strength to enable us to endure as deserved and remedial chastisement the results of our sins as they affect us personally. But what can we do when, either by the processes of our own thought as we consider our life, or by a discovery thrust upon us more or less accidentally, or by a swift illuminating flash of the Holy Spirit, we are brought to realize that our sin involved consequences not only for God, not only for ourselves, but for *other people* as well? No man liveth unto himself, and therefore no man sinneth unto himself. It may not be possible wholly to convert "moral responsibility" into "social responsibility," but the difference between them is not great, and they are in any event inseparable. As was suggested above, it is impossible to disentangle the moral and social orders. The moral makes itself manifest in the social, and the social illustrates and intensifies the moral. If it is God who speaks in conscience, calling attention to that personal act which ought not to have been done, it is surely God who speaks in those social ramifications which assure the perpetuity of personal action.

One of the hopeful signs of our day is the growing disposition to recognize these ramifications and their significance, and in consequence to give to righteousness and unrighteousness a social interpretation.¹² There is ample warrant for this in the Hebrew prophets and in the words of Jesus. In fact, what may be called the moral aspects of social science have emphasized most wonderfully the inexhaustible character of the Bible message. But the emphasis is a sword with a double edge. The more we see that *it has mattered profoundly to other people* what manner of persons we were, the more hopeless appears the task of dealing adequately with the problem that emerges. Byron was hardly an authoritative exponent of the ways of God, quiver though he did "with the dart he drave," but the man who wrote the *Ode to Napoleon Bonaparte* had at least used his imagination:

". . . Dark Spirit! what must be
The madness of thy memory!"

But a man does not need to have butchered in cold blood twenty-five hundred enemy prisoners because they were encumbering him, in order to be maddened by memory.¹³ He does not need to have occupied a throne in order to have social significance. The humblest of mortals is continually originating a train of consequences which enter into and help determine the experiences of many others. The fact that no human wisdom is able to trace these consequences, the fact that many of them must remain forever unknown to him who was their immediate cause, the fact that the mind cannot consciously retain the memory of each several sinful act that thus worked itself into the life of society—all this, so far from relieving the situation, only the more heavily loads it with tragedy. Every man knows something of the difficulty which has come to pass in other lives because of him, and what little he does know of this saddens his heart. If the revelation of the whole of it were given to

him, the burden would be greater than reason could bear. But this limitation on knowledge in nowise changes the reality of the fact. The fact itself is inseparable from life. Man, as a social being, is involved in a social order, and it is of the very essence of that order that there shall continually proceed from the individual and enter into the social structure a body of consequences to whose being and influence no limits may be discerned.

The possibility of restitution will be suggested. Restitution is a great and noble principle, and we shall have occasion to emphasize it later.¹⁴ But it is hedged around with very serious limitations. More and more will restitution come to take its place as a valid moral and social demand. The social concepts have a way of hanging together which is deeply suggestive. It is soon seen that the recognition of the social aspects of sin involves a social repentance, hence a social restitution, hence a social redemption. The same profound principle which introduces into the life of society the effects of unrighteousness introduces also the effects of righteousness. Precisely in that fact is the foundation of meliorism—the hope of better things. Few spectacles are more inspiring than that of a man seeking by all that lies in his power to remove the baneful social effects of his own sin and of the sin of others. In no other way can social redemption come to pass. The world is saved in the degree in which the saved become themselves saviours. The Parsee Saoshyant or Deliverer needs his “helpers,” and Paul describes the Christian as a coworker *of* God besides *with* God.¹⁵ But there are inevitable limitations on the operation of the principle of restitution. It is under the limitation of inadequate knowledge of all the consequences of personal sin. It is under the limitation of inadequate power on the part of any man to overtake his own record even to the extent of his knowledge of it. But above all is it under the limitation of the hard fact that what is done can never be undone. Earthly tribunals may decide what shall be

regarded as a satisfactory commutation by the criminal for a statutory offense. But such a procedure is in reality a moral fiction: it does not touch the moral tragedy at all. Killing one man because he killed another does not restore the first victim to his family, nor does it change the moral status of the criminal. There is no such thing as the equivalent in penalty of moral fault, as though, the penalty having been borne, the moral fault disappeared. "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned!" cried repentant David. Yes, but no violated home arose from its ruins, and no Uriah appeared from the grave to lead once more the armies of the king. "And when they were put to death, I gave my hand against them." With what humiliation of heart Paul made the confession we may only guess, but not all his toil could erase the record:

"Dear men and women, whom I sought and slew!

Ah, when we mingle in the heavenly places,
How will I weep to Stephen and to you!"

And this too:

"Make Thou, O Christ, a dying of my living;
Purge from the sin, but never from the pain!"¹⁶

Let us put the whole dreadful truth into one brief statement: No man can expiate his own sin, or have it expiated by another, if by expiation is meant the offering of an exact moral equivalent of the sin. And this appears as the more true when one transcends the individualistic view of sin and sees it in its character of social destructiveness.

NOTES ON CHAPTER X

(1) Eucken's position is well stated by Boyce Gibson, in his *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, the closing paragraphs of chap. v: "To reanimate the past in and through present inward experience we must already have broken with it *qua event*"

(p. 84). See Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit*, chap. ii, pp. 139-181.

(2) "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. . . . What are we, in fact, what is our *character*, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth—nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions?" (*Creative Evolution*, pp. 4 and 5; see *Matter and Memory* for fuller psychological treatment).

(3) *Metaphysics*, vol. ii, p. 182.

(4) See J. H. Moulton's fine exposition of Zoroastrianism, *The Treasure of the Magi*, p. 43.

(5) Cf. observations on this topic in Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Re-making*, chap. xvi. "Nothing is more natural than to feel one is making up for a wrong by good offices of some sort, or than a misstep is destroying a good record; but the result of such a balancing process is that our moral self-consciousness tends to become nondescript. . . . It is much as if we should balance off the black of one part of a picture against the white of another part and declare the whole a muddy gray" (pp. 127-128, revised edition; p. 104, old edition. Order of sentences is changed).

(6) This point of view is characteristic of Lotze. See his *Philosophy of Religion*, Ladd's edition, chap. vi, § 49, for a convenient statement.

(7) E. g., Boutroux, *Contingency of the Laws of Nature*.

(8) "In the actual condition of the world, either some men suffer too much for their sins, or some men suffer too little" (*The Atonement*, lect. viii, on "The Remission of Sins").

(9) See *Studies in Christianity*, pp. 150-164; *Atonement*, pp. 79ff.

(10) *Problem of Christianity*, vol. i, lect. v, on "Time and Guilt."

(11) This fact may be richly illustrated from practically all of the great writers of tragedy, and from those novelists, like Hawthorne and Dostoeffsky, who deal with the psychology of conscience.

(12) Cf. Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, and Ellwood, *The Reconstruction of Religion*.

(13) The reference, of course, is to Napoleon's heartless massacre at Jaffa. See W. H. Hudson, *The Man Napoleon*, p. 92.

(14) See Chapter XV.

(15) "Saoshyant joins with himself his helpers who are bearing the burden with him, of whom he is always speaking in terms of warm and generous affection" (Moulton, *ibid.*, p. 44).

(16) *Saint Paul*, by F. W. H. Myers.

CHAPTER XI

THE REDEMPTIONAL REQUIREMENT

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Himself—his ideas and sensations—never fell again precisely into focus as on that day, yet he was the richer by its experience. But for once to have come into subjection to that peculiar mood, to have felt the train of reflections which belong to it really forcible and conclusive—to have been led by them to a conclusion—to have apprehended the *Great Ideal*, so palpably that it defined a personal gratitude and the sense of a friendly hand laid upon him amid the shadows of the world, made this one particular day among all days a space marked in life and forever recognizable. It gave him a definite and ascertained measure of his moral or intellectual need, of what his soul really demanded from the powers, whatever they might be, which had brought him, as he was, into the world at all. And, again, would he be faithful to himself, to his own habits and leading suppositions, if he did but remain just there? Must not all the rest of his life be a seeking after the equivalent of that reasonable Ideal, among so-called actual things—a gathering up of every trace and note of it, here or there, which actual experience might present to him?—WALTER PATER, *Marius the Epicurean*, closing paragraph of chap. xix.

CHAPTER XI

THE REDEMPTIONAL REQUIREMENT

THE history of religion is the history of man's effort to find redemption, and in keeping with the tenor of the present discussion such redemption will consist in the knowledge of the nature and conditions of man's true end, and its actual realization in personal experience. With the emerging of the consciousness of self there came also the consciousness of needs such as the material order could not satisfy. Man has always felt himself to be greater than his environment. Much of his activity has sprung from that conviction, and it is here that we must place religion. Religion is allied to the "over-individual" reference. Its diversity of conceptions and multiplicity of details all have a common root, are the expression of a common conviction, point to the existence of a common need, and have reference ultimately to a common end.

We shall not make much progress in the understanding of man's search for redemption if we confine our attention to the word itself.¹ The derivation of a word may have for certain purposes very large value, but it does not necessarily fix the meaning of the word for all time. Because the word "redemption" may be traced to a root having the commercial sense of exchange for a specified price does not mean that we are therefore debarred from conceiving redemption in any other sense. The word as used in religion is to be regarded as a metaphor. The losing sight of that simple fact has been responsible for none knows how much of misapprehension and misstatement. The moment there enters religion the thought that redemption proceeds according to the analogy of a commercial transaction, a brood of

other errors are quick to follow. A brigand chief bargaining for the ransom of one of his captives, a shrewd merchant haggling over the price for which he is willing to part with a possession, a feudal baron laying down the requirements according to which alone his fiefs may enjoy his favor and protection, an unemotional judge announcing the money payment for which a crime may be commuted, and not caring at all whether the criminal or some other make the payment, so it be made—all these procedures are irresistibly suggested by some of the historic discussions of the process of redemption.² It is well enough to use illustrative analogies: we have the warrant of the New Testament for that; but all too often the illustration has been supposed to be also a precise description and even an exact philosophy of the process itself.

“Five bleeding wounds he bears,
Received on Calvary;
They pour effectual prayers,
They strongly plead for me:
‘Forgive him, O forgive,’ they cry,
‘Nor let that ransomed sinner die!’”

The entire hymn has an honored place in the church, but one needs to sing it not only with the spirit but with the understanding also. Does the Son *really* “plead” with an otherwise obdurate Father, and remind him that justice having been satisfied the guilty sinner must be pardoned? What a travesty on Him of whom Jesus himself said, “He that hath seen me—seeking, suffering, serving, saving—hath seen the Father!”

Which is not to suggest that man does not need to be redeemed from his sins and errors. He has no need that is greater and more imperative. If we take redemption in its sense of deliverance, we may say that there is that *from* whose control he needs to be delivered, and there is that *unto* whose control he needs to be delivered. Bearing

in mind, then, our discussion up to this point, let us inquire as to what a proposed redemption must really offer.

I. KNOWLEDGE. Adequate knowledge is absolutely fundamental to a satisfying moral experience. It is no false instinct which has insisted on "revelation" being at the basis of religious requirement and practice. Doing is not necessarily implicit in knowing, but knowledge of some sort is certainly prerequisite to the doing. "My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge." "How shall they know except they be taught?" The truth presented may be interpreted in different ways, but that the truth shall be presented—this is a demand made by the very nature of the case. Many factors enter into the idea and experience of redemption, and knowledge concerning those factors is indispensable. For example, redemption has to do with the relation of man to God: then the man must know the nature of that God with whom he is to deal. Redemption has to do with the relation of man to his past: then he must know how that past is to be viewed. Redemption has to do with man in relation to his kind: then he must know the principle according to which that relation is to be determined. Redemption has to do with an ideal of personal character in which man's true nature shall come to self-realization: then he must know himself as he is meant to be—that original divine thought for him in which his being is grounded. Redemption has to do with man's need of power adequate to bring him to that which he ought to be: then he must know the secret of the experience of that power. Ignorance on such questions necessarily means deprivation of fullness of life. It is not being maintained that knowledge of the kind in question shall be what is called scientific. It will not be logically demonstrable. The subject of the knowledge is a value and an experience which lie outside that area in which exact demonstration is attainable.³ That is why we must retain the idea of revelation, and that is why we must insist that the content of revelation is conditioned, in both

the giving and the receiving, on faith. It is required of such knowledge that it shall be able to secure the progress of man toward that end which every sign indicates he is intended to realize.

2. JUSTIFICATION. The term is used purposely because it can be made to cover so much, and because nothing that is offered as a redemption is really such unless it provides for all that this term covers. There is that which a man ought to have been and has not been. When he sees his past failure in the light of that revealed truth which illuminates life's end, there is only one way of describing his feelings: he has an overwhelming consciousness of sin and guilt. He faces the record of his own past as it affects him in his personal character. He faces it as it has set in motion social consequences which it is wholly beyond his reach to undo. He faces it as it assumes the character of disobedience to God—and it does not matter at all for this purpose how he thinks of God—and he knows that the marks of his disobedience are upon him. At such moments of self-examination a man confesses to himself that he confronts a situation which renders him practically helpless. If he realizes fully what it all means, *he is afraid*. Let us say even that he ought to be afraid—that fear in such circumstances is the natural thing—that the absence of fear betrays a want of clear understanding of the issue—and that fear is the first real step on the upward path. But he must be delivered from it, for fear is a disintegrating emotion, and where there is fear of the past there can be no confidence of the present or hope of the future. Just here, however, the seeming paradox of all sincere moral self-searching makes itself known. In proportion as a man realizes the full significance of his own sinful past so that he is led to utter self-condemnation, he feels how great is his need of deliverance while yet he hesitates to take the deliverance that may be offered. The bondage of fear will remain unless something is done about its cause that satisfies the man, *and that*

satisfies him at that very moment when he is most overwhelmed by the sense of his sin. No man to whom moral reality is precious will accept a justification, that is, a pronouncement that he is "made right," that has the marks of being a fiction.⁴ Hence it is not for nothing that the idea of atonement has persisted in human thought. Men have groped for it, hoped for it, believed in it. Often the expression of the idea has been unbelievably crude, but no crudity of ritual or creed or practice could ever quite conceal the underlying truth. Justification—let us now call it forgiveness—is an integral element in the complete idea of redemption. The question may at least be asked here, whether in view of all that is involved the basis of forgiveness be not in atonement in some sense?⁵

3. MOTIVATION. Redemption is not only a problem of adequate knowledge; not only a problem of adequate dealing with personal moral history in all its relations: it is also a problem of adequate motivation. It is of small use to lay bare to a man that whole body of truth with reference to which redemption is to be understood, or to bring him to the place where he can realize the peace of forgiveness, if that is all that is done. The revelation of a truth may prove to be the most discouraging thing in the world. Hence the disciples' amazed question: "Who then can be saved?" It is true that a man must know; it is true that he must be forgiven and restored: what is no less true is that he must be empowered. Besides the fact of his past deeds and what they require is the fact of the basic disposition out of which they sprang. "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." Such a prayer calls attention to that bitter fact of our human nature we have already considered—its moral instability. A redemption that cannot cope with that instability cannot be final. God forgives, yes, but—if one dare say it—even God would grow weary of doing nothing else but forgive. It is a blessed truth that a man may be justified, but his justification is not an end in

itself. He does not exist just in order to be forgiven any more than God exists just in order to forgive. Rather is the reason for a man's life in the realization of a state to which forgiveness is a condition—a necessary condition, it is true, but no more than that. It is a great thing to raise the fallen and cheer the faint: it is a greater thing to keep him standing and provide that he do not faint again. Nothing will save a man from falling but a sufficient motive to keep standing. Much has been written about “a renewed nature.” Innumerable devices have been resorted to to keep “the flesh” in subjection. The long and sad chapter of ascetic rigor in all lands is an illustration of the widespread realization of the internal discord rather than of wisdom in subduing it. Psychologically, at any rate, the problem is one of motivation. After all, there can be no such thing as a literal “cleansing” of the nature. What is really meant by the cleansing of the nature is such a rearrangement of interests as that a dominant motive is allied to a worthy end. Other necessary conditions being present, an end becomes possible of realization in precisely the degree that motive is regnant in regard to it, and where motive is not regnant the presence of the other conditions will avail nothing. It is through motive, then, that redemption becomes operative in the inner life. A motive is a person's reason for doing or being something. Give him a sufficiently strong reason, and he can—within the limitations just indicated—do anything. He can, for example, then organize his whole life with reference to a single end, even when that end is—as it must be in a complete redemption—utter loyalty and self-commitment to that comprehensive moral ideal in which inheres absolute value.

4. RECTIFICATION. From the standpoint of what is required in a complete redemption, rectification or restitution must always be included as a correlate of justification or forgiveness. Justification has a passive connotation: forgiveness is something to be received; rectification has an

active connotation: restitution is something to be rendered. Justification concerns that aspect of the personal record about which the person himself can do nothing except repent and seek forgiveness. He is "made to be right." But no man can be satisfied with that alone. He needs not only to be "made right," but also, so far as that is possible, to "make right." In other words, implicit in the notion of deliverance as here understood is the need of restitution. A complete restitution is not possible. That we have seen. The material and social bases of personality involve that personal action shall lead to irrevocable consequences. The impossibility of undoing the past points to justification as the only door of escape. But the impossibility of an enlightened conscience being satisfied with a purely passive attitude in relation to the past record as certainly points to rectification as the demand that the justified sinner will gladly recognize and gladly meet. Just as surely as there are remedial agencies in nature, so surely is there remedial power in a forgiven person who has found a new center of moral organization in the acceptance of a great end. But that remedial power must be put into action. In the degree in which it is not, the whole meaning and purpose of forgiveness is called in question. The deliverance *from* must pass over into a deliverance *unto*. For describing what is needed, we cannot employ a nobler phrase than that of "human service." Service springing from such a motive—while it would still need to be supplemented by other motives—would originate organic social consequences of redeeming power. Even where circumstances might render direct restitution impossible (and this is all too often the case), there would be in such service some atonement for the innumerable ills which spring from the unrepented action of others. We shall see later how fruitful is that principle which brings it to pass that service rendered to one man becomes service rendered to humanity. It suffices now to mention the fact that it is through the necessary interlacings

of social life that restitution becomes a truly redeeming force.

5. PERMANENCE. The final demand on redemption is that it shall contain in itself the guarantee of a personal achievement and a social order wholly agreeing with the absolute moral ideal, no matter with what increasing clarity that ideal shall be conceived as the ages unroll. Implied in every form of human unrest and dissatisfaction is an ideal. The heart is restless, and it finds no rest until it discovers what it wants. The gleam is ever before us, and we follow it. What we want is the assurance that we shall never reach the place where there will no longer be a gleam for us to follow. Is there anywhere offered to men an end of such quality as that we can never think of its being superseded? We have seen that the nature of man is the root out of which grow those ends in whose realization man realizes himself. We have seen the significance in this connection of that spontaneous emotion describable as desire, and that desire, just because of its spontaneity and lawlessness, needs to be subjected to critical control. We have seen that this controlling function is exercised by the organizing power of an end, so that what is needed is a supreme end whose scope and influence shall be all-comprehensive. To such an end, injecting meaning into the whole range of experience, is to be assigned absolute value. And we have seen that there are certain hindrances to the attainment of this end. The contention of the present chapter is that the removal of these hindrances, both the negative and the positive, is a proper demand on that which is offered as redemption. But in the very nature of the case, redemption is a process. It is a process keeping step with the life-movement itself. A process, however, just because it involves time, involves also the possibility of the emergence of new situations, and new situations involve at least the theoretical possibility of the ineffectiveness of what has hitherto been relied upon. Hence this final demand—that the proffered

redemption shall contain in itself adequacy to every personal and social and moral situation that can possibly arise in this world or in any other. Or, to change the terminology, what is presented as supreme end and therefore absolute value must be such that its being changed or superseded is inconceivable. It must be able to exercise its interpretive and organizing function on a universal scale. There must be in it an "infinite power of going on." There must be in it the promise of final peace and final satisfaction for *every* man. There must be in it the foreshadowing of a day, and the potency at last to introduce that day, when God shall dwell with men and men with God in a fellowship untrammelled by any sin. Only to that which can never be outgrown, and which fosters that to which it ministers and ministers to that which it fosters, can moral finality be assigned.

NOTES ON CHAPTER XI

(1) For fuller discussion of the term "redemption" and its synonyms, see the following: Tymms, *The Christian Idea of Atonement*, Lect. V. "The Old Testament will be searched in vain for any suggestion of a ransom or redemption price received by God, or of a price paid by him to others" (p. 243). "The New Testament writers freely speak of man's redemption as procured or effected *at a great cost*. . . . But while this is to be kept in the forefront of all our thinking and teaching, we cannot too strongly reprobate the assumption which underlies so many ancient and modern theories of redemption, viz., that buying things or persons at a great cost necessarily implies a consideration offered by one party and accepted by another. Until this assumption is effectually eradicated from Christian thought, some theory, or some vague admission, of a price paid by Christ and accepted by God will persist to the great detriment of faith" (pp. 244, 245). Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. v, especially §§ 2, 3, 10, 11, 12. "Another key will have to be sought for the apostle's doctrine of salvation, secured in the death of Jesus, than the judicial theory

of substitution and satisfaction" (p. 138). Lofthouse, *Altar, Cross, and Community*, chap. viii. Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pt. iv, chap. vii. "The humiliation, sufferings, and death of the Son of God, prompted by infinite love, represent and satisfy the total perfection of God. If Paul has expressed this sublime truth in commercial and legal analogies, it need cause us no difficulty. The ancient theology which built upon these analogies as if they were scientific formulas, and the modern theology which rejects them altogether, are equally unjust to the thought of the apostle. . . . The essence of Paul's thought does not lie in such notions as those of a deified law, quantitative equivalents, and literal substitutions and transfers, but in the conception of a fuller realization in Christ of God's perfections in his treatment of mankind than was otherwise possible" (p. 412). Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, chap. iv, "The Lamb of God."

(2) See the earlier chapters of Lofthouse, *ibid.*, for a readable account of the idea of redemption and the search for it in the ethnic faiths. For the idea in Christian history, any one of the following brief treatises may be consulted: Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*; Robert Mackintosh, *Historic Theories of Atonement*; Grensted, *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement*. Many of the books setting forth a particular theory of redemption give also history and criticism, e. g., Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*; Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*.

(3) Cf. Garvie, *Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, chap. ii, § 2. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, chap. viii, c, (b). "Faith," says Galloway, "is an act of the spiritual and self-conscious person, who affirms the religious values, and God the supreme Value to be essential to his own soul and to the meaning of the world. . . . The object of religious faith is the good which corresponds to the needs of the inner life. That good the soul cannot discover among the conditioned things of experience; so it goes beyond the given world and reaches its goal in the transcendent and unconditioned, in the idea of God as supreme Good and supreme End" (pp. 330 and 332).

(4) Sanday, however, in his *Romans* (International Critical Commentary), commenting on "Justification," etc., regards it

as a "fiction." See note on "The Righteousness of God," pp. 34-39. "The Christian life is made to have its beginning in a fiction. . . . The facts of language are inexorable" (p. 36). But in the same paragraph, Sanday goes on to say: "When a man makes a great change such as that which the first Christians made when they embraced Christianity, he is allowed to start on his career with a clean record; his sin-stained past is not reckoned against him. The change is the great thing; it is that at which God looks." And again: "When the process of Justification is thus reduced to its simplest elements we see that . . . it is simply Forgiveness, Free Forgiveness." It is difficult to see for what reason a forgiveness which is based upon a genuine change, and a repudiation of the past, is to be regarded as a "fiction."

(5) A discussion of atonement will be found below, in Chapter XIII, the section dealing with "Christ and Forgiveness."

· CHAPTER XII
THE SEARCH FOR REDEMPTION

The Son of God holds in his pierced hands the keys of all the religions, explains all the factors of their being and all the persons through whom they have been realized. And this means that the author would not, if he could, take the religion he loves out of the cycle of the historical religions. On the contrary, he holds that Christianity must stand there if it is to be really known and truly honored. The time is coming, and we shall hope that the man is coming with it, which shall give us a new Analogy, speaking a more generous and hopeful language, breathing a nobler spirit, aspiring to a larger day, than Butler's. It will seek to discover in man's religions the story of his quest after God, but no less of God's quest after him; and it will listen in all of them for the voice of the Eternal, who has written his law upon the heart in characters that can never be eradicated.—FAIRBAIRN, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, Preface, p. x.

CHAPTER XII

THE SEARCH FOR REDEMPTION

THE investigation of psychic origins is a fascinating but precarious pursuit. One of the chief dangers attending it is that there will be made an unwarranted application of the findings. It is falsely assumed that to know the genesis of a process is to be justified in putting all the later phases of the process on the same level with the lowly beginnings. Even the believer in the most crass mechanistic evolution has no case here, as Bowne has so convincingly shown, but for one who believes in a God with a plan and purpose it is utterly impossible. Because immortality, for example, may have been a thought originating in men's minds through a belief in ghosts, therefore we must surrender immortality, no matter what considerations of a more weighty character may be adduced in support of the belief! It would be well if our skeptical philosophies would bear in mind the fact that the truth of a conclusion does not necessarily stand or fall by the truth of its premises. Some very sound conclusions have been supported by very fallacious reasoning. One might add also that some very cogent reasoning has been employed in the defense of unsound claims.

It does not matter profoundly, therefore, what theory we hold of the origin of religious practice. That a dogmatic statement concerning it is impossible ought to be recognized by all. But we cannot be far wrong if we identify in point of time the appearance of the three factors which are necessarily basal in all religion: the sense of the supernatural, conscience, and the search for redemption. Both their logical and temporal order may be the order here indicated. Whether it is or not is of no practical moment. The dawn-

ing sense of the supernatural brought with it that sense of obligation which creates the conditions in which conscience becomes active, and that ensuing sense of need which manifests itself in a search. The modes in which the expression was made have been infinitely diverse, depending on a variety of geographical, social, and cultural factors. These different forms have a great interest in themselves, but that interest must never blind us to *that to which they bear witness*. They bear witness to the presence in man of an ineradicable element which impels him to a quest from which he can turn aside only at the cost of denying the very power that makes him as he is.¹

Our purpose does not call for detailed discussion of the various forms which the search for redemption has taken, but a brief mention of the more important of them will help us the better to appreciate the significance of that which has come to us in Jesus Christ.²

I. LEGALISM. Legalism is the search for redemption by means of the strict observance of a body of specific laws held to be of divine authority. The distinction herein suggested between the Law of God and a body of laws ought not to be over emphasized, but the distinction is certainly valid, and it is very important. If redemption is ever achieved, it will be by means of obedience to the Law of God, but that is by no means the same as saying that legalism is the true method of the quest. It is probable that legalism has never been entirely separate from religion. It has crept into practically all of the great religions: Brahmanism, Confucianism, Parseeism, Judaism, Mohammendanism, and Christianity (in certain of its forms). It is possible to make too much of the conflict between prophetism and legalism in the Old Testament, but there is a very real conflict there that is exceedingly suggestive.³ What is known as Judaism in contrast to the earlier religion of Israel is almost entirely legalistic. The Levitical legislation was designed to secure individual and social conformity to prescribed rules, and the

attempted reformation under Josiah, and the "theocracy" set up by Ezra and Nehemiah, bear witness at once to the fascination and the inherent defect of the method. That type of Pharisaism against which Jesus set himself so steadfastly was the supreme illustration of how legalism defeats its own purpose. Intended presumably as a means of bringing men to God (the critic might suggest that it was intended rather to strengthen the influence of the legislators), it so multiplies regulations that eventually the regulations are themselves deified. The result is all too often religious externality, ethical shallowness, social indifference, and intolerance of nonconformity in others.

2. RITUALISM. Ritualism is the search for redemption by participation in a ceremony conceived, in its higher form, as symbolizing the religious experience of the participant, and in its lower form as making the experience possible, or even as constituting it by being an acceptable substitute. The method has certain affinities with legalism, and the two often go together, but there are profound differences between them. For one thing, ritualism has a communal or social emphasis which is for the most part wanting in the case of legalism. Certain social results may follow from the individual's obedience to prescribed regulations, and such results may even be urged as a motive for obedience, but more often the regulations have a purely individual reference. But ritualism is essentially communal: the individual shares with others in that which is believed to have meaning for all. Sacrifice, or whatever else is the central idea of the ritual, is almost invariably conceived as in some way socially representative. Again, ritualism in distinction from legalism has a great emotional value. The Hebrew Day of Atonement, a great Hindu festival, the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Roman Mass—all have shown themselves possessed of a power to stir the participant to a holy rapture. And in the third place, ritualism holds out a promise of deliverance. It speaks of a world free from the fever and fret of time.

It momentarily envisages the ideal. The worshiper forgets his past failures (are they not even now obliterated?) and sees the possibility of his becoming one with his God. Perchance he even for the time being realizes the experience. Surely, these communal and emotional and anticipative aspects of ritualism are not to be despised. No religion which ignores them can long endure. Yet ritualistic history is not encouraging. It too easily allows of the separation of religion from life. Its tendency is inevitably to degenerate into an *ex opere operato*. As a concomitant of the search for redemption it has large value. But its own history shows that it is not and cannot be a comprehensive solution of the whole problem with which religion is concerned.

3. ASCETICISM. Asceticism is the search for redemption by voluntary self-infliction of physical discomfort conceived as necessary condition to moral victory and spiritual freedom. To the question, Is the world to be renounced or to be embraced? the ascetic answers that it is to be renounced.⁴ He claims that the ordinary life of the world is a snare. It is evil by its very nature. Since the body is part of it, the body too is evil. To give way to the world, or to engage in its accustomed occupations, or good-naturedly to tolerate it, is to pursue the sure way to spiritual bondage and death. Whether the ascetic be a Greek Cynic, or a Hindu devotee, or a Jewish Essene, or an early Christian hermit, or a pillar-saint, or a mediæval monk or nun, or a member of a modern "Religious Community," back of the fasting, the vigils, the solitariness, the flagellations, the contempt of comfort, the scorn of all passing pleasure, lies the same essentially dualistic view of things. It is a dualism of a type that involves principles whose practical application on a large scale would destroy the very bases of society. India affords the classic example of unrestrained asceticism. The practice has not had equally destructive effects elsewhere chiefly because it has met the check of a healthy naturalism.

Indeed, the two tendencies, the ascetic and the naturalistic—to call it that—sometimes exist together in the same individual or community, as is so vividly shown in some of Browning's descriptions of monks and other ecclesiastics. The advocates of asceticism often quote the example of Jesus. But Jesus was anything but an ascetic either in teaching or in practice. No man can be an ascetic who sees in life and its conditions the sphere of the activity of Divine Providence, and Jesus saw that as no other had ever done. He did not embrace the world, but neither did he despise it. Rather shall we say that he overcame it in the sense that he so used it as to make it *instrumental* to his vocation. There is undoubtedly a place for ascetic discipline when it springs from a sound principle. But the principle is not sound which assumes the inherent badness of all the natural and necessary functions and activities of life and the world. There is a vast difference between "crushing" our normal instincts and desires, and making them our allies by directing them to worthy ends. And there is a vast difference between the superinduced passivity of the ascetic, and the fullness of life of the man who has learned with Paul that all things are his because he is Christ's and Christ is God's.⁵

4. NATURALISM. Naturalism is the search for redemption by discovering and rightly obeying all the normal instincts, impulses, and desires. Such a definition would seem at first sight to imply that the word "redemption" in such a connection can have no proper meaning. Redemption always connotes deliverance, and deliverance seems not to be agreeable with naturalism. What does one need to be delivered from if "the natural is the right"? One may answer broadly that in such a case one needs to be delivered from the "unnatural." But then, what is the unnatural? The Stoic answer was that it was whatever was contrary to reason. Within certain limits, the Stoic ethic was naturalistic. It is true that it assumed the presence in man of conflicting elements, in particular of passion and reason.

Yet in the true sense it was reason that was natural. The Stoic could say this because of his belief that the whole system of nature was the expression of an immanent reason. Hence reason in man answered to reason in nature, so that the maxim, "Live according to nature," really meant, "Live according to reason." If naturalism had always moved on this exalted plane, and found its exponent in a Seneca, an Epictetus, a Marcus Aurelius, it would have been far less open to criticism than it is. It is in the hands of a Rousseau that the latent defects of the principle most clearly manifest themselves. Regarding culture as artificial, and social conventions as unjustifiable restraints upon the true freedom of the individual, he proposed that "nature" should be allowed to have its own way. The fundamental psychic state is feeling—a position not wholly indefensible—and feeling is a law unto itself—than which nothing could be more untrue. Then, said Rousseau, let feeling develop according to its own native tendency, and a true life will ensue. Surely, it is a strange deliverance that saves a man from the tyranny of social conventions and morality only to hand him over to the tyranny of his own emotions—and Rousseau himself is the classic illustration of the failure of such "naturalism."

A phase of naturalism is æstheticism, the search for redemption by the unification of life under the ideal of beauty. Beauty as here used means not merely appreciation of perfection of form, but the maintenance of order, proportion, and harmony throughout the whole experience of life. Plato and Aristotle gave the theory its most complete philosophical expression in the ancient world, and in modern times Schiller and Goethe have sought to conceive life as itself a work of art. The poetry of Arnold, although it is touched with a certain severe austerity, is in many respects the best popular exposition of this point of view in our own day. But it is a theory of life which is necessarily exclusive in its appeal, and which is more easily expounded on paper

than realized in actual experience. Moreover, apart from the question whether or not the claim of so organizing and ordering the life can be fulfilled is the question whether what was sought has ever come this way. By all the evidence we possess, it has not. It is true—and this is one of the main contentions of this book—that man has an ideal “nature,” which it is the purpose of life to find and to realize, and it is true that in this sense the natural is the right. A life such as this theory proposes would indeed be “well-ordered” and would itself exemplify the beauty that it sought. But the insistent moral problem does not find its solution this way. Not often has the Stoic been a lovable man and a servant of his kind, and some very questionable practices seem to have been quite compatible with the æsthetic’s devotion at the shrine of beauty. In Arnold’s own poetry there is that which he said he heard at Dover Beach:

“ . . . a melancholy, long-withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.”

Much that has been claimed in the name of naturalism must be allowed for, but it needs a much more secure foundation than that upon which the claim has generally been rested.⁶

5. MYSTICISM. Mysticism is the search for redemption by means of the attainment of direct and unmediated union with God. Sometimes this union is conceived as a clear vision; sometimes as an emotional experience of inexpressible rapture; sometimes as a loss or suspension of individual consciousness in an undifferentiated feeling of perfect calm. Mysticism, where it is a reasoned attitude, invariably rests back upon a certain psychological theory, and upon a certain theory of the world and God’s relation to it. Psychologically, it holds to the possibility and even the necessity of reaching the highest knowledge by intuition. Applied to religion, it means, therefore, that the knowledge of God is

direct. Then just because the knowledge is intuitive it is held to be authoritative, and because its object is God it is held to be the highest possible that man can attain. Mysticism is often, although not always and not necessarily, pantheistic. It rejoices in such terms as "The One," "The One-in-All," "The Universal Spirit," "The Undifferentiated Absolute," and so forth. It regards the attainment of "the Beatific Vision" as the supreme achievement of which man is capable, and as that one thing for which he finally exists. Mysticism enshrines a great and noble truth, but it is a dangerous truth, if it is not kept in proper perspective. True, man is meant to become one with God, but the ideal is a oneness consisting in a unification of wills, not in an identity of being. The very term, "unification," implies an essential distinction between God and man. Being that is originally distinct can never be made finally identical in any absolute sense. The denial of a real distinction between God and man involves a superficial doctrine of sin and guilt, and such a doctrine is always a close attendant on mysticism. The reality of sin, the permanence and identity of personality, union with God as a fellowship, not as an "absorption"—these are among the great verities, and mysticism has too often called them in question.⁷

6. MORALISM. Moralism is the search for redemption through absolute loyalty to the Moral Law conceived as the ultimate reality with which man has to deal. It has been a rather common practice in some quarters in the past to speak disparagingly of "mere morality." A preacher on one occasion exclaimed: "Honesty and truth-telling and faithfulness are nothing but mere pagan virtues," whereupon a person in the congregation whispered not too quietly, "Would to God there were more pagans!" Of course, if by "mere morality" is meant what was described above as legalism, disparaging criticism is just. If, however, it means obedience to the Moral Law, it is difficult to see on what grounds the criticism rests. Certainly, even although a man may

not be saved by such obedience, he will not be saved in the absence of it. Moralism can be effectively criticized only on the ground of its presuppositions. It conceives human nature too optimistically, and it conceives the Moral Law too abstractedly. Kant, indeed, who has given moralism its finest exposition, was guilty of no such optimism, and frankly recognized the presence of a "radical defect in human nature."⁸ But he certainly did not avoid conceiving the Moral Law abstractly, and, if one may be allowed the expression, he appears to think a good deal more of Duty than he does of God. God is a postulate called in to explain, among other things, the authority of the categorical imperative. Religion is the different character that is assumed by the categorical imperative and the various demands of conscience when the individual consciously relates God to them as their source. But the practical outcome of Kant's analysis was formal enough. "You must do your Duty at whatever cost, and your Duty is to keep your will directed always to the Moral Law, or the known best." The truth in this is undeniable, but what about the failures? What about the causes and the consequences of those failures? What about the human need for conscious fellowship with God? And what about those spontaneous actions which spring from love, into which the question of "duty" never enters, and yet which so truly express the things which the Law aims to bring to pass? Moralism supposes that a man can save himself—and *he cannot*. Kant himself, in his philosophic treatment of Christianity, would seem to allow that. The very first time a person fails of the moral ideal—does something less than the best possible—he has introduced into his own history a fact which no amount of future obedience can change or destroy. Logically, moralism can make no place for repentance and no place for regeneration. In so far as it does provide for them under the stress of life's bitter facts, it is untrue to the principles from which it works.

All truth is God. All religion is a revelation of God. The

motive controlling all the diversity of religious expression is man's desire to find God. It is not to be denied that in the various ways which have been described men have found something very precious to them. To deny that to be the case would be nothing but a narrow and unwarranted dogmatism. The tenacity with which men have pursued their chosen method in the quest can be explained in only one way: something worth while is discovered. On the other hand, the very variety of the methods witnesses to a lack of comprehensiveness in any one of them. Add to this certain obvious criticisms, a few of which have been suggested above, and it is clear what we are to look for. We are to look for a way of redemption which actually achieves the deliverance and transformation and satisfaction that are sought, and which by virtue of that fact bears upon itself the stamp of finality. We shall call that redemption absolute which makes possible to man the realization of all that he has ever felt after in his diverse ethical and religious activity.

NOTES ON CHAPTER XII

(1) Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, pt. i. chap. i, A and B, gives a very clear statement of the psychical basis of religion. "In every form of religion man seeks to establish a helpful relationship between himself and higher powers. The impulse to form this relationship, and to secure satisfaction through it, proceeded from a felt need, and this need must have been latent in human nature, only requiring stimuli from the environment to quicken it to utterance. . . . The universality of a felt need is the secret of the universality of religion. The uniformity with which religion comes to birth in human experience is the symptom and expression of the common character of man which lies behind his religion" (pp. 57, 58). Less satisfactory from the standpoint of psychology, and more purely speculative, is the discussion in Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, bk. i, chaps. vi and vii.

(2) The number of good books dealing with the history of religious and ethical ideas and practices is so great that a selection is difficult. For material bearing somewhat directly on the present chapter, and without being too technical, see the following: Kirk, *The Religion of Power*. Lectures ii, iii, iv, and v deal with the "Quest for Safe Conduct" among the Orientals, Greeks, Romans, and Jews respectively. Mackintosh, *The Originality of the Christian Message*, lect. iv, "Redemption as an Experience," discusses briefly Legalism, Asceticism, Ritualism, Mysticism, and Intellectualism. Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, chap. iii, "Saviours and Salvation," is confined largely, although not exclusively, to the Mystery-cults. Alexander, *Christianity and Ethics*, has a good chapter on "Ethical Thought Before Christ," but is to be especially recommended for the chapter on "Modern Theories of Life." If the student, however, wishes to approach the problem of the "quest" in a really large way, and from a predominantly philosophical standpoint, he will find Eucken, *The Problem of Human Life*, very useful. The book reviews the various "Life-systems" from Plato to the present time. Strictly histories of religion are the following: Soper, *The Religions of Mankind*; Cave, *Living Religions of the East*; Barton, *The Religions of the World*; Menzies, *History of Religion*. The standard, however, is *The History of Religions*, 2 vols., George F. Moore, in the International Theological Library.

(3) Lofthouse, *ibid.*, chap. v, "The Hebrew Sacrifices," emphasizes this conflict. For a somewhat different treatment, see Davidson, *Theology of the Old Testament*, pt. x, "Doctrine of Redemption—Priesthood and Atonement."

(4) Tennyson has perfectly caught the spirit of the ascetic in his poem, *Saint Simeon Stylites*.

(5) A strong plea for the ascetic element in Christianity is Thornton, *Conduct and the Supernatural*. Thornton is a member of the Anglo-Catholic Community of the Resurrection, and writes from that standpoint. An exactly opposite view is maintained by Harnack, *What is Christianity?*

(6) Cf. Alexander, *ibid.*, chap. vii, 5, (1).

(7) Almost any of the Religious Psychologies or Philosophies will give illustrations of these features of mysticism. There are

discussions in Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, chaps. xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, xx, and in Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, chaps. xiv, xv, xvi. It is yet too early to estimate aright the significance of the modern revival of mysticism. The literature is immense. Dean Inge is a conspicuous and able representative. In *Faith and Its Psychology* he offers a philosophy of mysticism. More popular is Buckham, *Mysticism and Modern Life*.

(8) In *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Only*, in which Kant deals with the philosophy of Christian doctrines, the first discussion is entitled, "The Radical Evil in Human Nature."

CHAPTER XIII

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: REVELATION;
FORGIVENESS

If there be any doctrines, however few, which justly deserve the name of essential doctrines, and stand at the root of the Christian life as its conditions, foundations, or presuppositions, it surely becomes the duty as well as the right of the Christian man to study them, to seek to understand them in themselves and in their relations, to attempt to state them with accuracy and to adjust their statement to the whole body of known truth—in a word, the right and function of Systematic Theology is vindicated. The extent of this Systematic Theology may remain an open question; but a content is already vindicated for it, and a place and function among the necessary theological disciplines, so soon as the conception of “essential doctrines,” however limited, once emerges into thought. He who goes only so far, in a word, becomes at once an “Intellectualist” in the only sense in which the Systematic Theologian is an Intellectualist—that is, he recognizes that Christianity is truth as well as life, and as such addresses itself to the intelligence of men, and has claims upon their belief as well as upon their obedience. He becomes at once a “Dogmatist” in the only sense in which the Systematic Theologian is a Dogmatist—that is, he recognizes the objective validity of a body of religious truth and its imperative claims upon all for acceptance, and is therefore prepared to press this truth upon the attention of all alike as the condition of their religious life. In fine, he who goes only so far becomes, in spite of himself, himself a Systematic Theologian.—BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, *The Right of Systematic Theology*, pp. 24 and 25.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: REVELATION; FORGIVENESS

FEW books of recent years dealing with Jesus Christ have provoked more discussion than Schweitzer's *The Quest for the Historical Jesus*. Unusually penetrating in its criticisms of other interpretations of the significance of Jesus, it yet presents an interpretation of its own which some would think as defective as any that it criticizes. "The sorry figure" which is left to us as the result of a wonderfully painstaking investigation is certainly not in proportion to the magnitude of the influence he has exerted upon mankind. Yet the closing words of the book, out of all keeping, as they seem to be, with the Portrait that is presented, strike such an exalted note that one feels constrained to quote them. "He comes to us," so writes Schweitzer, "as One unknown, without a name, as of old by the lakeside he came to those who knew him not. He speaks to us the same word, 'Follow thou me!' and sets us to the task he has to fulfill for our time. He commands. And to those who obey him, whether they be wise or simple, he will reveal himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings, which they shall pass through in his fellowship, and as an ineffable mystery they shall learn in their own experience who he is." One does not need to agree with Schweitzer's attempt to explain Jesus by reference to the eschatological hopes that were contemporaneous with him, in order to agree with him that there is in the Person and Message and Deed of our Lord an irresistible challenge and the promise of our redemption.

I. CHRIST AND REVELATION. The necessary basis of an adequate message of redemption is a knowledge of the con-

ditions out of which the very need for redemption arises. The first effect of such knowledge is, of course, to complicate the problem. Jesus himself realized that, as witness his solemn words: "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin." One may think of God, and sin, and righteousness in such a way as to be quite satisfied with oneself. But when these are seen through the mediation of Jesus Christ, they take on such a character as to be at once man's despair and man's hope.

In what way, then, did Christ reveal the truth to men? Was it by what he said, or by what he did, or by what he was? If the question as stated supposes that Christ can be properly subjected to arbitrary division, it betrays a serious confusion of thought. If there is one thing more than another that the gospel records impress us with, it is the fact of the coherence and continuity and congruity of the total representation. We are not to select his birth, or his sayings, or his miracles, or his death, or his resurrection, and give the selected feature all of the emphasis, as though the rest were secondary. It is Christ himself, *the total Person*, who is the revelation of God. God cannot be revealed in any complete way in a spoken message. He cannot be revealed in a particular deed. He cannot be revealed in a written record. He can be revealed only in a *life*.¹ The message, the deed, the record, may well be related to the life, and therefore to the revelation, but the revelation itself they are not and they cannot be. That to which we point specifically as being itself a Divine Revelation must necessarily be a continuous and consistent personal activity. "The law was *given* by Moses, but grace and truth *came* by Jesus Christ." "He that hath *seen me* hath seen the Father." One of the dangerous tendencies of the present time is that of separating the sayings of Jesus from the Person of Jesus. The assumption is that the sayings may stand wholly in their own right.² That they are self-authenticating is true,

but if we take from, say, the Beatitudes the personality of the speaker, surely we deprive them of much of their authority and significance. Not only is what is said important: equally important is the speaker's own relation to his words. What is back of the sayings of Jesus? A Person who was himself the living embodiment of his own sayings, and therefore their greatest commentary. Our Lord made no demand on others which was not justified by his own life. What he said and what he did were integral parts of the total Christ-Self, essential elements of the Divine Revelation. If we are to have the whole, we must have all the parts.

Christ made a certain claim as to himself and his vocation. Those who knew him best were convinced that the claim was true. The claim he made was to show men the Father. But how could he do that? He could do that only by himself realizing a perfect Sonship. Men never saw the Father. What they saw was the Son, and from the Sonship they inferred the Fatherhood. Such Sonship as men saw in Christ grew out of his relation with the Father. He said, in effect, "I am as I am because God is as he is." The one absolute expression of the filial spirit which has ever appeared in human history appeared because He who expressed it never doubted that God was just such a Father as he himself was a Son.³ Only one of two conclusions is possible: either Christ was deceived, in which case we are indeed without hope, for the greatest thing morally the world has ever seen was based on error; or he was right, in which case there is in the world of spirit that reality of Fatherhood which is every way the counterpart of that reality of Sonship which appeared in time.⁴ Now, to say that Christ was right as to this is a faith-judgment. It is not a judgment of which the contrary is not *possible*, but one of which the contrary is not *tolerable*. It simply cannot be that that because of which we have the figure of Jesus Christ is a delusion. We believe that he was right because what the belief

brings to us is so exactly what we need. If the extravagant statement may be permitted, we would rather be wrong in believing that he was right than be right in believing that he was wrong. We believe in God the Father because Christ did, and because that belief made Christ what he was. If God is not such as answers to this Sonship, then it doesn't matter much what he is. If there was such absolute trust, and yet no one to trust; such obedience, yet no one to obey; such praying, yet no one to pray to; such love, yet no one to love; such loyalty even unto death, yet no one to whom to be loyal—then, indeed, are we like the brute beasts that perish. The very integrity of our reason seems to be at stake. We will continue to stand by the historic Christian conviction: Jesus Christ is a Revelation of God. What he says, God says. What he does, God does. What he is, God is. In a word, at the heart of the universe, as the very ground of its being, is just such a Divine Reality as is needed to rationalize the experience and the fact of Jesus Christ.⁵

It is then with such a God as God in Christ is seen to be that we are to deal. God is Father. His nature determines his purpose and his demand. Because he is Father he wants loving obedience and untrammelled fellowship, for these are the hall-mark of the filial spirit. We then get the Christian idea of redemption. From this point of view redemption is the establishing of the filial relation, or man's realization of sonship to God. Speaking in terms of our earlier analysis and discussion, this is that "end" for which man exists, to which his whole nature points, and by which his experience is to be understood. But if this be so, if sonship with its implicate of brotherhood is the human ideal, the one reason why man is at all, then certain other facts are involved. For it follows that sin is now to be conceived as the unfilial and unfraternal thing; that it is therefore not merely selfishness, not merely lawlessness, but the disobedience of a child; that such disobedience is the straining of a

normal relation, involving suffering on the one side and loss on the other; and that the relation can be restored only as the conditions of the restoration, which it is the right of the Father to lay down in keeping with the interests of the family, are fulfilled by the disobedient son.

So true is it that in Jesus Christ is revealed that knowledge of God's nature and purpose which is the necessary foundation of a true understanding of the end which man, made in God's image, exists to realize.

2. CHRIST AND FORGIVENESS. The fact was before emphasized that by our daily experience we are creating our own moral history. Nothing that has ever really been can ever cease to be. It has become a part of that increasing totality which constitutes the world. History is only that totality seen in perspective.⁶ In relation to the twentieth century, the first century is far distant, but the first century is none the less a fact. Time creates nothing and time destroys nothing. Time is a convenient way of describing the process whereby "is" is continually becoming "was," but when "what is" becomes "what was" it does not thereby cease "to have been." If by some miracle we could be transported backward by ten years, we should find things exactly as they were then. They were realities then, and having been realities once they cannot cease to have been so forever. We conceive history as a chain receding into the distant past. But we so conceive it because our point of view is necessarily at this end of the chain. From another point of view history could appear as a simultaneous whole, but in that case it would not be history at all. It would be one great "now" and "is." Because we cannot occupy this absolute viewpoint (only God can do that) in no wise changes the fact of the equal reality of each several detail of the vast whole.⁷

Now, what is true of the whole of things in general is true with a special poignancy of the moral history of the individual. The dreadful thing about sin is that viewed in its

fact-aspect it is indelible. From this point of view, all such terms as substitution, expiation, and equivalent penalty are quite meaningless. No penalty ever destroyed the reality or changed the character of that which led to the penalty. No expiation, by whomever offered, ever changed wrong into right. It will not do to say that this insistence on the abiding reality of all the past is a piece of hair-splitting metaphysics, having no practical bearing on the moral problem. The fact of past sin depends upon the fact, not upon the power of memory to recall it. It would be an injustice indeed to endow so variable a thing as individual memory with the dread power of an arbitrary despot. It is not necessary that a person remember his fault in order to be responsible for it. The old idea of a "recording angel" shows how men have always felt the permanence of moral fault, just as the myth of Lethe—the river of forgetfulness—witnesses to their feeling that the incubus of the past must be removed as a condition to real blessedness.⁸

Here, then, is the fact of the personal record into which enters moral culpability. Deliverance from it is one of the man's primary needs. Let the history of sacrifice and penance bear witness how urgent that need has been. What has Jesus Christ to say about it? The answer is very simple, not nearly the elaborate thing it has so often been made out to be. He says that it is forgivable. The answer grows of necessity out of his revelation of the nature of God, and it constitutes the most hopeful word ever spoken to a humanity conscious of its sin. For if sin cannot be forgiven, freely and without qualification, then there is no redemption. Forgiveness does not change the fact of the sin: nothing can do that. But it does change the fact of the guilt. Sin, it was just said, is the unfilial thing. It is the child's disloyalty to the rule of the household, representing as it does the Father's will as directed toward the good of the whole. The Father's forgiveness of the child means that there has come about a change in the relations. So long as the child

is indifferent about his disloyalty and rebellion, the relations with the Father are strained and abnormal. The unfilial attitude is necessarily a barrier to the Father's approval and approach. In the degree in which that attitude is changed, forgiveness becomes possible. Forgiveness is, then, not a verdict of innocence; it is not a fiction of any kind whatever. It is the Father's declaration that the child being no longer wayward and rebellious, but loyal and obedient, he is restored to favor and accorded all the privileges of sonship.⁹

What right have we to say that such a forgiveness does actually take place? Again the answer is simple: we say that because we believe in Jesus Christ. If God is such as Christ is, then God stands just as ready to forgive as Christ did. Much of the significance of our Lord's divinity is at this very point. He stood unto men as God, and in that august capacity he forgave men their sins or declared that God would do so. If in like circumstances God does not do a like thing, then Christ, so far from representing him, has misrepresented him. That this is the case we resolutely refuse to believe. If the Son forgave, the Son is not more gracious than the Father, and he forgives also.¹⁰ The real evidence that sin may be forgiven is not in a certain "experience" of "the witness of the Spirit," for the grounds of that experience need to be validated. Rather is it in the prior fact that there is identity in moral quality and therefore in moral authority between the Son and the Father. The Son forgave, and declared that all who sought forgiveness could find it. We believe his witness, at least in part, because we cannot believe that there has ever appeared in time a spirit of grace and mercy such as transcends in worth the spirit of the Eternal.

Further, the condition of forgiveness must be the same in both cases. That is to say, if Jesus forgave the repentant sinner or declared him forgiven, for no other reason than because of the repentance, on what ground do we hold that God

required something more? Jesus' attitude toward all the various devices for securing the divine favor and forgiveness of sin was precisely the attitude of the Hebrew prophets.¹¹ It is true that he attended the great national feasts, but these had no "expiatory" significance. Repentance and faith, rectification and love, consecration and service—these were the "sacrifices" he asked of men. On them alone he conditioned the possibility of the wayward child being forgiven and restored to his rightful estate.

Then why, it will be asked, why did Christ need to come at all? Why his sufferings and death? Why the tremendous New Testament emphasis on the cross? If the conditions of forgiveness are the same now as they were before Calvary, or even before Bethlehem, why a Divine Incarnation? We find our answer in what was said before about the need of adequate knowledge. Repentance is the condition to forgiveness, *but what is the condition to repentance?* The condition to a complete repentance is a clear comprehension of the nature of the fault. Nobody has ever gone to the utmost possible limits of repentance who has not seen his sin in relation to Jesus Christ, and no one has ever entered into a total forgiveness who has not experienced that total repentance which the revelation made in Christ renders possible. Christ atoned for sin because he bore it to the point of dying for it, and the sin that broke the heart of such a One as he, did, in the very moment of its triumph, sound its own death knell, for it therein stood self-revealed.¹² In the moral history of humanity there is needed such a deed as shall by its very nature guarantee the final defeat of sin. Such a deed was Calvary, and all that of which it was the inevitable sequence. The world for which Christ died simply cannot be lost. He has saved it, not by bearing some calculated equivalent of what it deserved, not by satisfying the inexorable demand of an eternal law, but by suffering and dying in loyalty to his great vocation to show men God by being himself God's Perfect Son. A Christian repentance

is, therefore, a repentance made in view of Jesus Christ and all that he was and did and desired men to do and to become. There is no atonement for sin, and there is no reconciliation to God, apart from the repentance and its accompanying faith; but because the repentance and faith grow out of what Christ did it is true to say that by him atonement is made and through him man is reconciled to God.

When man repents God forgives. At all times and in all places, even in heathen Nineveh, that has been true. But God cannot forgive beyond the range of the repentance. To induce an adequate repentance is therefore God's problem, and he can do that only as he can in some way bring men to realize all that he meant them to be and do, and all that in consequence of their ignorance and folly they have failed to be and do. God had to have Christ and men had to have him. There was a divine necessity for what he was, just as there was a human necessity.¹³ Without him God could not reach men, and without him men could not reach God. Men needed Christ because they needed to know God in his real character and purpose. God needed him because he needed a perfect exemplification of the filial spirit as that which alone could show men the way to the Father and therefore the way to their own true life. God could come to men completely only through a person, and only through that same person could men completely come to God. Hence, "Son of God and Son of man." Hence, "the One Mediator between God and men." Hence, "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." Hence, "a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God." Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the world because he has made possible the knowledge and the realization of those conditions without which God could not forgive because man could not be forgiven. Christ, by rendering man completely forgivable, becomes indeed his Redeemer. Man is meant for sonship; all his deepest characteristics point to that; the nature and the method of that

sonship are both revealed in Christ; and through Christ is given the power of its individual realization.

Now, if this is not justification, what is it, and what is justification if it is not this? That which comes between man and God, to hinder their fellowship and to subvert man's true life, is removed. What more is needed? And again we ask: If this is not justification by faith, what is it, and what is justification by faith if it is not this? The sinner sees his sin in the light of Jesus Christ. That same Suffering Saviour who so mercilessly makes the sinner see what sin is, is the Saviour who proclaims that the sin may be forgiven—on conditions. The acceptance of those conditions, and the ensuing restoration, proceeds necessarily on a basis of faith. How else than by faith can justification be experienced if justification is conceived as forgiveness and restoration proportioned to the degree of repentance?¹⁴

But it will be urged that what has been said destroys the "objective" element in the work of Christ. That depends entirely on how the term is to be understood. If by "objective" here is meant that God "punished" Christ in the precise equivalent to the penalty due to all human sin that ever had been or ever would be forgiven, then the idea is frankly surrendered by the present writer, and no apology is offered for so doing. If the term means that in the sufferings of Christ God made such an imposing display of "the majesty of the law" that thereafter he could say to the sinner: "I am willing to forgive you, but you must not think that I do not realize the enormity of your offense. Calvary, however, satisfies me, because it protects all the interests of my moral government"—if it means that, then again it must be confessed that what has been written is a denial of the objective element. But why should the term be required to have such connotations? Why may we not conceive the work of Christ objectively without resorting to all this indirection and legal jugglery? It is claimed that

the view of the relation of Christ to the forgiveness of sins here set forth does this very thing. It was "for sin" that Christ suffered and died. There was a barrier to divine-human reconciliation which could be removed only by One who knew the nature of that barrier, but who in his own experience absolutely destroyed it. Of every wayward child who kneels in repentance and faith at the feet of the Father because he has seen the wonder and the glory of the Christ, it is true to say that "Christ bore his sin." Thinking of his evil disposition and evil deeds, thinking of all his past indestructible record of moral fault, seeing it all in the light of the suffering Christ, the penitent with complete sincerity and truth can say: "He suffered for *me*. My sin slew him. He is my Sin-offering. For me he bore the shameful cross. Through him I find God. Because of him I am forgiven."

If anyone still supposes that something more than this is needed before "atonement" can be accomplished, that is his right and privilege. But it is at least our privilege also to ask him to describe the nature of this mysterious "plus," which is so vague that few can agree concerning it, which is so unessential that the agreement or disagreement has no bearing whatever upon the personal experience of forgiveness, which can be left entirely out of the reckoning without weakening in the least the efficacy of the gospel as the power of God unto salvation, and which, therefore, is not at all necessary to the construction of a satisfying philosophy of the Christian faith. Why should theology, from a supposed loyalty to tradition, continue to struggle with a conception which confuses rather than clarifies, which hinders rather than helps, and which is more and more proving to be a useless fortification requiring defense at great cost rather than an instrument capable of effective use in pushing the battle into the enemy's country?¹⁵

NOTES ON CHAPTER XIII

(1) The case is well put by W. N. Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, pp. 12-20.

(2) How much can be said, however, for the Sayings standing alone, may be seen in King, *The Ethics of Jesus*, in the chapter on "The Great Motives to Living in the Sermon on the Mount." On the impossibility of separating the Speaker from the Sayings, see Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, bk. ii, div. ii (b), the section on "The Sermon on the Mount."

(3) Cf. Mackintosh, *The Originality of the Christian Message*, lect. ii, especially pp. 38, 39, 51-57. "God, for the Christian mind, is the Father corresponding to Jesus as Son: we see him reflected, without break or shadow, in the Redeemer's soul" (p. 39). "The new truth about God became flesh in Jesus; he guaranteed the message by being himself; mediated by all that he was and did, it seized men with fresh elemental power and passed like fire from heart to heart" (p. 53). A similar position is maintained in *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*. "Only he can perfectly reveal who *is* what he reveals. If he be less than quite identical with that which is made manifest, the manifestation is so far religiously insufficient. . . . The Christian mind . . . finds God personally present in Christ and responds to him so, immediately" (p. 341).

(4) Denney, *ibid.*, treats this alternative in the most convincing way. His conclusions are stated at the end of Book I and Book II, respectively, and in the closing section. .

(5) Cf. Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, chap. vi, "The Revelation of God." There is an excellent chapter on "The Christlike God" in McConnell, *Public Opinion and Theology*. "The peculiarity and the strength of Christianity is the belief that in Christ we see not only what man may become, but what God is; and in this latter phase of the Christian revelation the heart of mankind is more deeply satisfied than in the former" (p. 239).

(6) There is a profound difference between the conception of time as involved in a rational experience which yet by its very nature "transcends" time, and the conception of it as something independent, self-existent, necessary, and objective. In

the first case, to use Bergson's terminology, time is conceived "psychologically"; in the second case, it is conceived "mechanically." Cf. Bowne, *Personalism*, chap. iii. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, lect. xviii, "Time and Eternity."

(7) "If there were a being who could retain all the facts of his experience in a certain immediacy of consciousness, he would have no past; and, further, if such being were always in full possession of himself so as to be under no law of development and possessing no unrealized potentialities, he would also have no future, at least so far as his own existence might be concerned. His present would be all-embracing, and his now would be eternal." Bowne, *ibid.*, pp. 145, 146. "It is possible, on the basis of our own experience, to imagine a consciousness to which the whole content of time is known at once in the same way in which a finite being knows the specious present." Pringle-Pattison, *ibid.*, p. 354.

(8) Cf. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (revised edition), chap. xvi, especially pp. 128-130 (pp. 104-106 of old edition).

(9) This view of the matter is well set forth by Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, chaps. v and ix, and in *Sonship and Salvation*.

(10) Denney, *ibid.*, discussing the healing and forgiving of the paralytic in Mark 2. 1-12, holds not simply that Jesus declared the man to be forgiven, but that he himself actually granted the forgiveness. Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, p. 32: "Few episodes are more obviously authentic than the healing of the paralytic (Mark 2), where the narrative simply falls to pieces if we strike out Jesus' self-presentation as Forgiver." Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pp. 199, 200: "The Johannine description of the Son of man as bestowing eternal life (6. 27) corresponds to the synoptic representation that the Son of man forgives sins (Mark 2. 10) and seeks and saves that which is lost (Luke 19. 10)."

(11) Gore, *Belief in God*, chap. iv: "It was upon this revelation of God, given through the prophets, that in later days Jesus unmistakably took his stand" (p. 80). Lofthouse, *Altar, Cross, and Community*, chap. vii: "Jesus spoke as if the old prophetic polemic against the sacrifices was universally accepted" (p.

159). "Jesus stood for just that side of sacrificial religion which the Levitical system had neglected—the free approach to God" (p. 175).

(12) "The doing to death of Jesus has become the classical proof in history of the utter failure of a bad deed." Hutton, *The Proposal of Jesus* (G. H. Doran Company, New York), p. 152.

(13) Cf. W. E. Orchard, *The Necessity of Christ*, chap. vii. The chapter deals with "The Necessity of Christ to God," but in its metaphysics it goes beyond the position maintained in this volume.

(14) The entire chapter in Glover, *ibid.*, on "The Forgiveness of Sin," should be carefully read. He deals with the evil record, the evil habit or disposition, the social influence of the evil, the attitude of God, and the place of Christ in leading to a reconciliation.

(15) That the "satisfaction theory" has tremendous devotional possibilities is seen in so recent a statement as Clow, *The Cross in Christian Experience*. Modern theologians like Denney, in *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, and P. T. Forsyth, in *The Cruciality of the Cross*, have given it an imposing presentation. Students of the late Professor Olin A. Curtis will never forget the overwhelming power with which he expounded this type of theory. See his book, *The Christian Faith*, especially chap. xxiii. On the other hand, the number of books maintaining a different position is increasing rapidly. Such recent books as David Smith, *The Atonement in the Light of History and the Modern Spirit*; J. A. Robertson, *The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus*; Glover, *The Jesus of History and Jesus in the Experience of Men*; Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*; Underhill, *The Mystic Way*; Wilson, *The Christ We Forget*; Hutton, *The Proposal of Jesus*; Simkhovitch, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus* (the first discussion); Lofthouse, *Altar, Cross, and Community*; B. W. Bacon, *Jesus and Paul*; and Cross, *Creative Christianity*—such books show that men can break entirely with certain fundamental pre-suppositions of the older view, and still see in Christ the one hope of the salvation of themselves and of the world.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: EMPOWERMENT

If we seek to describe in a word the realization of union with God as an individual experience, we may say it is our personal participation in the Spirit of that progressive self-impartation of God to humanity which is truly characteristic of the divine life. It is our fellowship in the life of holy love. This the Spirit quickens and nourishes within us. This means the substitution of the outgoing for the self-centered life, of the social principle of love to others for the individualistic principle of self-love. These redeeming and regenerating processes of change and substitution are made possible for us as the Holy Spirit, on the one hand, empties forth within our hearts the love of God as the new dynamic of life, and, on the other, as he discovers to us a system of wider personal relations in which the narrow and divisive ideal of individual self-seeking is superseded by the wider ideal of sonship and brotherhood. It is the indwelling life of the Spirit which makes for us the self-imparting life possible. "The law of the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus" rules the new order of conformity to the new principle of life within us. The awakening of holy love in the soul, with its corresponding new dispositions, could only be wrought by an indwelling life of holy love in which God himself communicates his own characteristic. He thus produces by his own action another ethical being like himself, a spiritual offspring.—PLATT, *Immanence and Christian Thought*, pp. 488 and 489.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: EMPOWERMENT

3. EMPOWERMENT. No matter how earnestly one may insist on the necessity of a definite experience of justification following on repentance and faith, one would still have to admit that such an experience is not a complete solution of the moral problem. Even the Christian needs to pray continually for forgiveness, but that is not his only need. Indeed, the very fact of his failures shows that he needs something more. The results of that pernicious teaching which confused a highly emotional state with a holy life are with us still, as, also, is the teaching itself. The only kind of holiness that is at once intelligible and convincing is righteousness. Christian righteousness is that quality of character and conduct which springs from a conscious fellowship with God in Christ. There is a very real and precious doctrine of Christian perfection, but where it was properly understood it never meant that at a given time the "perfect" man has reached the limit of his moral and spiritual possibilities.¹

We have tried to show that the problem of the need of forgiveness for the past is met by Jesus Christ, conceived as making atonement by so exhibiting the nature of sin in its meaning for both God and man as that there is induced in the believer an adequate repentance. Through Christ we know God: he is, then, a Divine Revelation. Through Christ we come to that repentance and faith which insure justification: he is, then, to that extent a Divine Redeemer. But we saw before that sin is not only a particular deed, meaning by deed a form of external activity, but a disposition, an attitude, an inner bearing. It is active disregard of the law of the household, and the law of the household

is the will of the Father. Apparent correctness of outward behavior (if that be possible in the supposed circumstance) is no necessary proof that that disregard is not present. Viciousness and criminality are not the only evidence to a heart alien from God. The modern mind is frankly skeptical of the dogma of total depravity. One does not wonder at that when one remembers all the extravagant statements that have been made in connection with it. It is simply not true to say that human nature in itself considered is utterly and totally bad. To quote Paul to prove that it is is much more likely to bring Paul's authority into disrepute than it is to substantiate the claim. The whole testimony of Jesus—to say nothing of a sane psychology—is against such a perversion of the fact. To make man's moral helplessness complete in the interests of a doctrine of the Holy Spirit and his work of renewal is to defeat the very purpose of the view; for if man is so helpless as he has been made out to be, then it is difficult to see how the Holy Spirit could elicit from him that initial response upon which the whole renewing process depends. How could God save a man in whom there was no good at all?²

But even though it be true that man has in him of necessity those capacities by virtue of which he may come to sonship to God, it is equally true that the realization of those capacities is not something to be taken for granted. What the older theologians were wont to call "the internal contradiction in human nature," and what Paul describes by his antithesis of "flesh" and "spirit," stands for a very real fact.³ Speaking in terms of the moral life, we say that there is a difference between the ideal and the actual. Furthermore, we say that that difference is inevitable. The reference now is not to a difference from some "absolute" moral ideal. If the realization of such an ideal were laid upon us as the condition of our redemption, we should be without hope indeed. But the reference is to the *known* ideal—let us say the possible ideal—and the consistent failure to realize it.

It is all very well for a man to say that all that God expects of him is that he shall do the best he knows. If he searches his own heart and is candid, he will confess with sorrow that the occasions when he has really satisfied his own moral ideal, limited though it may be, are few enough. What was said above about knowledge and forgiveness really complicates the problem, as the words quoted from Jesus implied. He who came to us from the Father immeasurably exalts the moral ideal beyond anything else that was ever presented to men or asked of men. To see God and oneself and the whole meaning of life in the light of the Gospel Portrait is to see so much that whether there be anything more than that becomes a question of only academic interest. One might go even further, and say that it becomes an impertinence. What is revealed in and through Christ makes sin appear in its true form and color: the potency of it to destroy that one thing because of which all else is, is made plain in one great illuminating flash. The logical sequence—if one may be permitted the expression—the logical sequence of such a revelation is repentance. The full understanding of Calvary and what went with it must inevitably produce repentance in the understanding mind. And God being as he is, and Christ having lived and died for the purpose he did, repentance brings forgiveness. All this we have set forth before. God sent his own Son to save men, and they can be saved only as they realize the conditions of their salvation as these are determined by the very nature of God himself.

We claimed that one of those conditions is adequate knowledge and that Christ brings it, and that another is justification in view of the sinner's moral history and that Christ brings that also. But there is a third condition. It may be variously described, but the simplest description of all is—complete obedience to the Father's will. What has lain at the root of human ill has been ignorance of that will. What has made forgiveness necessary has been disobedience to it. Does He who meets the problem of that ignorance

by being what he was, and who meets the problem of that forgiveness by doing what he did, meet also the problem of that other need of human nature in its aspect of moral hesitancy? In other words, besides being taught the truth, and besides being justified before God, the enlightened and justified man needs *power*. He needs power whereby he may overcome the internal dualism. It is at the point of this need that all such terms as regeneration, the new life, growth in grace, the indwelling of the Spirit, and so forth, get their meaning. We may have a more accurate psychological knowledge of what is involved here than our fathers had, but the fact that they were dealing with is plain to the most casual introspection and observation. Christ starts a man in a new direction: but can he keep him going? He brings a man to God—shows him the Father: but can he hold him there?⁴

The Christian claim is that through him who reveals and through him who atones there comes also that divine empowerment which keeps the child true to the law of the household. It comes in the only way in which such power can come—*by the arousing of a great emotion*. Emotion does not necessarily mean a violent display. Very deep emotion may be very silent. But no cause ever prevailed which could not enlist and keep active a depth of feeling.⁵ Man may be, as we have claimed he is, essentially an acting creature whose activity is a response to situations arising independently of his volition and arousing in him desire. But to reach its highest moral level his activity must involve his total self. The total self is involved when there is such a ratio between thought, feeling, and will as that the range of one is the range of all. It is not enough merely to conceive an end. That is possible without loyalty to it being at the same time involved. It is not enough even to conceive an end and to will it. Those ends whose willing follows naturally and easily on the conceiving are not the greatest ends (waiving the question whether there could be, in-

deed, either a conception or a volition where there was no "interest" and therefore no "feeling"). The fact we have to face is that often enough the will is impotent in the presence of its own ideal. The end is clearly conceived; it is willed; but in actual experience it remains unrealized. What ought to be is plain enough: what is lacking is adequate power to transform the ought into actuality. The contention now being made is that in the typical Christian attitude to Christ, provision is made for this need of empowerment. But "power" is not some tangible entity that falls upon a man from without as rain falls upon the thirsty ground. The secret of power is within the human heart itself. Not that man can save himself; but the process of his salvation is from within out, and not from without in. There are certain necessary conditions whose fulfillment as certainly taps the sources of power as the adding of figures produces a total already implicit in the figures. The conditions may be stated as (a) a sense of indebtedness, (b) a change in attention, and (c) creative love.

(a) *A Sense of Indebtedness.* There is a very real sense in which Christ may be said to "own" mankind. This is not the place to raise the question of his cosmic relationships. Whatever supramundane dignities may be ascribed to the Redeemer, they must be such as appear to grow naturally out of the experienced results of his work. First to assume the dignities and then to deduce the results is an unwarranted proceeding from which theology has suffered severely enough. But even although we keep in abeyance for the time being the highly speculative question of Christ's Headship of the race as grounded in his creative activity, we should be surrendering our central position if we failed to insist on the fact that there belongs to him its moral and spiritual Headship. It belongs to him, not because of some pre-temporal deed on his part, but because of what he was and did in his life and death. Through him become possible of realization those conditions upon

which complete salvation depends—meaning by salvation the discovery and fulfillment of God's original thought for us. Now it is easy to say that and go no further, just as we recite creeds and prayers and sing the hymns of the Church. There is a perfunctory recognition of obligation. But if when we say that Christ is our Saviour *we mean it*, and if we set ourselves to work out all that is implied in the confession, we cannot but go on to realize that we are indebted to him as we are not to any other person in the world. Where there is not that sense of indebtedness there is not a full recognition of the significance of the Redeemer. But when we comprehend that upon him hinges our moral destiny, then we can take upon our lips with complete sincerity that great New-Testament word "purchase," and can say: "I have been bought with a price—and He paid it"; "I have been purchased unto God—and by Him." In such an attitude and belief there is evidence that the general perfunctory sense of indebtedness has become, so to speak, focused into a personal feeling of overwhelming intensity. "For *me*." "In *my* stead." "On *my* behalf." "To bring *me* to God." Such phrases may mean nothing. But, sincerely used, they may mean everything.

(b) *The Changed Attention.* Nothing is more fateful for moral peace than for a man to fix his attention on himself in his aspect of lawbreaker, and on the law which he conceives himself to have disobeyed, and on God conceived as the administrator of the broken or disobeyed law. Such fixing of the attention has great preparatory value in its emphasizing the consciousness of moral impotency: it can never yield the power which is so sadly needed. Hence Paul's familiar words: "The law is our youthful guardian, to lead us to Christ." Of the many fruitful suggestions made by psychology which religion can utilize, one of the most fruitful is the theory of "fixed ideas" and their possible effects on the entire experience. Thus the mind that is obsessed of the idea of God's wrath as directed toward it

specifically is in a condition which, however much it may be justified by the facts of the case, and however much it may be needed as a first step, is a condition which must somehow be broken up if the whole outlook of the life is not to become distorted. The attention must be shifted from that which only fosters despair to that which fosters hope and courage.⁶ It is at this point that we find much of the significance of Jesus Christ, and especially of his own thought concerning himself. One of the most striking things about the gospel record is its revelation of Jesus' own self-consciousness in his use of the words "I" and "me." Nobody ever used those words as he did, and nobody—and we are not unmindful of the criticisms offered on this very account—nobody was ever more free from arrogant egotism. "Moses said that, but I say this." "I say unto you, Arise, thy sins are forgiven thee." "I and my Father are one." "He that loveth not me more than anyone else in the world is not worthy of me." "I am the truth." "Take up thy cross and follow me." Such sayings are of the very structure of the record. What they mean is that Jesus thought of himself as having such absolute moral worth that he could be thought of as the equivalent of the Moral Law. Whatever the Law required, he required—and more. Whatever the Law sought, he sought—and more. Whatever the Law could do, he could do—and more. Whatever significance in relation to God's purpose for men attached to the Law attached also to him—and more. If this self-consciousness is valid—and the results of the alternative are so destructive that it seems incredible that anyone could entertain it seriously—then its significance for the moral organization of life is simply revolutionary. For the personal sinfulness may now be thought of in relation to him. A Person such as he was becomes substituted for the impersonal Moral Law.⁷ The avenging Judge is clothed with his grace and tenderness, with his patience and unfailing love. In other words, we may think of our weakness and failure in

terms of disloyalty to a Personal Friend whose love never fails us although we have failed him. But we can do more than that. We can think of all the demand that is laid upon us for our absolute best as a demand made not in the name of abstract authoritative right but in the name of friendship and love. Such a change of conception utterly transforms the nature of our moral problem and the conditions under which we are to work it out. The expressed will of a Personal Friend allies itself to forces within us which the demand of an impersonal "Eternal Law of Righteousness," to use Dale's phrase, cannot begin to touch. Blessed is that man who has ceased to direct his attention to Law and directs it instead to Incarnate Love, and who knows that while the demands of Love are no whit less searching than the demands of Law, they are demands which carry in themselves the secret of their own realization.

(c) *The Creative Love*. The principle that has just been suggested cannot be emphasized too strongly. It means that for the man who sees Christ in his significance for redemption, the moral task has changed from what is an impossible condition—undeviating obedience to Law—to what is possible—whole-hearted love to a Person. "For what the law could not do . . . God sending his own Son . . . condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us." Never can there be by finite creatures perfect obedience to a code designed to cover the entire activity. The emphasis is in the wrong place. The attention is on the wrong factor. But let a person conceive Christ as Him by whom deliverance is made possible. Let him conceive him as making that possible by his own absolute devotion to the Father's will. Let him conceive him as vested with the right to legislate for the moral universe. Then let him make the great venture of faith whereby he can say: "Christ is the very end and purpose of my being. In him I see my own ideal self. Yea, in him I see also the very God. What he suffered, he suffered for me. Through

him, I *know*. Through him, I am *forgiven*." If a person can say that much, he can say more. He can say, "And through him, I find *power*." He has learned what Paul at last came to learn—that not in calculating obedience to an impersonal Law, but in moral love to a Moral Person who in himself incarnates the Moral Law is the secret at once of moral peace, moral power, and moral progress. What Law cannot do, Love can do—it can supply the adequate motive. A command conceived as the desire of a Beloved to whom we owe our all becomes a vastly different thing from a section of a Decalogue. What we need is something that will transform our terror into hope, something that will integrate rather than disintegrate, even though it at the same time chastise and humiliate us. We find it when we find that our sins have been not the breaking of the rules of a Taskmaster, but thoughtless and willful darts driven into the heart of Love.⁸ We find it when we see that what he is to us he is to every other man, so that all our uncharitable treatment of our fellows has but increased the travail of his soul. We find it when we see that what he asks of us God also asks—that in neither extent nor quality is there any difference between what is thundered at us by that Awful Voice which echoes out of the eternities and what is asked of us in the name of Love by One who, knowing all the Father's mind and will, loved us even unto death. If we fail now, it is not in rendering a prescribed obedience which can never be quite rectified, but in loyalty to unfailing Love, and what sorrow so cleansing as sorrow for disloyalty like that! In a word, there is no demand which can consistently be thought of as issuing from God which does not issue also from Jesus Christ, and there is in the total fact of Christ and his meaning for men the power to evoke that wealth of adoring love which carries with it in its turn the power whereby the demand may be met.

In him we see God. But he is Son, so that the God we see in him is Father. Our allegiance to him as Son is

therefore our allegiance to God as Father. In seeking to express the will of the Son for us we express also the will of the Father for us. Then in loving Christ we are loving God, and in such love lies the sufficient motive for obedience to every high and holy behest.

A discussion like the foregoing must inevitably appear as incomplete. Apart from the fact that all psychological analysis is only provisional and necessarily leaves out something, there is the other fact that what we have called "empowerment" appears, in ordinary religious experience, to come upon a man from without, or, as we say, from "above." That divine self-impartation which we know as "the baptism of the Holy Spirit" can never be satisfactorily explained to the religious consciousness as the necessary result of the individual's discovery of the law of his inner life, and of his acting on the discovery. It is obvious that there is a law of the spiritual life, and that the most exalted religious experience has a psychological basis without which the experience itself would be impossible. But over and above the psychology is the experience itself, and religious faith can never surrender the conviction that God himself is involved in the experience. If our discussion has not made this sufficiently clear, that is because our major interest was with the psychological process of empowerment. The fact in the case is that through a person's faith in Christ and love for him, God can more and more fully enthroned himself in that person's life. Necessarily that is not an arbitrary proceeding on God's part: man is always a coworker in his own salvation. God determines the conditions: it is man's part to meet them. When they are met, God instantly responds. What those conditions are in the main is clear to all. What they may be in their profounder philosophical and psychological aspects is an open question. If we have here considered these aspects, it is only for the sake of emphasizing the essential rationality of the Christian life. There is a psychology of mother-love, but no mother,

hearing it explained, would feel that that was all there was to her love. Our religious experience must always outstrip our attempted psychology of it, and in no way can the two ever be identified. What we *know* is that through Christ God has come to our help. This is the distinctly "religious" side of our experience, and thus viewed it appears as a reenforcement of the human on the part of the transcendent Divine. There is a relationship, the two terms of which are God and man. God at "that" end can no more be dispensed with than man at "this" end. When we think of him, we think of him as other than ourselves. When we pray, we "approach" him. All this involves personal distinctions, and spatial terms like "drawing near," "coming down from above," serve to emphasize these distinctions. Reflective thought, however, quickly recognizes that spatial terms cannot be literally understood in this connection. The "beyond" is really the "within." God is wherever man is. The law of the man's life is the law of God himself. The man's increasing appropriation of God is his increasing appreciation of that law and obedience to it. It may very well be that he does not clearly understand the deeper conditions of the process. In fact, when the strictly "religious" interest is supreme, he is quite apt not to be even concerned about them at all. But it will still be true that the conditions are there, and that his experience has come to pass because of them. This is the fact that justifies our discussion, the more so as the starting-point of the discussion is the experiential fact that Jesus Christ is "the power of God unto salvation."⁹

NOTES ON CHAPTER XIV

(1) There is a strange and significant paucity of recent books on the Christian Experience of the caliber of the older books such as those of William Arthur and Kuyper. It has become impossible to treat the doctrine of the Holy Spirit apart from an experiential basis. For this purpose, see Platt, *Immanence and*

Christian Thought; W. T. Davison, *The Indwelling Spirit*; T. Rees, *The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience*; R. Montgomery Rees, *Aspects of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*; Streeter, *The Spirit*; and Scott, *The Spirit in the New Testament*.

(2) How greatly Christian thought has changed on the question of the relation of sin to original human nature may best be seen by comparing a modern psychologist with a theologian of a former day, e. g., R. Watson, *Theological Institutes*, vol. ii, chap. xviii, and Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, chap. xix, "Why Men Sin." In an earlier discussion Hocking seeks to interpret sin in terms of human instincts. "Sin, I believe, is the refusal to interpret crude impulse in terms of the individual's most intelligent will to power" (p. 140, revised edition; p. 116, old edition). Note here that where the older theologian would say "inability," the psychologist says "refusal."

(3) On "flesh" and "spirit" see Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pt. iv, chap. ii; Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. iii, §§ 2-6.

(4) See Kirk, *The Religion of Power*, chap. vi, "Christianity as the Religion of Power," for a clear statement, but differing somewhat in its rationale from the present discussion.

(5) Everyone interested in making Christianity practically available should read Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, especially chap. iv, with its thesis, "Power in Civilization Rests on Collective Emotion, Not on Reason," and chap. v, on "The Emotion of the Ideal."

(6) Cf. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, chap. vii, "Two Types of Conversion." The second type dealt with is that represented by John Bunyan and David Brainerd—"sick souls," in the phrase of William James. Steven, *Psychology of the Christian Soul*, says, "The malady of a soul enslaved by sin is a malady of attention" (p. 135).

(7) Cf. Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 214.

(8) See Francis Thompson, *The Hound of Heaven*. This is one of the greatest religious poems of modern times. There is a good exposition by Trevor H. Davies, in *Spiritual Voices in Modern Literature*.

(9) See note (11) to Chapter XIX below.

CHAPTER XV

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: REDEMPTIVE SERVICE

If it be admitted that the Religion of Humanity alone can adequately produce any true personal unity, its superiority is still clearer when we turn to social unity. For its power to restore harmony in society is a consequence of its principle of affection and its Basis of speculation; both of which tend equally to reunite men universally in the same feeling and in the same belief. . . . Children of the same Great Being [Humanity], we all become at first his objective servants in life, and then his subjective organs after death. The communion of this vast whole is far from being confined to the present: Intellect and Feeling combine in comprehending in the same circle, the entire sum of the Past, the entire sum of the Future of mankind; the Past being the source, the Future being the aim, of the vast consensus of Man. It is this spirit of *continuity*, or communion between successive generations in time, which is more characteristic of the true Religion even than the *solidarity* or union of the whole living race now contemporary in space. It is here that we gather most distinctly the true purpose of our objective existence in life; which is, to transmit, improved to those who shall come after, that increasing heritage we received from those who went before. Thus regarded as a whole, the service of Humanity appears to be in its essence truly gratuitous.—AUGUSTE COMTE, *System of Positive Polity*, Frederic Harrison's translation, Chap. I, p. 62.

CHAPTER XV

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: REDEMPTIVE SERVICE

4. REDEMPTIVE SERVICE. We have placed a good deal of emphasis in this discussion on the necessary social entanglements of human nature and human experience. In the consideration of the individual's moral history, we saw that one of the dreadful things about sin was the fact that it set in operation social influences which could never be quite overtaken and destroyed. No amount of remorse on the part of the murderer, and no bearing by him of the extreme penalty, can restore his victim's life, or remove the distress of others. Just as the physicist tells us that in nature no activity can be isolated, so may the moralist tell us that one life is so entangled with other lives that it is not possible to understand them apart. No matter how unintentional the injury that one received from another, and no matter how genuine the sorrow for what was done, the act and its consequences have passed into the sum-total of being, and in that factual aspect of them they are irrevocable. The spoken word may be "taken back." What cannot be taken back is the *effect* of the spoken word on those who heard it.¹

But we saw that there was another side to this. That fact of necessary social reciprocity which perpetuates our sinfulness equally guarantees the perpetuity of our goodness. Moreover, it is that same fact which contains in itself both the promise and the power of mankind's eventual redemption. Let it be granted that we have here a principle which is operative in two directions—conserving the evil and conserving the good. None the less, the world is constituted with reference to righteousness, Human nature is

intended for goodness and not for evil. The general social movement is in the direction of the better, and although the better may not be the best, in so far as it is the better it is good. In a word, the law of social reciprocity, operative though it is in both the good and the evil, will eventually destroy evil as an actual fact. It will do so because it has for allies the very constitution of the universe, that which we feel most truly belongs to human nature, that which is the manifest purpose of life, and, for final guarantor, Jesus Christ.

No man can reverse the direction of his life-movement. No man can set in operation forces whose influence will be retroactive. What he does may reach outward and forward: it can never reach backward.² Does that mean that he stands wholly helpless in the presence of his own past? It does not. We have seen how the possibility of forgiveness ensuing on an adequate repentance injects hope into the troubled heart. Concerning sin in one of its aspects nothing can be done except to forgive it. Forgiveness presupposes repentance. But repentance—what is that? Uncertainty at this point may make redemption appear to be a very cheap and easy thing. Repentance and faith may avail to secure forgiveness in so far as the sin is against God. But sin is never against God alone. It cannot be. If we keep our figure of the family, and regard sin as indifference to the law of the household, then our indifference has affected not only the Father whose will is expressed in that law, but also those other members of the family whose interests the law is intended to protect. The Father may forgive, freely and to the uttermost, but the returning son knows that that is not all that needs to be done. He must bring forth fruits meet for repentance. It is just that necessity, already anticipated in Hebrew prophecy but revealed as to its full significance in the New Testament, that makes the Christian redemption the most profoundly ethical process the world has ever known.

Redemptive service, with the significance already assigned to it, may be analyzed as follows:

(a) *Direct Restitution.* Restitution in the proper sense is a direct effort to make good a fault. It is quite impossible that such a restitution should ever be complete. Indeed, it is that very impossibility which creates the necessity for forgiveness. It is difficult to see how both forgiveness and restitution could apply to the same fact, or at least to the same phases of the fact. But this aside, it is certain that no man with a fully aroused moral sense can be really satisfied unless he make every possible effort at direct rectification where he has been at fault. Rectification is never the ground of forgiveness, but it is the evidence to the sincerity of the repentance. If one could avoid the mechanical and legalistic implication, one might say that all sin has two aspects: the aspect to which forgiveness is the only response, and the aspect to which restitution is the only response. Whatever may be said as to this differentiation, it remains that the forgiven sinner still feels that the divine forgiveness has not wholly released him from responsibility. In so far as he does not feel this, his attitude is unethical and, one must add, insincere. There is a popular form of evangelical doctrine which would lead people to believe that the past has no claim upon them, just as there is a popular form of doctrine, not evangelical—at least, not evangelical in the Protestant sense—which would lead them to believe that they could commute the past by a nicely graded system of penances and payments. Restitution can never be absolute. A person who steals a hundred dollars and afterward repays a like amount may thereby make a legal restitution, but a complete moral restitution he does not and he cannot make. Implicit in that inability is the need of forgiveness, but then implicit in the experience of forgiveness is the need of all possible rectification. Nothing but that can preserve the ethical character of forgiveness and round out its moral content. This, of course, is not to be

understood as an attempt to rehabilitate "salvation by works." The very insistence on the necessary incompleteness of restitution should be evidence of that. But he who is content not to do all he could do to "make right" where he has been consciously at fault has certainly not yet read the mind of Christ. One suspects that the world would quickly offer a new appraisal of Christianity if its doctrine of restitution should come to be as much in evidence as its doctrine of free grace.³ Rectification apart from forgiveness spells moral despair. Forgiveness apart from rectification spells moral chaos.

(b) *Social Devotion*. What has been said may very easily create a false impression. If forgiveness is God's way of putting the sinner into a different relation to his sin, and if all possible direct restitution is necessarily involved in the genuineness of the repentance which precedes forgiveness, it would seem that there is a point beyond which no demand can be made on the forgiven person. He has discharged his obligation. Anything more is therefore "supererogatory." Now, if there is anything in the world that is alien to the true spirit of Christianity, it is just this supposition that the relations between God and men and between men and men can be determined on the basis of a calculated equivalent. There is simply no place for the legalistic conception in a true interpretation of the mind of Christ. It is true that Christ called men to repent. It is true that he required of them to make all possible reparation for their misdoings. What is not true is that he ever supposed that that new spirit of love and gratitude that comes with the realization of the redemption that he makes possible could be satisfied with an exact calculation of how much it owed. Love, real love, never calculates in that sense. Love gives all it can give with no other thought than that of the joy of the giving. Indeed, there is a certain extravagance and abandon about love, a certain sublime indifference to all consideration of worldly prudence.

that is one of its chief charms—and, let it be said, that is the source of its power.

It was said before that when we see ourselves in the light of Jesus Christ we realize our sinfulness. We see that sin is against God and against mankind. The moment we see sin with the eyes of Christ we see God also with the eyes of Christ, so that the very thing that reveals the true nature of sin reveals its forgivability as well. But sin, now conceived as unfilial disobedience, cannot be that and nothing more. Being unfilial, it is, if the term may be allowed, unfraternal. That which was done against the Father was done against the brother also. Repentance involves direct restitution to the limit of possibility. But the new relation with God into which we come through Christ brings us at the same time into a new relation with men. It is not only that we may have wronged this particular man or that particular man. The question becomes a very much larger one than that. Abstractions have been the bane of theology, and "the fallacy of the universal" is always close by. The danger of both must be incurred if the present point is to be given its full force. For we must say that a sin against a man is a sin against humanity. It is so little that we can do in the way of *direct* reparation, but there is hardly any limit to the possible *indirect* reparation. In other words, the principle of restitution is to be lifted out of the sphere of the particular into the sphere of the universal. The new conception of social relationship carries with it a social ideal. The Service of Humanity becomes the correlate of the true interpretation of Calvary. Such are the interrelations of human life that in sinning against particular men we have sinned against man. Again, such are the interrelations of human life that the possibility of universal redemption is in this very fact—that there are no limits discernible to the healing influences issuing from the service of love rendered to a common humanity in the name of Jesus Christ. Hence, "the second command is like unto

the first: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "And who is my neighbor?" Let Jesus answer in his story of the good Samaritan.

(c) *The Motive.* It will still be easy to say that all this seems remote and unreal—hazy generalization and vague theorizing rather than concrete possibility. It would be impossible enough if it were kept on the low level of a legal obligation. That is why we need to emphasize again the significance and the power of Christian love. Because a demand appears to be entirely logical is no guarantee that it will therefore be met. The logic must be set on fire through a passion of holy love. Who has not been convinced that he ought to render a certain service—and left it undone? And who has not found that the alchemy of love has transformed the impossible thing into a possibility? It is at this point that a double enforcement is provided by a unique and distinguishing feature of Christianity. The Christian is committed to the service of Jesus Christ. Why is he? Because he believes that Christ has secured the conditions of his redemption. But what Christ did for one man he did for every man. The realization, therefore, of Christ's significance for him on the part of a given individual commits him to the service of that Cause for whose sake Christ lived and died. There is no man anywhere, howsoever sunk in ignorance and wickedness, for whom Christ did not pour out his soul unto death. The Christian sees men with the eyes of Christ, and for his sake works in holy love for their good. But he does more than that: he sees, so to speak, the latent Christ in every man. Wherever there is a human soul, there is the Saviour. Covered though he may be by a mountain of pride, of selfishness, of error, of vice, of all that is utterly alien to the divine order of goodness, he is still there. Faith and love see in the actual man the ideal man, and that ideal man is, may we say, to be identified with the eternal Christ. If we cannot love men for what they are, we can love them for

what they might be. We may oppose ourselves to them in all those things that we conceive to be evil or undesirable, but the very opposition is because of the good that we seek—because of that “end” which we have seen envisaged in our Lord and his kingdom. We love Christ because we believe in him as our Redeemer. Because we love him we love his Cause. His Cause embraces every individual. We render the service of love because our love to Christ prompts us to work together with him to save men. And if anything more is needed to steady and empower our motive, it is the consideration that Christ is so related to every human soul that when we pour into the wounds of the wayfarer the oil and the wine, we are lessening the sufferings of our Lord and doing for him in return for what he has done for us.

Something like this is what is meant by that rectification which inheres in the Christian doctrine of redemption. No one can deny that much has been done to make it real, but there is much more to do. What would happen if the Christian Church should not in theory only but in actual practice identify its Lord with Humanity, and should learn that only in serving the one was it really serving the other? What would happen if we should so order our lives moment by moment as though he were at our side to see it all? What would happen if our first question as we considered a course of conduct should be, “Will this grieve or will this rejoice the ever-present Saviour?” And, after all, why not this attitude, seeing that we are no longer our own but Christ’s, and Christ is God’s?

NOTES ON CHAPTER XVI

(1) Glover’s suggestion (*Jesus in the Experience of Men*, p. 90), that a man is responsible for his influence, but not wholly for another’s reception of it, needs a much greater qualification than he himself gives it. We affect others, not merely by

our personal influence, but by creating situations and conditions which have a practically determinative power for them.

(2) There is, of course, a sense in which the *meaning* of a past deed may be transformed by a present activity. But an important distinction must be recognized: (1) The present may transform the meaning of the past through a manifest teleological connection. Thus a final interpretation of organic evolution cannot be reached until we have considered its apparent consummation in man as rational intelligence with unlimited ethical possibilities. From this standpoint, which is that of the theory of Epigenesis, the past is purposive means to the present, and is therefore not complete without the present. (2) The present may transform the meaning of the past because a personal volition makes the past a means to something in the present. Here the connection is not necessary and intentional from the point of view of the original deed, and therefore, is not strictly teleological. The past was not *in order that*. But the person, confronted by the past, may do something *which he would not do but for that past*. In this sense also, therefore, the past and the present belong together as parts of one whole, but the whole is an integration of otherwise disparate parts, and the integration is a deliberate personal achievement. It is this principle which Royce employs so thoroughly in his philosophy of the Atonement (*Problem of Christianity*, vol. i, lect. vi). He regards the postulate of atonement as follows: "No baseness or cruelty of treason so deep or so tragic shall enter our human world but that loyal love shall be able in due time to oppose to just that deed of treason its fitting deed of atonement" (p. 322).

(3) Even in such books as Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, and Ellwood, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, which deal expressly with the "socializing" of religion, while the principle of service is given its rightful place, there is a curious lack of specific emphasis on this principle of direct restitution. Surely, we ought not to fall behind Greek tragedy and Hebrew prophecy.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: EVERLASTINGNESS

Come up hither. From this wave-washed mound
Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown'd.
Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond—
Still, leagues beyond those leagues, there is more sea.

D. G. ROSSETTI, *The House of Life*, lxxiii.

The subjection of all things is perfect, that God may be all in all. There is no fear of the end; perfect love has cast out fear. There is no fear of that which lies as the unknown, for the law which determines it is known. There is no fear of that which may be summoned forth from beyond the confines of this earth, nor drawn from the lowest deeps; for the same organic law prevails through all worlds—the law manifested in the Christ, in his redemptive kingdom. There is, then, no power that is not brought into subjection to man—no power in life or in death, in things present or things to come. There is no finite limitation to the redemption of the Christ, whose kingdom shall have no end. St. Paul says, the Christ being raised from the dead is far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. The message of the worlds to come, of their law and power, is that the Christ is there, Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever.—ELIJAH MULFORD, *The Republic of God*, pp. 255 and 256.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CHRISTIAN WAY: EVERLASTINGNESS

5. EVERLASTINGNESS. We analyzed above what was described as the redemptional requirement. So far, we have found a close agreement between the results of the analysis and the Christian way. We must *know*, and we have in Christ that which so answers to the need that we do not hesitate to trust it. We must be *justified* or forgiven, and through Christ we are led at one and the same time to a great repentance and to a faith that the God against whom we sinned is such a God as wants only repentance that he may forgive. We must be given new *interests and motives*, and when we come to realize all that Christ has made possible for us there comes into being such a love for him and his cause as meets the demand for power commensurate to the need. We must *rectify*, both directly and indirectly, and in our personal relation to Christ and in his relation to that humanity of which we are integral parts we find the demand, and with the demand the power, to work with Christ and for Christ in humanity's redemption.

If we could say no more than this, it may be that we should have said enough. But there is always the question of the future. History is an unfolding movement. The whole historic process is a process of the replacing of the old by the new. Religious conceptions and practices, philosophical systems, scientific theories, even whole civilizations, have appeared only at last to vanish. "All things flow." "Creation is evolution and evolution is creation." What guarantee have we then that anything is stable?¹ May it not be that, after all, we can only hope to meet our problem for the time being and as we now see it, without being justified in supposing that our solution is final? Besides, what

more than this do we really need? Why be anxious about some hypothetical future which may never materialize, and about problems that may never arise?

That this is a possible attitude is not to be denied. But neither is it to be denied that it is an attitude which profoundly misapprehends the whole significance of Christ and the projected Christian redemption. One can hardly write calmly when one thinks of some of the discussions of the "finality" of the Christian religion.² It is not merely an academic question—although some may so discuss it as to give it that appearance. The person who says that he can conceive the time coming when Christ will have been superseded, when his spirit will appear imperfect, when his ideal for men will have passed to make room for a better, and when his thought of God and God's purpose will have become obsolete—such a person surely cannot have entered into the innermost meaning of the gospel story and its relation to permanent human need. Besides, it is one thing to say that a better can be conceived: it is another to state clearly just what that better would be. Those who speak so easily of the "relative" character of Christianity can hardly be said to have been strikingly successful in their suggestions as to what would constitute a "higher" religion or a more satisfactory solution of man's insistent moral problem.

The problem of redemption is the problem of the ultimate meaning of man's life and its realization in personal experience. There can be only one reason, therefore, for challenging the finality of that which is offered and believed in as redemption. That reason must be that it does not really provide for that very thing with which it is supposed to be concerned. In our earlier analysis of the redemptional requirement, we saw that the final demand was for the guarantee of the validity of the proposed redemption in every conceivable circumstance, either in this world or in any other. It is of the very essence of Christianity that it con-

tains in itself this guarantee. We claim for the Christian way not only that it is the best that is known but that it is the best that can be conceived. We claim for Jesus Christ not that he is merely the greatest of Prophets and the greatest of Teachers, but that he is in a category all by himself—Incarnate Deity in the sense that *he* is why things are, the Alpha and Omega of creation.³ We claim that He gives the absolute meaning to the world, the absolute meaning to every single fact and every single experience. We claim that He makes possible for men a way of looking at things and a way of dealing with things which issues in a form of experience bearing the character of absolute normality. Christ is not merely a Redeemer: he is The Redeemer. He is not merely a Son of man and a Son of God: he is Son of Man and Son of God. He is not merely one who speaks for God: he is God speaking. He is not merely one more link in an evolutionary process which began before him and which will some day outgrow him: he *consummates* the process, in the sense that what now remains to be done is to explicate, appropriate, and make real all that lies implicit in him and his work and his Cause. These are strong statements, and they are made purposely so. No exigencies of apologetic strategy shall lead us to abate one jot or tittle this claim that to Jesus Christ belongs the absolute moral Lordship of the human race forever because in him is the potency to bring every man in his individual, social, and spiritual nature to complete self-fulfillment. What, indeed, is the very strength and glory of Christianity but just the magnitude of its claim, the audacity of its proposed conquest, the illimitable vista which it opens up before mankind? If we ask again, Why is the world? Why is man? we can but answer as we did before—that Jesus Christ is why the world is, and that he is why man is. That is why we may speak of his finality. We have already considered the broad philosophical and experiential reasons that justify this answer. Two or three other things need to be said, however, by way of elaboration.

(a) *The Historic Christ Himself.* There is a rather common notion that it does not matter profoundly whether the Gospel Portrait is "historical" or not. We are told that the important thing is the Portrait, not the Subject. Even if there was no such Subject (and no one can now prove that there was), the Portrait remains, and men will always feel its charm and power.⁴ The spirit behind this concession to "religious-historical" criticism may be commendable, namely, the desire to put Christian ideas on safe ground. But the concession itself is fatal. If the world ever becomes convinced that there never was such a Person as Jesus Christ, it will soon lose interest in the ideas associated with his name. It may even be that there are those who would welcome the evidence that he was fictitious as affording them an excuse for ceasing to be troubled by certain insistent Christian ideas. If there is not at the heart of Christianity a historical Person whose like was never seen before and will never be seen again, then the very foundation of our faith is gone. The final testimony to Christianity is not in the nature of its ideas, nor in some pragmatic principle of results, important as these are, but it is in Christ himself. Why should we believe in such a God as is distinctive of Christianity? Because we believe in Jesus Christ, who was what he was because of what he believed God to be. And why should we take up toward the world the distinctive Christian attitude? Because that was the attitude of Jesus Christ, and in accordance with it he did all his work. But take away the actual Jesus, and you take away that Perfect Sonship in which once and for always the Divine Fatherhood was attested. Take away the actual Jesus, and you take away that One Life in which the world was absolutely "overcome." The very needs of faith, of life itself, demand the historic Person. But such a Person does more than validate faith. He appears as the type of man's normal relationships. If there was never such a Person as the Jesus of the Gospels, then Christianity is simply one more re-

ligion. If there was such a Person, then there has actually appeared in history One whom the human race can never outgrow, one whom every man can put over against himself both to condemn and to inspire. One speaks mildly when one says that the talk of Christ being outgrown savors of audacity. Certainly such talk has not often come from those who were notable for their moral and spiritual attainments. We find, then, in the very fact of Christ himself, and in the inexhaustible nature of his spirit, the promise of everlastingness in the Christian way.

(b) *The Nature of Christ's Method.* The more one studies the method of our Lord, the more one is impressed with the absence of anything that could be called external legislation. It is true that certain ecclesiastical theories are traced to his words, but surely only with small success. There is nothing that Jesus ever said that gives to baptism in any form, or to the church organization in any form, or to the Eucharist in any form, an absolute character.⁵ Spiritual life and experience will inevitably take certain forms, but there is no such thing as a form that is indispensable in the sense that the absence of the form makes the experience impossible. Forms come and go, being determined by a variety of circumstances, but the life remains. Necessarily Jesus used forms, and his speech is colored by contemporary customs. Take the saying: "If thou art offering thy gift at the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." Certainly the form of expression was taken from a current religious custom, but who will question the validity in all times and circumstances of what the form was used to express? Is a man not to put himself right with men before he can offer acceptable worship to God because, forsooth, there is no "altar" in his church to which it is customary to "bring gifts"? Is a man not to "eat and drink in remembrance" because wine ceases to be

manufactured? Is the Christian released from civic duty because "Cæsar" has been replaced by "The Community"? Because we no longer "light a candle and set it on a stand," but instead push an electric button, are we therefore released from letting our light "so shine before men that they may see our good works"? The questions are almost puerile. To ask them is to answer them. If it were legitimate to use the term "genius" in connection with our Lord, we could say that in nothing did he more strikingly exhibit his genius than in his avoidance of hard-and-fast legislation. It is the Spirit that quickeneth. Give men the Spirit of Christ and whether they be black or white, Oriental or Occidental, simple or learned, they will pour that Spirit into such molds as lie to their hand. What folly it would be to try to make Chinese or Japanese or Indian Christianity an exact replica of American and English Christianity in its externalities!¹⁶ What a tribute to the inexhaustible vitality of the Christian way that it can find appropriate expression at any time and in any place where it has the opportunity!

(c) *The Adaptability of the Christian Way.* The last sentence brings up the question of what is usually called the universality of the gospel. Certainly, that can never be final which shows itself unable to meet the test of universal adaptability. On the other hand, that which answers to human need wherever found thereby attests its ultimate character. It may be too much to say that universality is a logical demonstration of finality, but it at least points in that direction. Now this question of universality as applied to the Christian way is one of simple fact. Most religions have been tribal and national. Even where they have been more than national, the various groups among which they have prevailed have possessed certain racial similarities. But in a sense in which no other religion has ever been—not forgetting Mohammedanism—Christianity is a missionary religion. No one would want to defend the whole course of church history. But church history is one thing: the his-

tory of the conquest of the Spirit of Christ is another and a quite different thing. The potential universality of the Christian way does not mean that some particular form of church organization is able to embrace mankind. Nothing could be more undesirable than a catholicity of that sort. The true "note" of the church's catholicity is not in the form but in the spirit. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is the catholic church." Paul was thinking of that sort of catholicity when he said that in Jesus Christ there is neither Greek nor barbarian, Jew nor Gentile, bond nor free, but all are one. There are some religions which one simply cannot think of as universal. The Christian way, on the other hand, is not truly understood if its universal note is not recognized. It is elemental in the very idea of Christianity that its mission is world-wide, and that it is to spread not by virtue of some extraneous force but by virtue of its innermost nature and spirit. In a word, the conquests which have already been made in the name of Christ, the essential nature of the Christian way as a life and an experience rather than a set of rules, the infinite variety of individual and national self-expression which may consistently go with devotion to Christ, and the response which the Christian way makes to the permanent human needs—all this bespeaks that adaptability which promises universality and justifies the claim of finality.

(d) *The Expansiveness of the Christian Way.* There is one feature of Christianity which has never been emphasized as much as it might have been. It is its power to continue to foster and provide for that which it creates. There is a certain moral and spiritual fecundity in Jesus Christ and the spirit he imparts to men which is a guarantee of permanence. Christianity is concerned with an experience which points to nothing beyond itself. Its doctrine of "the imputation of Christ's righteousness" is really an anticipation of the future, a future in which all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge and love hidden in Christ will be

more and more brought to light through human experience.⁷ Let the future be called "an undiscovered country." None the less, He who leads us now will lead us then. Let there be the certainty of new and strange situations in far-distant worlds: no situation in human relationships can arise which devotion to the whole truth of Christ will not be adequate to meet. We have far less need to fear that Christ shall fail than that he shall not be fully tried. He who has caught the significance of the Redeemer and his work, and has understood its interpretative character, faces forward with complete confidence. He is concerned rather that men will fail to appreciate the interpretation than that the interpretation itself will prove at last to be inadequate. The Christian way is as immortal as man because of its power to produce a type of life which grows by virtue of its own inner vitality. The more a person loves Jesus Christ as his Saviour and Lord, the more he is able to love him. The more he learns of him, the more he is able to learn, and the more he sees yet waiting to be learned. The more he seeks to express practically his Lord's spirit, the more he realizes the versatility and creativeness of that spirit. In him he comes to sonship, and in him he finds the power to carry the sonship on and perfect it. If such sonship does not constitute God's ultimate purpose for men, then we cannot imagine what does and the human quest for the abundant life becomes fruitless.

There is, indeed, one possible ground on which the truth of what has now been said can be challenged. The significance that we have attributed to Jesus Christ assumes the permanence of the essential human nature. If human nature shall ever change fundamentally, then it may be that Christ will cease to interpret it. But the hypothesis belongs in the class that Spinoza described as "fictitious," meaning suppositions that dealt with the impossible. It is simply wasting time to deal with a situation which depends for its actuality upon human nature ceasing to be what it is now. For when

we speak of fundamental human nature we are speaking of personality, and if personality is not the ultimate form of being, and therefore the ultimate category of thought, then the possibility of a rational interpretation of experience disappears.⁸ Whatever is offered to us as replacing personality as ultimate necessarily depends upon personality for being conceived. To try to imagine a nonpersonal which transcends the personal is a process of "lifting oneself by one's bootstraps." All problems of ultimate meanings are finally the problem of man himself, of his own real nature and destiny, of his ideal self and its realization. Jesus Christ answers to man's need in this regard as the key to the lock. He is meant for mankind and mankind is meant for him. In the complete understanding and experience of Christ man finds that "end" which his nature, in its individual, social, and religious aspects, insistently demands and to which it unerringly points. It is therefore according as man realizes God's purpose for him in Christ that he finds the realization of his own true self.

NOTES ON CHAPTER XVI

(1) The modern revival of the theory of a "Changing God" shows that this question is not merely rhetorical. For a discussion, cf. Sheldon, *Pantheistic Dilemmas*, chap. iv. Even so sane a thinker as Boutroux suggests that the law of change or evolution may include in its scope ultimate being itself (*Contingency of the Laws of Nature*, Eng. trans., pp. 171ff.). In that case, change is the ultimate, which is equivalent to saying that there is no ultimate. We are back to Heraclitus!

(2) Cf. G. B. Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*. Eucken's book, *Can We Still Be Christians?* is not nearly so doleful as its title. Much more positive and satisfying are Bouquet, *Is Christianity the Final Religion?* Mackintosh, *The Originality of the Christian Message*, lect. vi, "The Absoluteness of Christianity," and Kirk, *The Religion of Power*, chap. ix, "The Finality of Christianity."

(3) Chap. viii of Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, is entitled "Alpha and Omega," and deals with the thought of the text. Glover writes: "If Jesus Christ is Omega as well as Alpha, if the experience in virtue of which men have moved to this great conception of him is approximately right, then a light is shed on the whole of God's universe, and on the whole of God. Jesus becomes the solution of all the mysteries of the world and of human experience" (p. 143). The same theme is dealt with, but more in the spirit of traditional theology, in the closing chapters of Temple, *Mens Creatrix*.

(4) This is the point of view in, e. g., Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion*. The other side is well put by Mackintosh, *ibid.*, lect. ii, pp. 51-57: "There are grave risks and apparently prohibitive drawbacks in such a vital relationship between faith and historical events. These the Christian religion has accepted calmly. . . . How faith can rest on fact which, like all other elements of the temporal succession, like all other bygone things, can never be exhibited as necessary in thought, and which would lose its special quality of Divine wonderfulness if it could—this enigma, I suppose, Christianity has entirely, or almost entirely, to itself. These difficulties have not been allowed to obscure the vast, inimitable truth. Our faith stands alone in the claim that the Power transcendent over the universe coincides in moral being with One who lived on earth, and that if we would see into the life of things, we must gaze upon a Cross" (p. 57).

(5) There is a distinct tendency among certain Free-Church leaders in England toward a more elaborate theory of the Lord's Supper. See the chapter in Lofthouse (who is a Wesleyan Methodist), *Altar, Cross, and Community*, on "The Eucharist and the Mass."

(6) Cf. Paul Hutchinson, *The Next Step*.

(7) "Religion, we may now say, is the present attainment in a single experience of those objects which in the course of nature are reached only at the end of infinite progression. Religion is anticipated attainment." Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 31.

(8) There are many readable expositions of the type of philosophy which treats Personality as the supreme category. The

following are easily accessible: Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, bk. i, chap. i; Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*; Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*; Bowne, *Personalism*; and *Studies in Philosophy and Theology*, edited by E. C. Wilm.

CHAPTER XVII
CHRISTIANITY AND REASON

No doubt ordinary, uncritical beliefs may serve well enough as working hypotheses and for practical purposes. Philosophy and scientific criticism are not popular necessities. We can use and enjoy nature with the rudest and most wrong-headed ideas of our relation to it. . . . But one thing is inevitable. If you begin with reason and criticism, you must go on with them. You cannot, when their first teachings disturb old notions, or seem to undermine cherished beliefs, hark back to what you call "common-sense," or shelter yourself from the smart of reason's arrows behind the old bulwark of authority, whether that of consciousness or any other. The wounds of reason can only be healed by reason. If the first draught of philosophy have confused and unsettled us, it is only by deeper draughts that we can overcome its intoxicating effects.—*From an address on David Hume, delivered by JOHN CAIRD before the University of Glasgow, November 5, 1881.*

CHAPTER XVII

CHRISTIANITY AND REASON

THE general foundation for what has been said so far is in Scripture, history, and experience, with such help from theological and philosophical considerations as was needed to give some coherence to the thought. What now remains to be said must necessarily move almost exclusively in the realm of the speculative. The Ritschlian contention is undoubtedly sound—that it is possible to present the full significance of Jesus Christ for religion by remaining strictly within the limits of history and experience. Thus limited, Christ is seen to have for men “the value of God.”¹ But this very fact forced the problem which Ritschl’s entire construction was an attempt to evade. Christ as he appears to faith must lead on to Christ as he is to be construed by thought. The assigning to him of a unique place in the relations of God and men is not the last thing to be done. If what he has done and promises to do entitles him to be regarded as unique, the exact nature of that uniqueness falls to be considered.

Early in our discussion we attempted an analysis of the essential characteristics of man. We found that man is fundamentally an acting and end-seeking creature, but that his activity involves all the aspects of his personality, emotional, rational, and volitional. We found that action, in so far as it is free, is never without a reason. That reason we found in a need, sometimes apprehended and sometimes not. The presence of the need is indicated by the fact of desire. The only way to rationalize need and desire is to suppose that they have correlates in ends. But desire is exceedingly lawless, and desire may be falsely understood.

It is therefore only through a "criticism of life" that the life-movement may proceed as it should. The standard of criticism must be an end of so comprehensive a character as to possess the power to subject to it all the essential human characteristics. Through such subjection, the meaning of those characteristics is brought to light. In its turn, the discovery of meaning involves the realization of the self. There is, therefore, a purposeful relation between the basic self and that end through devotion to which the self comes into its kingdom. The end in question must be assigned an absolute value, since it appears as the reason because of which all things are. So much may be claimed as the result of patient reflection on the facts of life and on the nature of life.

But while reflection may discover what is required, it has not discovered that which actually meets the requirement. Religion has carried on the search with more success. Through his religion man has endeavored to find the clue to the total meaning of his life and experience. What reflection would lead us to expect, what religion in all ages has persistently reached out after—this has come to men in Jesus Christ. He may be so construed as that through faith in him and through devotion to him all the potentialities of life may be fostered and brought under the domination of an end which leaves nothing out of its consideration.

(1) Man is held, and often terrified, by the sense of moral demand. Jesus Christ, conceived as in every way to be identified with the moral law, makes possible to us moral obedience and the realization of moral peace, because by loving him as our Redeemer and Lord, and doing for love of him all that his love for us properly requires, we at the same time satisfy all the demand of the Law. In despair we turn from Sinai to Calvary only to make the greatest moral discovery of human history—that Sinai and Calvary do not stand over against each other, but that Calvary rises upward from the topmost pinnacle of Sinai. He who with

clear vision carries out in himself all that is implied in Calvary does thereby enter into intimate personal relation with the Unseen. "The Unseen" becomes "The Father," and "The Law" becomes "The Father's Will."

(2) Again, man is involved in social relationships. He can no more escape them than he can escape himself. He enters life under the influence of social conditions for which he is in nowise responsible, and as he carries on his life-task he not only takes color from those social conditions but in his own turn modifies them for others. Socially he receives and socially he gives and he can avoid neither the one nor the other. He is held as firmly by his social nature as he is by his moral nature, and the results of each react on the other. The moral and the social—God hath joined these together, and no man may put them asunder. That is why the same Christ who guarantees to man the realization of the moral ideal guarantees to him also the realization of the social ideal. It is due to man's social nature that the results of his activity have become enshrined in the social whole. In and through Jesus Christ alone have we learned how that very fact—social reciprocity—which appears to guarantee the permanence of evil, may be utilized to the realization of a family in which each shall work for the other in loving obedience to the Father's will.

(3) Once more, man must be considered with reference to his individuality. In every life there are tendencies and qualities and characteristics which are not in themselves desirable. But, on the other hand, there is in every life a certain peculiarity of temperament and endowment which is to be preserved and cultivated and brought to fruition. Not only must we associate the moral and the social, but we must also associate with these the individuality as well. And in utter devotion to that same Christ who holds the secret of the realization of his moral and social nature man finds also the secret of the realization of his basic individuality. There is not one undesirable trait but that, through

Christ, it may be so held in subjection as to contribute thereby to the worth of life. There is not one desirable trait that needs to be lost. And if it be asked what may be the criterion of the desirable and undesirable in this connection, we must answer that the criterion is the potential relation of the trait to the mind of Christ. In complete loyalty to Jesus Christ as his Redeemer and Lord, the artist, the singer, the statesman, the mechanic, the man of any "talent" whatsoever, may use his talent to its utmost capacity. In so far as he does not so use it, he falls short of his greatest possibility. Thus it is that that end which the very complexity of man's life demands is found in Jesus Christ. Through him, the moral, the social, and the individual may each realize itself, not in separation, but in complete reciprocity and harmony.

What may be said further—indeed, what must be said further—of Him of whom this much is true? The place of Christ in faith is undeniable. His moral and spiritual supremacy cannot be seriously challenged. It is the testimony of those who know (and surely they have a right to speak) that through him they come to peace with God, that in him they find an inexhaustible motive to service, and that they have no personal endowment which is not made more meaningful by being subjected in agreement with his mind. But the experience depends on a certain faith, and for those who know the experience the faith itself is thereby validated. As we have said so often, man's supreme need is for an end to which the whole experience of life may contribute and in which that experience may find its meaning. In Jesus Christ the nature of that end has been revealed: it is a certain order of moral goodness. But just because this is a revelation and not a discovery of reason, the element of faith becomes operative. He who would know the secret of Christ must commit himself in trustful confidence to him as his Saviour and Lord. Surely, he who does that must be allowed to testify to what takes place as a result, although

others will be entitled to judge his testimony by such practical standards as character, achievement, and social worth.

But this union of faith and experience can travel only so far. It cannot pronounce definitely on questions which lie beyond the limit of its travel. The painful history of doctrinal controversy has had its origin in this misapprehension of the function of faith and experience. Men have been entirely within their right in asserting what Christ has done for them and what they believe he can do for the whole world. And they have been entirely within their right in seeking to work back intellectually from their experience of Christ to a construction of the ultimate nature and significance of his Person and of the experience which has come to them in him. Where they have erred has been in not clearly distinguishing between the discoveries of faith and the deductions of reason. The Arians believed that Jesus Christ was their Saviour and the Saviour of the world, and the Athanasians had the same belief. The Arians could believe that, even although they denied that the Son was "co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father," whereas the Athanasians affirmed that only an Eternal Son could be the world's Saviour. It has been the general judgment of the church that the Athanasians were right and the Arians wrong. But the intellectual rightness of the one and the intellectual wrongness of the other were not in themselves criteria of the genuineness of the faith and devotion of the parties. It is at least conceivable that an Athanasian could be more interested in his formula, "begotten, not made," than in the question of his personal consecration, and that an Arian could be more interested in winning men to Christ's service than in defending his phrase—"there was a time when He (the Son) was not." The Baptist has a perfect right to believe in trine immersion, as the Romanist has to believe in transubstantiation and the Calvinist in predestination. But what none of these has a right to suppose is that the assent to such a belief is identical with that living faith

in Christ as Saviour and Lord which alone can save, or that that living faith is impossible in the absence of that belief. Notwithstanding authoritative pronouncements and solemn anathemas, it must be written down here as simple truth that neither being baptized, nor being confirmed, nor participating in the mass, nor subscribing to the Augsburg Confession or the Westminster Confession, the Thirty-nine Articles or the Twenty-five Articles, nor reciting the Apostles' Creed or the Nicene Creed—that neither of these in itself ever made a Christian yet nor ever will it. That these rites and formulas have a proper function is not for a moment being questioned: indeed, what they bear witness to of intellectual and practical need is most earnestly to be defended. What is being questioned is the right of any church to apply a purely ceremonial or intellectual test as a means of judging the genuineness of a person's faith in Christ and the reality of the experience which the faith calls into being.² The Christian experience has a certain self-evidencing character. The condition to it is simple: faith in Jesus Christ as personal Saviour and Lord, or, more exactly, faith in God as he has appeared in Christ. But the entering into that experience does not automatically qualify a man to pronounce definitely upon all that it may be held to presuppose and imply. Bernard was right when he said that it is the heart that makes the theologian, but it is a necessary part of even a theologian's equipment that he have a head as well as a heart. It is simply nonsense for a man to say that the reality of the Spirit's presence with him fits him to declare the rightfulness of the "filioque" clause in the Western Nicene Symbol. Can a man not know God through Christ, can he not love him through Christ, can he not serve him through Christ, can he not for Christ's sake order the whole course of his life and have no other purpose except to see Christ crowned Lord of all—can he not do this unless and until he understand and assent to a theory of the inner constitution of the Godhead which wholly iden-

tifies Jesus of Nazareth with a self-conscious Person who from eternity existed as an integral and necessary element in the Godhead, and who was temporarily absent from the Godhead for the space of some thirty-three years? To say that he *can*, because it has been done in untold numbers of cases. Religion is one thing and theology is another. The Christian experience is one thing and the philosophy of that experience is another. Expertness in setting forth the philosophy is no necessary proof that the expert has entered completely into the experience. But on the same principle, a ripe Christian experience does not necessarily transform the believer into an expert theologian and philosopher.³

This much having been said, with more emphasis and elaboration than some will think necessary for so obvious a truth, this also now falls to be said with like emphasis, namely, that the reason has its function. For the purpose of the present discussion, the function of the reason is understood to be to coordinate, so far as that may be possible, the facts of life and experience. But that coordination cannot be achieved so long as reason stays wholly within the realm of known fact and experience. If it be true that there are large areas where uniformity is seen to prevail, it is no less true that there are innumerable apparent oppositions and antagonisms. If it be true that there is much that we can be said to know, it is no less true that there are limits to our knowledge, while yet we have an insatiable curiosity to penetrate beyond those limits. We want to *explain*, and mere description of what is so is not explanation. A description of a natural process is not at the same time a philosophy of that process. We fall back upon a certain theory, but a theory never represents the empirical. Rather does it represent an attempt to solve a problem which has been raised by the empirical itself. If a theory was empirical, it would cease to be a theory and would become knowledge. It is because we do not know and yet

want to know that we construct our hypotheses. God has no hypotheses or theories: our very definition of him excludes their necessity and even their possibility. A hypothesis is at one and the same time an indication of the unique function of reason and of the limitations under which, in us, it must necessarily proceed. Only reason can hypothesize, but human reason is not omniscient: hence the necessity of the hypothesis. Reason finds itself confronted with a body of facts. It is the very nature of reason to synthesize its material. It carries on the synthetic process by postulating a principle which appears to be warranted by the facts in question. It assumes the principle to be valid if it really does all that is required of it, namely, if it does really *explain* the facts. But reason makes a more pretentious effort even than this. It is not satisfied merely with making theories that appear to account for particular groups of facts. That same passion for unity which urges reason to seek for the unknown X which reduces to order the elements of a given phase of experience urges it to find that supreme unknown X which shall be to all lesser X's what these in their turn are to this or that group of facts. To use the language of Plato, like phenomena have their own particular "good," and there is a Supreme Good which is the "good" of all particular "goods," and therefore of all phenomena as well.⁴ The history of philosophy is but the history of reason's quest for this Supreme Unknown. Theology is allied to philosophy in the sense that it seeks the same goal, but it confines itself more particularly to the realm of religion, and it claims the right to use the facts of religion and of religious experience as reliable data. Working from this standpoint, it equates the unknown X of philosophy with a Personal God, and affirms that this, properly explicated, is the supreme postulate or hypothesis by reference to which the total facts of life and experience may be explained. One of the facts of religion with which theology deals is that of Revelation, but no insistence on this fact

and the use of it can destroy the function of reason. It is true that the Revelation, if accepted, is accepted by faith, but it is not thereby accepted on arbitrary grounds. It is accepted as one accepts any other idea or principle which is not logically demonstrable—that is, on the ground that it offers the necessary explanation, and then is sufficiently verified in experience. There is, however, for religion, an added fact of very great significance, namely, that the acceptance of the belief in God not only “explains” the facts of life, but leads the believer to the creation of new facts and new experiences of such character and of such worth as that they attest still more strongly the reality of the daring postulate whence they proceed. Herein lies the philosophical value of the testimony of religious experience.

But reason cannot be permitted to play the part of an arbitrary despot. Faith is just as normal an activity of mind as is any process of logical deduction. In fact, it could very easily be shown that the coldest piece of reasoning ever conducted admitted the element of faith in that somewhere in the process something had to be taken for granted. Complete skepticism involves a complete intellectual paralysis. Where reason is used to discredit reason the discrediting conclusion can hardly be convincing. To say that we cannot know involves that we know that we cannot know; and if we know that we cannot know, then certainly we know. Let reason be crowned monarch as it should, but it is less an absolute than a constitutional monarch, and it must exercise its authority in agreement with fact and faith. Facts may be never so contemptible to lordly reason, but facts they are, and reason ignores them at its peril. Many a noble metaphysical structure has come to ignominious ruin through its scorn of the services of “humble facts.” Creative faith may be very unostentatious, but reason cannot safely legislate in defiance of it. Such faith may stand within the shadow, but nevertheless it stands there, and it keeps watch above its own,

All this is said with reference particularly to the common disposition to say arbitrarily what can be or what cannot be. What is and what is not are, after all, somewhat more important considerations than dogmatic pronouncements as to what can be and cannot be. At least, the pronouncement as to possibility must take account of actuality. For example, to rule out any theory of scriptural inspiration purely on the ground that such inspiration is neither credible nor possible is not scientific. If a person believes he can deal adequately with all the Scripture facts without falling back on any such theory, he is entitled to do so, and his procedure is at least not arbitrary. On the other hand, he must be willing to submit his explanation to the scrutiny of others, and if they are not satisfied that he has adequately accounted for all the facts, and if they believe—and can say why they believe—that the assumption of “inspiration” of some sort does account for them, they are surely within their right in supposing that reason is not violated but, rather, is honored by the assumption. A good deal has been said about the idea of Divine Triunity which would have been better left unsaid. The bitterness has not been confined to either the defenders or the opponents of the idea. It is certainly an arbitrary proceeding to say that since the very idea of Triune existence is an impossibility, therefore in Jesus Christ there was no divine incarnation. One may not settle the question of the unique significance of the Person and work of Christ by making an *a priori* pronouncement on what God cannot be. On the other hand, it is no less arbitrary to require of a man that he wholeheartedly assent to a theory of the interior constitution of the Godhead as a condition to being enrolled among the followers of Christ. Certain facts may seem to point in the direction of such a theory. Because the facts do so point, it is not permitted to hold against the facts a pure *a priori* conception of Deity. But then, because the facts only point in that direction, and do not absolutely demand the theory in the

sense that no other explanation of them is possible, a check is necessarily set to any dogmatism, and there is left an area of freedom which it is the function and the prerogative of faith to possess. We will not make a purely intellectual test a condition to salvation. But neither will we surrender our freedom to any other man's intellectual bias, or hesitate to make and subscribe to those postulates which our faith and experience appear to demand, and to which, therefore, that same faith and experience are for us the sufficient evidence.

Now, there are certain facts connected with Jesus Christ. They are facts of history and of experience. What they are has been to a degree set forth in these pages. Some will be satisfied to rest in these historical and experiential facts, and there can be no quarrel with them for so doing. Others will not. They will want to bring to bear upon the facts the coordinating function of reason. The result will be a Christology. This result may be confined wholly within the sphere of the human, or it may fall back upon the divine, but it will be a Christology in either case. In the end, however, it must meet the test applied to any hypothesis: does it adequately explain the facts in question, and is it capable of being taken up into a total world-view that really satisfies the intellect, appeals to the imagination, and challenges the will?

NOTES ON CHAPTER XVII

(1) Ritschl's *Justification and Reconciliation*, even in the English translation (by Mackintosh and Macauley), is difficult reading for the average student. Among the expositions are the following: Swing, *The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*; Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology* (quite critical); Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology*; Edghill, *Faith and Fact, a Study of Ritschlianism*. There is a brief discussion in Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, pp. 278-281, and allusions elsewhere.

(2) A question of very great significance is that of the relation of doctrinal formulation to the needs and the task of the church in a given age. Modern philosophy of religion recognizes (1) the necessity of dogma to the religious community for both subjective and pedagogic reasons, (2) the form of the dogma as necessarily determined by existing culture at the time of the formulation, and (3) the consequent instrumental and provisional character of the formulation. Cf. A. Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, bk. iii, chaps. i, ii, and iii, Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, iii, c, "Dogmas and Symbols"; Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, chap. iii, b, "Religious Doctrines." Carlyle was probably right in his judgment that the Athanasian victory saved Christianity. Perhaps as much is to be said for the adoration of the Virgin Mary during the mediæval period. The question is: *Does the fact of the approved worth of a mode of doctrinal expression in the past give to that expression a permanent character?*

(3) Cf. Bowne, *Studies in Christianity*, chap. vi; Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, chap. xiv.

(4) See Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, paragraph 35, "The Theory of Ideas of Plato."

CHAPTER XVIII

CRITICISM AND THE GOSPEL PORTRAIT

But, if some protest against the methods of certain critics seemed necessary, there is cause for gratification, on the part of believers in the Creed of Christendom, at the large and increasing amount of positive testimony which so many of them bring to the traditional conception of our Lord's Person. Faultiness of method does not avail to stem the expression of reverent devotion, which men of the most advanced type of criticism lay at the feet of Jesus of Nazareth. At times it seems that all we could wish for is there. The heart, disregarding the supposed intellectual necessity, asserts itself and comes nearer to the Christian view than the cold, critical faculty would allow. No effort of criticism has been able to eliminate from the New Testament portrait of Christ the sinless character, the uniqueness of Personality, the Majesty in word and deed, which generations of his adoring followers have found in it. The only fair construction to be placed on the admissions of the writers referred to, is to credit them with belief in a certain transcendental element in the Personality of Christ, a *Geheimniss* which separates him from ordinary men, and brings him into touch with God as no prophet has ever been.—C. F. NOLLOTH, *The Person of Our Lord*, pp. 354-357.

CHAPTER XVIII

CRITICISM AND THE GOSPEL PORTRAIT

WE have tried to show that it is the known facts concerning Jesus Christ that give rise to the problem of his Person, and that it is the very nature of reason, when confronted with that problem, to seek a solution of it that shall not violate but rather conserve the faith that is allied with the facts. If a choice has to be made—and the very limitations of reason, together with the essentially subjective character of religious certainty, seem to compel it—between confessing that an absolute solution of the problem appears not to be attainable, and such a distortion of the facts as eases the force of the problem but at the same time destroys the foundations of the faith, there can be no serious hesitation. What we *must* protect is the faith by which we live, and if that faith shall appear to rest ultimately on a “mystery,” so be it—provided only that the mystery arise inevitably out of the facts and be not the creation of an arbitrary and insincere dogmatism.

(1) Perhaps the crudest way of evading the problem is by making a flat denial of the historicity of Jesus. It is not probable that very many people have taken this way with any great seriousness, but a considerable amount of ingenious scholarship has been expended in defense of it. It is customary to ridicule this position, but ridicule is never an answer, and it may possibly betray a feeling of insecurity in his own view on the part of the scoffer. The position in question is far better met with evidence, and the evidence to the historicity of Jesus is simply overwhelming. The Gospels themselves are historical documents with a pedigree at least equally unimpeachable with that of other documents

whose general reliability has never been called in question. But the fact of Paul and his letters is the rock upon which this assault on the origins of Christianity must always break. Those who have led the assault have felt this themselves, and have tried to make Paul out the creator of a purely fictitious Jesus. They say in effect: "Yes, all these references to the earthly career of the Saviour in the Pauline letters are undoubtedly intended to convey the impression that he had lived and died a short time before. But the references are deceptive. The Jesus-cult worshiped a mythological hero. But as the cult spread, it was seen that the lack of a historic Founder was something of a handicap. Paul and others therefore invented a Founder in order to help them in their propaganda, and especially to give them an advantage over the contemporary Gnosticism and Mithraism." The theory is not even plausible. Men can be very courageous in the pursuit of what is false so long as they suppose it to be true, but it is too much to ask us to believe that Paul and his fellow workers underwent all their sufferings in behalf of what they knew was not so. But more than this is involved. There is involved the moral integrity of the whole of Christian history—indeed, one might even dare to say the moral integrity of the universe itself. The mere fact of widespread belief is, of course, no necessary proof of the truth of what is believed. But the case under consideration must be allowed to be different from that, for it concerns the most beneficent influence that the world has known. What hope is there for the reality and supremacy of Truth if the gospel Portrait was deliberately invented and passed off as historical by men who had no other motive for this than a desire to see their own cult outdistance its competitors! If those are to be charged with credulity who believe the gospel story to be substantially true, surely they also are credulous who would explain the matchless story and all its marks of verisimilitude as a clumsy revamping of a solar myth. So long as human

nature remains as it is, men will turn to the New-Testament record, and will feel themselves confronted there with facts that they want to be true, and of whose truth they will become the more certain in the degree in which they submit themselves to them.¹

(2) Another way of evading the problem is by such a free handling of the gospel records as reduces Christ in all respects to the limits of our ordinary humanity. This, of course, is nothing new. From the time of the first-century Essenes there have always been those who have sought to keep the Redeemer entirely within the human category, or at last have been unwilling to believe that he represented a wholly unique form of the divine self-revealing activity. Among these have been included some of the great intellectuals of the church, and in more than one case the intellectuality has been matched by an equally great devotion. In our own day this point of view has assumed a much greater significance and has gained a very wide following by the claim that it is supported by both the history of religion and the psychology of religion. An elaborate and plausible methodology has been applied to the Gospels, with the result that we have been told that there is a large subjective element there which obscures the real history and makes it unreliable, save as it can be critically reconstructed. A like subjective element is held to be present and operative in religious history generally. All history, indeed, is psychologically conditioned, but this is especially true of religious history, and the more so when it is concerned with a great and commanding personality. In the case of the Gospels, it is the task of criticism to show how that element of the record which is obviously unhistorical because it presupposes the supernatural, is to be explained. It is due not to purposeful deception on the part of the writers but to uncritical assumptions which they shared with their age, and which together with certain discoverable subjective conditions confused their judgment.²

The sincerity and ability of many of the advocates of this method are not to be questioned. The method itself, "comparison, criticism, and correlation," is entirely sound, and we waited for it unduly long. But the fact has still to be insisted on that the method is too often the instrument of men who have already prejudged the case. They want no other than a humanitarian Christ; they believe that the humanitarian was also the historical Christ; and they so employ the method that the Gospel story is made to support the prejudgment. They say in effect: "There could not have been such a Person as Jesus is portrayed to have been. The impossible features of the Portrait are entirely explicable when one takes into account the historical situation, the prevailing ideas, the adoring hearts of the followers, the naïve credulity of the reporters, the natural tendency of men to exaggerate, and so forth. Jesus was a great and good man, who had seen deeply into the meaning of things, especially as this related to man's salvation, who saw the significance of the developed Hebrew conception of the Kingdom of God, and who announced the conditions under which that kingdom could appear." There is a measure of truth in all this, but before we assent to it we should be quite sure that we see where it leads. Nobody is any longer going to claim that the New-Testament writings are sacrosanct. They claim to be history, and as history they must be dealt with. But inasmuch as they do claim to be history, is it a fair treatment of them to prejudge that of which they tell? Under the method in question, these writings cease to be genuine history, because what they record is not the truth. Jesus lived and died—yes! but the Jesus who lived and died is not he who appears in these pages, but one whom these pages rather conceal than reveal. "We would see Jesus." But we may not see him until criticism has cleansed the medium through which he appears to us. How does this cleansing proceed? Too often by regarding as un-historical all that which cannot be wholly accounted for

by certain historical and scientific canons. When we ask whence these canons are derived, we are told that they are derived from a study of history and psychology, especially religious history and religious psychology other than that in the New Testament. It is, of course, the common procedure to derive from studies in various fields the laws according to which the events and experiences falling within those fields take place. It is also the common procedure to suppose that the laws thus derived possess an absolute character, and no departure from them can be tolerated. Applied to the problem in hand, then, religious-historical studies are held to yield the laws according to which we may correct the reported history of Jesus. As a result of the application and correction, all that is difficult of comprehension drops away from the record, and Jesus stands before us a simple, devout, lovable, far-seeing teacher.

It is here contended that this method in its extreme form begs the question. The New Testament is certainly entitled to be heard in its own behalf. If those documents report such a series of events and experiences as baffle historical science to account for in agreement with its canons, it is at least as plausible to suppose that the canons are not absolute and infallible as it is to suppose that these documents, matchless in their sincerity and charm and verisimilitude, are so utterly unreliable that we cannot trust them. The right of criticism is not to be denied: what has been written in these pages is itself an exercise of that right. All that is denied is the right of criticism arbitrarily to handle the Christian sources in such a way that what is left to us *would not, if it represents the reality, have sufficed to create the documents*. Christianity had its origin in the belief in a Divine Christ. Of that fact the whole of the New Testament is the witness. Christianity has persisted through the years for the same reason. But we are told that the time has now come when the Christian *ideas* have obtained such sway that no theory of their origin can any longer affect

their influence. A person or a myth, a divine saving act or no divine saving act—whichever it was, the kingdom of God will go on winning its widening way. The truth of that remains to be seen. Meanwhile, radical historical criticism of the sort under discussion finds itself in a dilemma: it claims that the "super-natural" has never appeared in history, while yet it allows that historical documents must be treated with scrupulous fairness. If it declares that the New Testament does not record what can only be described as "supernatural," then it does not treat it fairly, and it breaks one of its own canons. If it does treat the New Testament fairly, it cannot escape the pressure of the evidence that Jesus Christ is at the center of a movement in which God is involved in a special way and for a special purpose. If this be admitted, the admission is tantamount to recognizing the "supernatural" in history, and through such a recognition historical criticism surrenders the absoluteness of its other canon. It should be added, however, that a canon that is not absolute may still serve a very useful purpose in guiding critical investigation.

(3) There is a third way of evading the problem we are considering. Some would regard it as only another form of the method just discussed. It is the attempt to explain Christ solely by the help of his religious heritage and the religious environment within which he moved, in particular the prevailing apocalyptic. He was no mere mythological hero. He was no mere ethical and religious teacher announcing and illustrating the truth of divine Fatherhood and human brotherhood. Neither view does justice either to the Christian sources or to the Christian conquests. What we need to do is to reconstruct the religious atmosphere which we have every reason for believing Jesus breathed. We know that that atmosphere was surcharged with apocalyptic and eschatological hopes and beliefs. Jesus thought much about these things until he became possessed of a great conviction, namely, that he was predestinated to be

the Messiah of the apocalyptic visions. If John was "Elias," then he himself must be "The Coming One" whom John anticipated. He kept this at first as a secret in his own heart, until the time came when he could test it. He sent out his disciples on a missionary journey, and all the instructions he gave them were based upon such assumptions as that the Kingdom of God would come in some supernatural catastrophic form; that it could not come until there had been a great "tribulation"; that those who endured the tribulation would enter the Kingdom; and that the disciples "would not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of man, or the kingdom of God, be come." What happened? To Jesus' surprise, the disciples returned, and reported the greatest success. The expected Kingdom had not appeared. This forced him to a reconsideration both of his own significance and of his method. So far he had suffered the actual history to be determined, to the extent that it was within his power to do so, by the predicted history of apocalyptic. From the time of the Transfiguration and the confession at Cæsarea-Philippi, the history is determined by Jesus' possession of the secret, which is now imparted to the disciples, and by a new and most important conviction. He had supposed that the tribulation which would introduce the Kingdom would be general. He now sees that it must be particular, that is, that it must be his own personal suffering. He therefore deliberately puts himself in the way of trial. For this purpose, he went to Jerusalem. If the Messiah must suffer before the Kingdom could come, and if he be the Messiah, then his suffering is inevitable, and he will rather seek it than evade it. He knows that Judas has "betrayed" the secret, but the disloyal deed will only serve to hasten the divinely appointed end. Throughout the closing scenes, he is buoyed up by his strong conviction that his death is the predicted tribulation that will consummate the old age and introduce the new; that it will be followed by his own Parousia and by the

resurrection of the elect; and that in the coming Kingdom he will reign over the faithful.³

In so far as this is an attempt to see Jesus in relation to his own age, it is to be commended. It helps in the elucidation of the difficult apocalyptic features of the Gospels, but it does so at the expense of bringing so much else under suspicion. Did Jesus Christ employ the thought-forms of his day? We must answer that he most certainly did. But was he wholly at their mercy, so that he could not distinguish between the temporary and the permanent? To say that he was has again the appearance of begging the question. Plainly, if Jesus was a subject of vagary and illusion, who died under a total misconception of the significance of his death, whose ethical precepts had only an "interim" value, and in whom the one really admirable feature was his spirit of devotion in being willing to die for the sake of a kingdom whose real character he yet entirely misapprehended—if this is the real Jesus of history, there is, of course, no longer any material for a problem of his Person as that has been usually understood. But one problem is disposed of only at the expense of raising a great many more. One gets rid of the Divine Christ—that is true. But that is not all that one gets rid of. Not only is the Divine Christ gone, but we are left with what the ablest advocate of this theory himself admits is "a sorry figure." What must we say of a critical method which leaves us with such a result—a result which is so wholly different from the total impression of our Lord that the Gospels themselves yield, and a result so wholly incommensurate with the influences that issued from it? Let us insist to the uttermost on our Lord being regarded as a Man of his own day. Let us recognize the presence of apocalyptic elements in his speech. But, on the other hand, let us recognize his unique self-consciousness. Let us recognize that he spake as never man spake. Let us recognize that he possessed and exerted powers which some thought were from "Beelzebub," but which he himself de-

clared were "from the Father." Above all let us recognize in him that overwhelming moral urgency which led him to be preoccupied with the thought not of some sudden and mysterious change in the physical order but of the need of men to be "born again," to be baptized with the spirit of holiness, and of the demand that was upon him to bring that need home to men by going to his death out of love for them and fidelity to his redeeming vocation. After all, there is no absolute need that we reach a theory of his Person that explains every single element of the record. But there is every need that we have a Christ who is big enough to do what he came into the world to do and what he is everywhere confessed to have done, and who is big enough to account for that faith which engendered the new life of the first Christian community, and which has gone on repeating itself ever since. The Strong Son of God of Mark's Gospel a deluded visionary—"a sorry figure"! The Preacher of "The Sermon on the Mount" an impractical dreamer laying down the rules as to how his disciples should act during the few days or weeks or months—he didn't know how long—before the coming of the Kingdom would abrogate them all! The Son of Man of Luke's Gospel claiming a title which he only thought was his because he only thought he was right as to his secret! Yes, it evades the problem, but what shall we do with the problem it leaves us with—the problem of a gross misapprehension by the Saviour of his real position, and the problem of a gross misrepresentation of him by those who have told us his story? And withal what shall we do with the problem of a God who remains indeed "a veiled Being," for if we do not see in Jesus Christ, as he is portrayed in the Gospels, the very God, then are we of all men the most miserable, and we know not where to turn for comfort, for peace, for hope.

(4) A fourth way of evading the problem may at first sight not seem to be that at all, yet from one point of view it is the most serious of them all. It is so serious because it is

so generally done, and because it is supposed to be so entirely proper. The reference is to the so-called "authoritative" or "orthodox" solution of it. Whether heresy is to be condemned and orthodoxy to be commended depends upon various other considerations. Heresy may very well be a sign of vitality, just as orthodoxy may be a sign of easy-going acquiescence. The authoritative solution of this problem was reached by men in the first place as the result of earnest effort. But the solution soon became traditional, and just because it was traditional it came to be accepted without any question. It is not necessarily desirable that we shall to-day reach a solution that is wholly different from what has in general obtained. The new is not true simply because it is new, any more than the old is false simply because it is old. But what is desirable is that we shall on our own account work over the material that yields the problem, and deal with it by the help of all the light that we can gather. If, doing this, we find ourselves arriving at a solution in substantial agreement with that which earlier Christian thinkers attained, that will be so much more evidence to the validity of the faith. But it is infinitely better that we engage in this task of working over the material on our own account, and as a result find ourselves with a solution not in precise formal agreement with the traditional one, than it is for us to refuse to make the effort either through intellectual laziness, or through fear of the possible outcome, or through a false supposition that we have "nothing to do but believe." The true life of the church will never suffer because of intellectual unrest and curiosity. It will never suffer because some men challenge the absoluteness and finality of hoary creedal statements. It may well be that the visible organization must insist on some uniformity of expression and final assent to a creed. The very idea and purpose of the organization may justly be held to require that. But the right to prohibit liberty of thought has often been exercised at altogether too high a

price. Precisely here, of course, is the fundamental difference between Romanism and Protestantism. Romanism is concerned to perpetuate a tradition about whose absolute truth it is claimed there can be no question. Protestantism is concerned to ascertain to what extent the tradition can show itself worthy of being perpetuated, and that involves the continuous exercise of the function of criticism. One fears that there is altogether too much of the Romanist spirit in Protestant circles. Sometimes it takes the form of intolerance, and sometimes it takes the form of intellectual paralysis. But whatever the form, the spirit is alien not merely to Protestantism but to the very genius of Christianity itself. It is one thing to believe what others have believed just because they have believed it. It is another thing to believe what they have believed because, having like them exercised the prerogative of free inquiry, and having as they had a great and precious experience to protect and foster, the belief in question, with such modifications as our own situation may demand, does what is required and therefore appeals to us as entirely reasonable.

Jesus Christ exhibited those qualities that we associate with true humanity. He also exhibited those qualities that we associate with true divinity. He estimated himself as one who had come from God on a special mission to save mankind. He understood man's salvation to consist in the realization and exemplification of a spirit at once truly filial and truly fraternal. Those who knew him best did not hesitate to place him both within and without the human category. They based their description in part on his words, his deeds, his character, and in part on the new life and experience which grew out of devotion to him. The problem that they thereupon raised for thought was the problem of how what was so truly human could be at the same time so truly divine—of how what was so truly divine could be at the same time so truly human. In the first flush of the new life, and while the memory of the gracious Personality

was still cherished and talked about, the problem was not a pressing one. Whatever difficulties might have been felt could always be silenced by a reference to the concrete fact itself, that is, that such a Person had actually dwelt among them, and they had beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.⁴ But the nucleus of the Christian community passed away. The new life spread, and in spreading came into contact with types of thought antagonistic to its claim, or at least not friendly to it. The problem had to be grappled with in a large way. The controversy was often bitter, as is inevitable when men are seeking to express the most precious thing they know in categories which are not only different in themselves because of differences in the range of individual culture, but which are necessarily not completely adequate to the task. A solution was eventually in general agreed upon, one that made free use of the terms of the prevailing philosophy. There is a divine nature—so the statement in effect ran—and there is Divine Personality in which that nature is expressed. There is a human nature, and there is human personality in which that also is expressed. In Jesus Christ we have One Person into the basal condition of whose life there entered at one and the same time, and without confusion or division, the divine nature and human nature.⁵ The production of such a Person involved a great act of self-sacrifice on the part of God, but it was rendered necessary by the exigencies of his redeeming purpose, and becomes the supreme attest to that purpose and the promise of its realization. Can we distinguish between the truth that this statement, clumsy though it may appear to us, was designed to protect, and the statement itself? And can we make a statement on our own account that shall keep that truth just as real, just as precious, just as vital, just as full of saving power to us as it was to those men of a bygone day whose formal statement we may hesitate to accept? That, surely, is one of the most urgent questions waiting on Chris-

tian thought at the present time. And the truth we are concerned with is this: *that in Jesus Christ and what he represents we are confronted with that Final Fact with which man must be supremely concerned, and in reconciliation to which alone he finds his salvation and, therefore, the reason for his being.*⁶

NOTES ON CHAPTER XVIII

(1) All that can be said for the Myth Theory was said by Drews in *The Christ Myth* and in *The Witnesses to the Historicity of Jesus*. Interest in the theory appears to have waned, although occasional attempts are made to revive it, as, e. g., Riegel and Jordan, *Simon, Son of Man*; R. W. Sellars, *The Next Step in Religion*; and Ignatius Singer, *Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul*. The refutations are many. Loofs, *What Is the Truth About Jesus Christ?* is scholarly, but concedes too much, especially in the matter of the early references to Jesus outside the New Testament. Thorburn, *The Mythical Interpretation of the Gospel* (The Bross Prize for 1915), still stands as on the whole the best reply. More popular, but much less satisfactory, is David Smith, *The Historic Jesus*.

(2) A popular presentation of this method in its extreme form is Cheyne, *Bible Problems*. A conspicuous recent example of its sane use in conjunction with a frank recognition of its limits is Moffatt, *The Approach to the New Testament*, especially chap. viii. Moffatt says: "One of the healthiest signs in the practice of the historical method is the increasing sense of its own limitations. The genesis and structure of a belief are its task, not the validity of the belief" (p. 203). More drastic than Moffatt, but still constructive, is Bacon, *Jesus and Paul*, and the same may be said of Cross, *Creative Christianity*, lect. i, and the first part of lect. ii. Garvie gives an account and an estimate in *The Christian Certainty*, chap. iii, "The Religious-Historical Method."

(3) The summary is based on Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. Schweitzer is the ablest exponent of this point of view. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, endeavors

to show that the standpoint is compatible with Roman Catholicism. See also Garvie, *Apologetics*, chap. iv, and *The Christian Certainty*, chap. xvi.

(4) Hutton has argued convincingly for the "case" theory of the Gospels. The disciples had a great and varied store of memories of Jesus. As time went on, and the young church grew, different concrete problems naturally had to be faced. The disciples selected from their memories the particular item that best met the case. These items acquired an increasing value, and this value guaranteed their permanence in the life of the church. "The Gospels, as we have them, are so many books of cases—for the control and defense, and for the support and refreshment, of the Christian soul, as the Christian soul had already discovered its various perils and threatenings of collapse in the stress of one and two and three generations." *The Proposal of Jesus* (George H. Doran Company, New York), p. 16.

(5) See Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, bk. ii, chap. iv, for an account of the Arian controversy and its results.

(6) Any of the following will give the student a fair account of the course of Christological discussion in modern times: Mackintosh, *ibid.*, bk. ii, chap. viii, bk. iii, chaps. i, ii, and note to bk. iii, chap. x; Fairbairn, *Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, bk. i, div. ii, chaps. ii, iii, and iv; Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, chaps. iii, vii (in which Sanday states his own peculiar "psychological" theory), and viii; and Schweitzer, *ibid.*

CHAPTER XIX

THE HISTORY AND THE EXPERIENCE

All the moments which we look for in a revelation capable of exciting religious trust, in their necessary inner relation to each other, the Christian Church finds harmoniously realized in the historical personality of Jesus. In his words, deeds, and suffering, and in the impression made by his life as a whole, he works as God; as the God by whom he professes himself sent, whom he designates it as his calling to bring near to us, and assure us of, knowledge of whom by himself alone he urges as the supreme proof of this calling. The content of the divine life is effectively realized in the form of an historical life under human conditions; Jesus is the personal self-revelation of God—of the God who, in his Kingdom, unites sinners with himself and with each other in the eternal fellowship of his love, judging sin, pardoning guilt, renewing the will, vanquishing death. Jesus is the personal self-revelation of this God, since he evokes such trust as the actively real presence of the invisible God in the actual world, in which there is otherwise no real assured confidence in this God. He is the ground of faith, i. e., of trust. This is the truth to which the faith of the New Testament testifies in the most varied forms. What is most important, it records the impression which Jesus himself produced, and which he always continues to produce, as the ages pass.—HAERING, *The Christian Faith* (Eng. trans., George H. Doran Company, New York), Vol. I, pp. 208-209.

CHAPTER XIX

THE HISTORY AND THE EXPERIENCE

AT various times throughout this discussion it has been made clear that the great affirmations of the Christian faith, and in particular those affirmations which concern the redemptive significance of the Person of Christ, have their bases in history and experience. This fact is now to be especially emphasized. Only as that is done can criticism and speculation be kept reverent and prevented from becoming arbitrary and irresponsible. When the attempt is made to fit the affirmations of faith into a philosophical framework, both the history and the experience will necessarily be outstripped. But this necessity of going *beyond* the facts must not be construed as releasing the intellect from the *control* of the facts. It is infinitely more important that we be true to the history and the experience than it is that we accomplish a complete intellectual synthesis of all that they seem to imply. What it is desired to reach is a true understanding of the significance of Jesus Christ and his sacrifice for men. The approach to the problem is to be made through the facts that yield it, namely, (1) The synoptic Gospels, (2) The Apostolic Consciousness, (3) The Course of Christian History, and (4) The Individual Christian Experience.

I. THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. These give us, in the most accurate form in which we can ever have it, the impression created by Jesus on his contemporaries. Whatever may be the problems of date and composition and authorship, we must believe that through these documents we are in the closest possible contact with the earthly life and work of our Lord.¹ We never expect anything to come to light

that will seriously modify the Portrait here sketched. The chronology may not be consistent. There may be differing descriptions of what appears to be the same event.² It may not be possible to show that all the reported Sayings are the Teacher's *ipsissima verba*. Nevertheless, we have no reason for questioning the substantial reliability of the total result. Here we learn the time and manner and circumstances of his birth and training; the events associated with his entrance upon his public career; the inward and outward struggles that marked his progress; the mighty words that fell from his lips; the mighty works which evinced his power; the sinless life he lived amid a sinful world; the consciousness of his Vocation as the work of saving men; his conviction that he represented in himself the standard and principle of final judgment; the inward impulsion that led him to put himself deliberately in the way of a cruel death; the manner and circumstances of his end and the spirit with which he faced it; his strange reappearances after his death and burial; and the conviction aroused and through bitter trial sustained in the hearts of a few men that he had come from God, had lived for God, had revealed God, had gone back to God, and for evermore would live with God while yet he did not cease to be present with themselves. Critical questions as to this and that detail there may be in plenty. The claim that the documents—*just because they are documents*—are historically accurate at every single point may not be defensible.³ That has no bearing at all upon the main issue. The main issue for the purposes of religious faith is that the Gospels emerge from that group of men who were directly implicated in the birth of Christianity, that they tell of One such as was never seen before or since, that these men came to have in themselves no least taint of doubt that he was the long-promised Saviour of the world, and that upon the Gospels themselves are the undeniable marks of a general verisimilitude. The Portrait may not be a photograph, but it is incredible that the lineaments here

portrayed are not those of a living Subject. And just because we are constrained to accept the general integrity of the Portrait, we are led also to affirm that no construction of the final significance of Christ can be accepted which is not every way true to the story here told and the life here depicted.

2. THE APOSTOLIC CONSCIOUSNESS. By the apostolic consciousness is meant that body of convictions concerning Christ and his worth for men which we find reflected in the writings of the New Testament other than the synoptic Gospels.⁴ It is often charged that the Christ there presented bears no manner of resemblance to the Jesus of the Gospels.⁵ The charge grows for the most part out of failure to recognize the difference of viewpoint in the two sets of writings. Speaking broadly, we may say of the Gospels that they are descriptive; of the other New Testament writings, that they are interpretative and hortatory. When that distinction has been grasped, it is not difficult to show that there is no *essential* feature of the apostolic consciousness respecting Christ which is not abundantly vindicated in the synoptic portrayal.⁶ It must never be forgotten that the Gospels and the Epistles circulated side by side among the same people, and so far as we know created in them no feeling of mutual inconsistency. The leaders in that movement of which the apostolic consciousness was at once source and result were for the most part men who had known Jesus in the days of his flesh.

The real problem, therefore, is not with any supposed inconsistency between the Jesus of the Gospels and the Christ of the Epistles. Rather is the real problem with *the validity of the apostolic interpretation*. If that interpretation is valid, the entire New Testament becomes at once fundamentally self-consistent and unitary. It is not valid, however, if validity is held to depend upon complete identity of language and of thought-forms. In the apostolic writings we are in the presence of men who are struggling

- to express in the strongest language they know a great spiritual reality. Through Christ they have found peace with God. Through Christ they have been delivered from the terrors of the Law. Through Christ the bonds that held them have been broken. Through Christ they have found the secret of moral power and a holy life. How shall they describe this experience? How shall they describe Him through whom it has come? How shall they make others feel the greatness and the wonder and the power of what they feel themselves?

Setting themselves such questions as these to answer, the apostles called their experience redemption, reconciliation, deliverance, enlightenment, regeneration, justification, adoption, sanctification, cleansing, forgiveness, passing from death unto life, putting off the old man and putting on the new, being crucified with Christ. One of the most fruitless tasks in the world is to take these different expressions and attempt to make them the key-words to a system of theology. Such a procedure forgets that the apostolic writings were, with a few exceptions, not scientific treatises but casual letters called forth by a specific situation. If only we had a little more imagination! If only we had a little finer appreciation of the essential symbolism of all language! The words that these men used were molds, and the significant thing about a mold is not the mold itself but that plastic reality that it is designed to shape. It is not wholly incredible that a person may insist on the literal inspiration and the literal meaning of the words and phrases just mentioned and remain a perfect stranger to the great experience which they were employed to express. But if that is true, it must be true also that a person may refuse to attach to these words anything more than an instrumental significance, while yet there is in his heart that same devotion to Christ, that same love for him, that same surrender to his will, that same purpose to exalt him above all others, that same deep and abiding peace, which marked those early

Christian leaders, and in whose steps we seek to walk. Words such as these are symbols, and more important than the symbols is the reality that is symbolized.

Similar considerations hold good of the way in which these men described Christ himself. It was because they believed in him that their experience had come: that is, because they had thought of God and life and sin and salvation and destiny as Christ had. It was because they had faith in him that they could think and feel with him, and it was through their faith that they were saved. Who must he be, they asked, who is like this, who can do this, by whom such things can come to pass? The various titles ascribed to Christ in the New Testament are attempts to answer such questions.⁷ Hence Peter called him Prince and Saviour, the Lord's Anointed One; John called him the Eternal Logos, the Word become flesh; Paul called him the Wisdom of God, the Power of God, the Son of God, the Second Adam, the Man who gave himself a Ransom for all, the First-born among many brethren, the Propitiation for our sins; the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* called him a merciful and faithful High Priest, a Sacrifice without blemish and without spot, the express image of the Father's substance, the Author and Finisher of our faith; and the man who saw in his visions the flashing splendors of the Apocalypse called him the Alpha and the Omega, the Keeper of the keys of death and of Hades, the slain Lamb who shared the throne of God, King of Kings and Lord of Lords. It is plain that these descriptions are not identical, but it is equally plain that they deal with the same ultimate reality, and that language fairly groans with the burden that is laid upon it. When we plow down through all this terminology, what is it that we find there? We find the belief that in Jesus Christ the very God tabernacled in the flesh, that the presence in the world of such a Person had a universal significance, that he was somehow necessary to God and yet equally necessary to mankind, and that he did what he did

in order that through him men might have life and might have it more abundantly. Language may *indicate* his significance: it can never *exhaust* it. Those who most deeply *feel* his worth best know how inadequate are their greatest descriptions of him. The language of the New Testament can only mean that he is unique—unique in his Person, unique in his achievement, unique in his vocation, unique in his relation to both God and men.

All this means agreement of the essential content of the apostolic consciousness with the representations of the synoptic Gospels. Between the consciousness of Jesus respecting himself and his mission, the conviction respecting him held by those who produced the first three Gospels, and the conviction respecting him held by the earliest organized church as this is reflected in the apostolic writings—between these there is a profound and suggestive similarity. Jesus believed that he was the world's Saviour and Lord; the first disciples believed it; the church of the apostles believed it. All believed that he was the world's Saviour and Lord because of what he was and did, and because of what he could bring men to be and to do. All believed that his work was God's work besides his own, and that because it was God's work and because men by faith could make it their own work, it provided the basis for the reconciliation of God and man. And to this belief the philosophy and the theology of the New Testament are *instrumental*—which is to say, that they are the servants of faith, and not its relentless master. The titles ascribed to Christ by the apostles and the terms applied to his work are not so much the postulates of living faith as its corollaries. What broke down the opposition of Saul of Tarsus, for example, was not a doctrine of Divine Triunity, but a conviction that finally seized him that in opposing the work and will of Jesus Christ he was opposing the work and will of God himself. The peace he had sought in vain elsewhere came when he yielded, and that peace was so deep, and the joy it brought was so

great, that he could never say too much or do too much for Him who made it possible. Paul's faith must of necessity have had its origin in a rational conviction of the religious significance of Jesus Christ, but the great affirmations that we associate with Paul grew out of his experience. Then as now the theology nurtured the experience which yet it had no power of itself to originate.⁸

3. THE COURSE OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY. Is the history of the church in any proper sense an explication of the essential Christ? An affirmative answer is impossible unless Christian history is subjected to searching criticism. That there is an aspect of the history in which the guiding power was manifestly that of the Spirit of Christ is obvious. Equally obvious is it that there is an aspect of the history where that Spirit is totally lacking. A conception of Christian history which identifies the entire activity of the church with the progress of Christ's Spirit is a false conception. So also is the conception which confines the activity of that Spirit to some one particular form of organized Christianity and denies it to every other form. Throughout the centuries Christian faith has expressed itself in various ways. What existed at one time as potentiality appears at another time as actuality. What is necessary to one age or to one individual seems not to be necessary to another age or to another individual. A form of organization that is successful in certain circumstances becomes useless when the circumstances change. All this is true, but it raises the question, What is the relation of this or that feature of Christian history to the Spirit of Christ as this stands revealed in the New Testament? The history can be given a meaning only as it is regarded as an increasing understanding of the mind of God. There is not only no reason why we should deny the idea of historic development, but every reason why we should agree to it and rejoice in it. But while a true development does not exclude the appearance of the new, it does exclude antagonisms, contradictions, and

inconsistencies. Newman's attempt to substantiate Romanism by means of the analogy of continuity and evolution in the organic realm could give no satisfactory account of the life that had escaped the bounds of Romanism, and for that reason its basic tests of what constituted the continuity and development of Christianity were fallacious.⁹ No theory of Christian history is a true theory which cannot distinguish between life and form, and which cannot see that the life creates the form and may on occasion outgrow it or even dispense with it.

We shall therefore regard that as a true unfolding of the essential Christ which is in unquestionable agreement with the whole spirit and purpose of Christ as this was first manifested to men. He produced in his original disciples a great faith, which led to an increasingly deeper and more satisfying experience of God the more that the faith was understood. What was fundamental in the work and mission of Christ was clearly apprehended by those early followers. They may not have apprehended all the implications of what was revealed, but to suppose that we grasp more firmly than they did the essential truth in the revelation *when our very knowledge of that revelation depends upon their having transmitted it to us*—this is to approach perilously near to pure arrogance. There is just one thing that can make Christian history vitally continuous, and that is the perpetuation of the faith that originated the church. Where that faith is wanting there may still be continuity, but it is a continuity that is external and mechanical, not vital and internal. Wherever the faith of the New Testament has appeared in history, there have appeared also the other great achievements to which the New Testament bears witness. In other words, there is a body of historic testimony, increasing in amount with each passing year, to the creative and recreative power of that faith in Christ and of that daring affirmation concerning his absolute redemptive significance which meets us everywhere in the New Testa-

ment. The place claimed by Christ for himself, and the place assigned to him by his early followers, has been assigned to him also by the church of history. There have been times when it was obscured, but the fitting commentary on such defection is the accompanying spiritual decline. "Where the Spirit of Christ is, there is the catholic church."¹⁰

One is tempted to raise another question, even although it hardly belongs to a discussion which is emphasizing history and experience: To what is the persistence of the Spirit of Christ in human history due? Is it due to his own continued activity, or is it due to simple transmission from generation to generation through human instrumentality, or is it due to both of these? What we know is that Jesus himself intrusted to his disciples the promulgation of his truth, and yet at the same time he spoke of his abiding presence with them, and his continued activity in their behalf. It is what the Fourth Gospel describes as the promise of the Comforter. The reasonable way to understand what our Lord meant by this is to consider what has actually happened. The testimony of history is that the experience which men found through faith in him in the days of his flesh—the purified heart, the forgiveness of sin, the enlightened mind, the transformed life, the endowment for service—that this experience has been continuous on the same condition of faith. Unless we are to invalidate his own reported teaching about the Comforter as his own presence with men, we must believe that while the knowledge of the conditions of the Christian life depends upon human agency, the experience which grows out of those conditions is a direct witness to the continuing activity of the essential Christ. "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." But it would not be difficult to show that the gifts we associate with the name of Christ were in some measure enjoyed by men before the incarnation, and are found in the world to-day in places where that Name is not yet known. *Shall we*

trace all such gifts, wherever found, to the activity of that Spirit which we know as the Spirit of Christ? If not, why not? But if we do, then we must go on to say that neither the being nor the activity of the essential Christ began with the birth and ended with the death of Jesus of Nazareth. Which is but to say that a proper interpretation of history justifies us in ascribing to Christ that attribute of *timelessness* which is ascribed to him in the New Testament.

4. THE INDIVIDUAL CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. That experience has already been described as an experience of peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, the fruit of which is a life of holiness and a service of love.¹¹ What are the conditions of that experience? And we must answer again, not the intellectual assent to a system of dogma, but a living faith in Christ as Lord and Saviour, and a complete obedience to his will. But living faith in Christ—what is that? Is it an acceptance of the facts of the history of the human person Jesus? May a man not accept every one of those facts, and still not have the faith that saves? Is the man Jesus the object of faith, or is not the object of faith rather that God of holy love who in Jesus revealed himself to men? So also of obedience to Christ. Is there any proper sense in which we can render obedience to One who lived and died some two thousand years ago, so long as we think of him purely as a historic figure? Is not Christian obedience the obedience to God in Christ, and therefore obedience to One who is as real now as he ever was, whose presence is an abiding presence, and who can make known his will not merely through the records of the past but through the intimacies of personal fellowship? The Christian experience as we have defined it depends upon our conceiving God in terms of Christ, and to conceive God in terms of Christ, and then to accept all that the conception implies, is to have that living faith in Christ which is at the same time a living faith in God.

At various times and in divers manners men have at-

tacked the integrity of the Synoptic Portrait. They have questioned the validity of the apostolic interpretation. They have seen in the church of history a perpetual menace to moral and social progress. They have regarded the individual Christian experience as a piece of self-hypnosis. And yet the challenge of that Portrait remains. Those who wrought out that early interpretation remain as the classic examples of moral heroism and human devotion. It remains that at innumerable points in the historic church the pure Spirit of Christ has broken out in blessing to men—the Spirit of love, of purity, of service, of self-forgetfulness. And it remains that no man can have what we have set forth as living faith in Christ without becoming at the same time a center of redemptive power. The history confronts us, the experience confronts us, the achievement confronts us. What shall we do with it? We shall perhaps go on to attempt to construct a theory of the Person of Christ which shall serve to unify all this diverse material, and render it intelligible. But if we do that, we must bear in mind two facts: the one, that our theory will be only an intellectual instrument, and its necessary imperfection can in nowise invalidate the history and the experience with which it deals; the other, that what in the end really explains the history and the experience is the great truth that Christ showed himself to be the Son of God with power, and that succeeding generations of men have not hesitated to accept him at his own estimate.

“‘Who say ye that I am?’ ‘Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God.’ ‘Blessed art thou . . . and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.’”¹²

NOTES ON CHAPTER XIX

(1) The material relative to this point is unlimited. See Burkitt, *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*; Moffatt,

The Historical New Testament; D. Smith, *The Days of His Flesh*, the Introduction; Glover, *The Jesus of History*, the Introduction. Two books from a former generation which are still very useful are Cone, *Gospel Criticism* (considered radical at the time of its publication), and Dale, *The Living Christ and the Four Gospels*.

(2) Moffatt, *The Approach to the New Testament*, chap. v, § 1, gives a good example of the historical method applied to the feeding of the five thousand.

(3) There is no better way of getting the force of the chronological and allied problems of the Gospels than by a direct comparative study of the texts. For this purpose, Huck's *Synopsis*, now obtainable in an English translation prepared by Ross L. Finney, is an excellent guide.

(4) Cf. Gore, *Belief in Christ*, chap. iii.

(5) As, e. g., by Harnack. "Under the influence of the Messianic dogmas, and led by the impression which Christ made, Paul became the author of the speculative idea that not only was God in Christ, but that Christ himself was possessed of a peculiar nature of a heavenly kind." *What is Christianity?* p. 185. The whole section should be read, however, to prevent misapprehension of Harnack's real estimate of Paul. Vol. I of Pfleiderer's *Paulinism* is an elaboration of this same point of view. For a vigorous defense of the other side, see Machen, *The Origin of Paul's Religion*.

(6) Denney, *The Death of Christ*, is an able defense of this fact.

(7) Mackintosh says some wise words on the claim that a given person's experience of Christ's saving power is to that person *ipso facto* the evidence of Christ's Godhood. *Person of Christ*, bk. iii, pt. ii, chap. vii, opening paragraphs.

(8) There is no end to the books on Paul. The following are all written from differing standpoints: Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*; Deissmann, *Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History*; Morgan, *The Religion and Theology of Paul*; and Machen, *ibid.* (see note 5 above). Machen's book, the most recent of these, is able, scholarly, and conservative. In Chap. IV, on "Paul and Jesus," he tries to prove too much, but his main contention is entirely sound, namely, that not Paul,

but Jesus, was the real Founder of Christianity, "for historic Christianity, like the religion of Paul, is a religion of redemption" (p. 168). So also Bacon, in *Jesus and Paul*, although many would regard him as radical (cf. the chapter on "The Transfiguration of the Gospel"), concludes his defense of Paul as an interpreter of Christ with the words: "There may be those who can conceive of Christianity as the mere following of a high moral example. As for myself, I see not how it is possible for Christianity to be a world-religion (or, indeed, to be a religion at all) unless the Spirit of Christ, into which our own personality is merged in a self-dedication answering to his own, be nothing less than the eternal Spirit of the Creator and Father of all, the Spirit of righteousness and love" (pp. 135-6).

(9) See his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. The following are Newman's seven tests of true doctrinal development: (1) Preservation of Type or Idea. (2) Continuity of Principles. (3) Power of Assimilation. (4) Early Anticipation. (5) Logical Sequence. (6) Preservative Additions. (7) Chronic Continuance. On the fourth test, Newman accomplishes a skillful piece of negative "proof" (?) He desires to show that ideas that appear late have invariably an early "germ," and he illustrates by the use of the defects of Lutheranism. "Lutheranism," he says, "as is well known, has by this time become almost simple heresy or infidelity; it has terminated, if it has even yet reached its limit, in a denial both of the Canon and of the Creed, nay, of many principles of morals. Accordingly, the question arises, whether these conclusions are in fairness to be connected with its original teaching or are a corruption. And it is no little aid toward its resolution to find that Luther himself at one time rejected the Apocalypse, called the Epistle of James 'straminea' [straw], condemned the word 'Trinity,' fell into a kind of Eutychianism as holding the omnipresence of our Lord's Manhood, and in a particular case sanctioned bigamy" (Chap. I, Sect. I, § 6). If Lutheranism is degenerate because of a few erroneous opinions held by Luther and questionable advice given by him, how great ought to be the degeneracy of Roman Catholicism, if judged by the same principle!

(10) "The plain historical fact is that we never can tell when

the church is going to break out into new life. The wonderful thing about it is, as Paul saw, that it is in a real relation with God in Christ; and when that is the case, there is always liable to be new light and new truth breaking out of Zion, as John Robinson of Leyden saw" (Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men*, pp. 204-205). The entire chapter should be read, and with it Glover's earlier book, *The Christian Tradition and Its Verification*.

(11) No student can afford to neglect James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. An older and more formal, but still useful, treatment of the subject is Stearns, *The Evidence of Christian Experience*. Fresh and suggestive is H. W. Clark, *Philosophy of Christian Experience*. There is a readable chapter on "Spiritual Experience" by Clutton-Brock in the volume, *The Spirit*, ed. Streeter. More satisfactory is the discussion in Mackintosh, *The Originality of the Christian Message*, chap. iv, especially the closing summary, pp. 120-126. The psychological features of conversion and the new life are simply sketched in Steven, *Psychology of the Christian Soul*, chap. v; Snowden, *Psychology of Religion*, chaps. v and vi; and Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, chaps. vii and xx. Rather technical, but deeply suggestive, are the last four chapters in Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Re-making*.

(12) There is a sane discussion of this passage, the sole and therefore precarious scriptural foundation for the enormous claims of the papacy, in Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, vol. i, bk. i, chap. vii, § 5. "This formidable chain of Romish proofs lacks just the first member, on which all the rest are to hang, namely, the proof that Jesus there founded an office at all, or conferred a judicial authority, and not simply an inward authority depending on the personal qualities of the man who was invested with it. The more one considers the passage the more impossible it is to hold that he intended to found an office" (pp. 173-174). A similar position is maintained in Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pt. i, chap. xi.

CHAPTER XX
THE KENOTIC THEORY

The way, then, in which I myself regard the Creeds, from this most individual and personal point of view, is as great outstanding historical monuments of the faith of the church. As such I cannot but look upon them with veneration. As such I desire as well as I can to conform my own opinions to them. But the same principle comes into play that I have just been laying down. I desire to enter into the mind of the church. I desire to the utmost of my ability to be loyal to that mind. But, at the same time, I cannot forget that the critical moments in the composition of the Creeds were in the fourth and fifth centuries, and that they have never been revised or corrected since. It is impossible that the thought and language of those centuries should exactly coincide with the genuine, spontaneous, unbiased, scientific—or that aims at being scientific—thought and language of the present day. We must modernize, whether we will or no. . . . The particular form of fusion each one of us must work out for himself. To his own Master he stands or falls. . . . All that we need is patience; and faith is the mother of patience. If we once have an assured hold on God in Christ, all the rest will come, when and as he wills.—SANDAY, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, chap. ix, on "The Guiding Principle of Symbolism," pp. 237-239.

CHAPTER XX

THE KENOTIC THEORY

IT is facts like those stated in the last chapter that create what is known as "The Problem of the Person of Christ." Stated simply, the problem is to explain how Christ can be at one and the same time both human and divine, both man and God. The problem is not one that has been invented by theologians: rather is it one that grows inevitably out of the facts of the history and of the experience. The Synoptic record presents us with the Portrait of One who was undeniably human, and yet One who was undeniably divine as well. The apostolic consciousness is wholly inexplicable save on the basis of a fundamental article in what is probably one of its earliest formal confessions—"He who was manifested in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3. 16). Christian thought in its historical development has shown a tendency to veer sometimes in the direction of exclusive stress on the humanity, sometimes in the direction of exclusive stress on the divinity. These tendencies have usually been a protest against the opposite extreme, evidence that on the whole Christian thought has kept true to the original fact and faith.¹ No one will deny that the speculation has often been crude, often fantastic, often impossible. All that may be forgiven when the motive of the speculation is seen to be not merely personal interest in argumentation but the desire to make *intelligible* the object of adoring love and faith. And the Christian experience itself has always proved a check when vagary became too pronounced. Whatever may have been true in the realm of theological discussion, the stream of Christian piety has flowed on unbroken, having its perennial source in the conviction that Very God had come

in the flesh for us men and for our salvation. It is only as that conviction continues that the stream of Christian piety also can continue. Humanity cannot save itself, and Deity is not Deity if it is satisfied to be a merely passive spectator of an unavailing struggle. Man must be saved, and only God can save him: Anselm was right there.² *Why* did God become Man? The question assumes much—very much—but not more than Christian faith believes to be warranted, for it answers that God became Man in order to accomplish a necessary human deliverance. But *how* did God become Man? Any history of doctrine will show how men have wrestled with that question. The question still challenges our greatest effort. That God *did* come to us in Jesus Christ, and that he *did* come for our redemption, we do not for a moment doubt. But *how* God could come to us in Jesus Christ, *how* the Eternal could appear in time, *how* the Underived could enter the relation of dependence, *how* the Divine Fullness could manifest itself “bodily”—this, while not necessarily an insoluble mystery, is the problem of problems for the Christian intelligence. Here, if anywhere, we need to pray for the guidance of that Spirit who leadeth into truth those who have the reverent and teachable mind.

The most familiar, because, on the whole, the general traditional form of the answer to our question, is that God became Man by an act of self-emptying. This is known as the Kenotic theory, “kenosis” being the Greek word meaning “to make empty,” or “to exhaust,” or “to drain out.” The word is used by Paul in the great “self-emptying” passage in Philippians 2. 5-11.³ The passage affords much of the evidence for the theory, besides giving it its name. The theory necessarily requires a very definite view of the interior constitution of the Godhead. If God is a Solitary Unit, a pure “Monad,” it is difficult to see how he could undergo the process of incarnation as understood in Kenoticism and at the same time carry on his creative act. It

is claimed that the difficulty is solved by the fact that Christ appeared not as Sole God but as the Eternal Son of God. Taken in conjunction with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as also an Eternal Person, it is held that this leads us on irresistibly to a theory of Divine Triunity. That same theory, then, serves to explain how God could become Man. It is not the *total Godhead* that appears in the flesh, but the Son only. The Son, however, being truly God, it is a divine incarnation, and being a divine incarnation—the manifestation in the flesh of a Person who is essential to the integrity of the total Godhead—there is involved in it at once a renunciation and an assumption. What is renounced is the divine estate, the divine glory, the divine mode of existence. What is assumed is the human estate, the human nature, the human limitations, the human mode of existence. By such means the Son becomes man without ceasing to be God.⁴

The advocates of the Kenotic theory can say a great deal for their point of view. Its very antiquity is in its favor. It appears to explain much that we meet in the New Testament. It fits in with the belief in Christ's birth as supernaturally brought about. It sheds light on those passages in which there is a reference to his premundane existence. It gives a certain dramatic intensity to the belief that the sufferings of Christ were divine sufferings, and his death a literal forsaking of the Eternal Son by the Eternal Father. It emphasizes the cost of human redemption, for if the Godhead is normally a Society of three self-conscious Persons in complete and ineffable fellowship incarnation necessarily involves the interruption of the normal divine experience. The theory in question is, therefore, eminently "preachable." It contains a tremendous emotional appeal. It holds attention at one and the same time to the divine estimate of sin and the divine love for sinners. God would save, but he could not save except at a cost that disrupted the harmonies of his own being. If God the Father in the

most literal sense tore out of his own bosom God the Son, and "sent him," how great the love both of him who sent and of him who came! If nothing less than this would suffice to save, how great the need of those for whose sake it was done! And how great the ingratitude, and how blind the folly, of refusal of God's great gift! The Kenotic theory visualizes for us, so to speak, the redemptive process. We can seem to see the solemn council of the Three-in-One before ever the morning stars sang together. We can see the Son bow to the Father's will that through him a world shall be made, and later through him redeemed. We can—if we dare say it—see that supreme miracle when the moment arrives for which creation was groaning, the moment when the Son consents to cease to be—and Mary, "an angel-watered lily, that near God grows and is quiet," hears a Voice and sees a vision, and "woke in her white bed, and had no fear at all." A hiatus has appeared in the God-head. One hears Tertullian: *Prorsus credibile est, quid ineptum est*. The Eternal Father is without a Son. The Son—where is he? And if all the universe were searched, he could not be found. Until there is the growing consciousness of a Little Lad in a quiet village home in Galilee. And then the Man. And then the strange intuitions. And then the Transfiguration. And then Gethsemane. And then the broken heart and the cry of despair on Calvary. And then the shattering of the tomb. And then the resurrection of—. But our very reverence stops us: thought is too halting, and language is too poor. "He went back to where he was before."⁵

There are those to whom this account of the matter is completely satisfying. These are conscious of no difficulties in the way of accepting it; or, if there are difficulties, they are only such as entirely vanish before a fresh survey and the power of the appeal. Let it be said here with all possible emphasis: those who can hold their faith and their hope and their peace only by the help of such a framework

as is provided by this description, are not only justified in retaining the framework, but they are not justified in surrendering it. There are undoubtedly many earnest-minded Christians to whom this way of stating the relation of God to their salvation is entirely indispensable. Infinitely more important than the way the fact is visualized is the effect of the visualized fact on the whole life. If the effect can be obtained in some other way no less intellectually satisfying and convincing, well and good. If it cannot, what is to be gained by insisting to another that his chosen method of visualizing the fact is false? At the best, theology is only an instrument, which means that it must be the servant of faith, not its lord. If the devout Romanist needs an image of the crucified Christ to assist his piety, one does him a small service who takes away his image and thereby destroys his piety. If the devout Protestant needs a type of theology which makes dramatic for him the truth of the divine self-giving, why insist that this dramatic force shall be surrendered in the interests of a more closely articulated philosophy?⁶ On the other hand, it may justly be asked of him in return that he shall not question the faith and the devotion and the sincerity of one *who claims to experience a similar effect from a different mode of representing the facts*. We are justified not by our theology but by our faith. "Is thy heart right, as my heart is with thy heart? If it be, give me thy hand."

Having said this much, having gladly recognized the rights and the helpfulness of that way of conceiving the Christian facts which is suggested here and there in the New Testament, which is everywhere present in our ritual and hymnology, and which has so generally prevailed throughout the church that it may well be called, if anything may, "historic"—having done this, we have to ask whether it is permissible to scrutinize this dramatic representation of the divine activity in relation to human redemption, and to subject it to the calm appraisal of the Christian intelligence, with a view

to passing beyond the representation to the reality thus represented. The very life of Protestantism depends upon the permission. Rome might well object: did it not object, it would lose its power. Only as Protestantism not only does not object to such scrutiny, but fosters the reverent exercise of free Christian thought, can Protestantism continue its mission.

For it is evident that the common theory of Kenosis, and what goes with it, presents many grave difficulties when it is not regarded as more or less pictorial and symbolic but as precise scientific statement. Some men, indeed, find these difficulties not merely grave, but insuperable, so much so that the theory itself cannot command their assent.⁷

(1) Kenoticism involves an impossible disruption of the being of God. As popularly understood, the theory supposes that at one time there was no creation. God was all. He existed as a Society of three self-conscious Persons. He did not *choose* to exist that way: it is his very nature so to exist. He exists as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit *because* he exists as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It is the Father's necessary nature to be Father, the Son's necessary nature to be Son, the Holy Spirit's necessary nature to be Holy Spirit—"and these Three are One God." God could not exist any other way than that, and still be God. And yet Kenosis takes out of the Godhead one of these Three Persons without whom God could not be. Advocates of the theory have tried in various ways to avoid this difficulty. Some have held that the Logos lived "a double life," meaning that without leaving the Godhead or ceasing his cosmic functions, he underwent the process of incarnation, "being at one and the same time in the arms of his mother and on the wings of the wind." Others have held that since the Father's will is the causal will in the Godhead, the Son's relation to the Father being wholly that of dependence and subordination, so that he automatically accepts as his whatever the Father wills—since this is so, if the Father should will that

the Son enter another mode of existence, the organizing will of the Trinity would still be operative and accepted, and no integral feature of the Godhead would be lost. To the first suggestion it must be replied that it introduces an impossible dualism into the innermost being of the Logos. Besides this, it destroys the idea of divine sacrifice. It is as though we said: "He became incarnate, but it cost him nothing. The King tabernacled in the hovel of his meanest subject—but he did so without for a moment leaving his own palace!" To the second suggestion it must be replied that it surrenders its own Triune theory. Triunity can mean nothing less than that each of the three self-conscious Persons is necessary to the existence of the other two. It is a shrewd stroke to deprive the Son of volitional initiative for the purpose of protecting the unity and integrity of the Godhead, but the price is high: if the Son lacks volitional initiative, in what sense does he possess complete personality? We are compelled to say it: if the necessary form of divine existence is as a complex of three self-conscious Persons, and one of these Persons became, for any reason whatever, wholly unconscious, as must have been the case in the early stages of incarnation as understood in Kenosis, then God would cease to exist—which is impossible. On Kenotic presuppositions, the necessarily Triune God became in effect Biune—but how could he? If God does not choose one mode of existence, he cannot choose another. The way he necessarily is—is the way he necessarily is. One is fully conscious of the dangers of all such speculation as is being indulged in here, but one cannot very well escape the feeling that a theory of Christ's Person which depends upon an insoluble speculative puzzle must somewhere be defective.⁸

(2) A Divine Being cannot cease to exist, and Kenoticism supposes that he can. Whatever Paul meant when he said that Jesus Christ "emptied himself"—and what would we not give to know what the apostle was really thinking!—

he certainly did not mean that he emptied himself of his own being. It is a false psychology that supposes that the relation between a person and his experience is like the relation between a vessel and its contents. In the first case, the relation is organic, so that it is impossible to destroy the total experience and still keep the person. In the second case, the relation is purely mechanical: the vessel in nowise depends upon its contents. But if the experience and the experient Divine Subject are vitally related, it is difficult to see how the Subject could remain and the total experience disappear. Yet it is this impossible thing which is demanded by the popular form of Kenoticism.⁹ The facts of embryology must be faced—with all reverence, let it be said, yet without flinching. “Incarnation,” it is claimed, “was exclusively by Virgin Conception.” It must therefore be supposed that the moment of Mary’s conception coincided with the cessation of the conscious being of the Eternal Son. But what is conception? Conception is the activation of an ovum. On the theory we are considering, the moment the ovum was activated that activated ovum was identical with an Eternal Divine Being. But an Eternal Divine Being, on any adequate definition, must be possessed of consciousness and personality. Yet, where is this consciousness now, and where is this personality now? We are told, “In the womb of Mary.” But if we assume that the process of gestation was the same here as in all other cases, then we know that at first there was simply a tiny collocation of cells. There is life there, just as there is life in anything which has the power to grow, but there is no consciousness—and as yet *no power of consciousness*—and there is no personality—and as yet *no power of personality*. And yet this embryo is God! This embryo, which at thirty days has a length of one third of an inch—this embryo is that which a month before its origin, a week before, an hour before, a moment before, was the Eternal Son of God through whom the worlds were made and kept in being! So

far is it from being divine that it is not even human. True, it is a condition because of which, in the course of time, a personality will appear, *but the condition is not itself the personality*, and must not be confused with it. Whatever meaning, therefore, is to be ascribed to the statement, "The Word . . . took flesh in the womb of the Virgin Mary," it cannot be held to mean—and one is grateful that the article does not affirm it—that the Logos absolutely *became* an unconscious, impersonal, nonhuman "it," gradually developing from germ to embryo, from embryo to foetus, from foetus to a babe capable of an independent life. Were that actually the case, Mary would be literally "Mother of God," and the phrase, intolerably blasphemous to every true Protestant, would be not only justified but inevitable. Kenoticism is the highway to Rome, if the road be followed to its end. There is one at least who refuses to take it.

(3) We must regard as wholly unintelligible the Kenotic supposition that Eternal Mind can "forget." Any definition of Divine Being will include among much else the possession of complete knowledge. At any point, therefore, in our Lord's career at which we choose to take him, we are confronted with One who once knew "all things," but who now does not. The fact presents the Kenotic theory with an insoluble problem. It is conceivable that a Divine Being may choose *not to do*. Indeed, there are some things that he could not even *choose to do*. Omnipotence is under the check of God's total nature. The only thing that God cannot know is the thing that cannot be. His knowledge does not extend to the impossible. Omniscience is, therefore, his perfect knowledge of reality. For One to whom such knowledge is a necessary constituent of his being to give it up, and to choose *not to know*, is to us quite inconceivable. It is hardly fair to tell us that this is a mystery that we must be satisfied to accept, *when we have no evidence that such was the fact*, and when the mystery is itself the offspring of a theory that can never be substantiated. A mys-

tery that grows out of another mystery only increases our confusion, and the entire proposal becomes suspect. A fact may very well be mysterious—what fact is not?—but we must first prove the fact. If that be done no mystery can destroy it. But in the case of the surrender of omniscience are we dealing with fact or with supposition? If there is no indisputable fact—and there is not—then there is no attendant mystery. Some, however, insist that we do have the fact, and they suggest the analogy of an educated man banishing from his mind for the time being all thought of a certain field of knowledge, or the analogy of a faithful mother who in her devotion to the needs of her sick child is oblivious to the less urgent needs of her other children. The analogy overlooks the fact that the process by which a human being acquires knowledge must be held to be wholly different from the method by which a Divine Being has it. Moreover, the occupation of a mind with, say, reading Latin to the temporary exclusion of Greek does not mean that the Greek is unknown, or that the mind has been “emptied” of it. If the reader were suddenly interrupted by a request that he translate a verse of Greek, he could not, knowing Greek, reply: “I do not know how.” Is it credible that a mind of which it could once be said that it knew everything ceased for a while to be even a mind at all, or became a mind, as in the early childhood, of which it could be said that it knew only the simplest things? If omniscience is a necessary attribute of Deity, that nescience should take the place of omniscience without in anywise impairing the essential Deity is a miracle infinitely greater than any miracle of transubstantiation. It is not the mere fact of miracle that makes one hesitate. Rather does one hesitate because of the inherent incredibility of what is proposed. If the Omniscient became for a season nescient, *that very nescience must have been eternally embraced in his omniscience*. What can be meant by nescience in such a case? And if, in a final effort, it be

said that what is essential to the being of Deity is not actual omniscience but the *power to be* omniscient, it must be replied that the power to be omniscient was one of the very things that our Lord denied he possessed.

(4) Kenoticism unwittingly plays directly into the hands of naturalistic evolutionism. When the theory of evolution was first propounded, the claim was very generally made that the theory put an end to the belief in a Personal God because it could explain without God the facts upon which the belief had usually been based. Many Christian people supposed that the claim really followed from the theory, and this was one chief reason why the theory was so strenuously opposed. The claim that there was a lower form which contained in itself the promise and the potency of a higher form, the claim that the perfected organism was already present in the original germ, the claim that all progress could be explained as due to ascertainable natural laws, the claim, therefore, that ethical intelligence, the very apex of the evolutionary pyramid, was an integral element of the primitive world-stuff—claims such as these were met with counter-claims hardly less unreasonable, and certainly no less dogmatic. The marks of that dreadful and unnecessary conflict are upon us still. A better day, however, began to dawn. Those much-maligned persons philosophers and theologians called attention to the fact that describing a process was very far from explaining it. They showed that if there was “more” at the end than there was at the beginning, the beginning could not wholly explain the end. Fundamental distinctions were emphasized, such as the distinction between a cause and a set of conditions, the distinction between surface facts and underlying reality, and the distinction in value and therefore in being between a process as completed and that same process as merely begun. It became increasingly clear that evolution needed a God just as much as did creation by fiat. “Law” was seen to be man’s way of representing to himself the Cre-

ator's orderly habit. Things could remain in being only through his perpetual presence and activity. Progress appeared, not as an inherent necessary principle, but as an increasing manifestation of God's purpose, or better still, of God himself. The creative power was not some abstraction called "law" or "time," but God, a Personal Will. The saving truth came to light, and should be by now a commonplace, that development is increase, according to a method which arises out of his own nature, of God's self-manifestation and, therefore, of his self-impartment.¹⁰

This truth, so hardly won, is being endangered by those whose chief concern it should be to preserve it. The true theist would not dream of trying to account for a complete organism solely by its original seed or germ. Much less would he do it when the organism in question was a personality. He would regard the germ merely as an initial condition—a necessary condition, let it be also said—but a condition depending on many other conditions and quite helpless without them, and he would regard the total conditions as the instruments of that causal power which he identifies with God. But when popular Kenoticism claims, as it so often does, that incarnation is exclusively by Virgin Conception, it confuses the initial condition with that continuous divine activity without which the later process is wholly inexplicable. Haeckel tried to believe that in the original uncreated "matter-force" was all life, all consciousness, all thought, all personality. Except in regard to reverence of spirit, there is little difference in the implications of this philosophy—the last word of crass materialism—and of the philosophy that can see no difference in worth, no difference in meaning, no difference in reality, between the consciousness of the Son of God as he died upon the cross and Mary's unborn Babe. If there is no essential difference between that tiny collocation of cells with which our Lord's earthly life must have begun, and that spirit which he "gave up" when he bowed his head and died, then

the very idea of growth, of a process, of an immanent, sustaining, self-giving Creative Will, becomes an illusion. But if there is a difference—and nobody, of course, could be so committed to the implications of the Kenotic theory as to deny it—then that difference must be accounted for, as it must be in the case of any other person. It cannot be accounted for merely as the necessitated unfolding of the enfolded. The continuous activity of God must be assumed; his continuous self-impartation must be claimed. But in that case, it ceases to be true that incarnation is *exclusively* by Virgin Conception. That would commit us to the most hopeless kind of determinism. In certain quarters to-day the claim is being urged that the entire future of any human personality is absolutely determined at the moment of conception.¹¹ In the name of all that we hold most dear, we must contest that claim—yet in principle Kenoticism of the kind being considered artlessly concedes it in the case of our Lord! Popular Kenosis talks much of the supernatural, and supposes that by its main contention it gives to the supernatural the largest emphasis. Yet when Kenoticism makes the initial germ absolutely determinative of the later personality and its unique self-consciousness, *it makes in effect the most glaring denial of the supernatural that the history of theology contains*. To explain any person, and especially the Supreme Person of history, exclusively by the conditions of his physical origin is not supernaturalism so much as it is the grossest materialistic naturalism. If it takes more than ancestry to explain us, it takes more than ancestry to explain him. If it takes more than environment to explain us, it takes more than environment to explain him. If we are continuous with our earliest beginnings, yet greater than they and other than they, the same must be true of him. If our lives increase in worth, then so did his. That same divine process whereby there can be any man, must be the same divine process whereby there could be This Man—only, let it be said with the greatest em-

phasis, raised to a degree wholly unique. It is precisely in the unique degree of that process that we find the real ground of our Lord's supernaturalness. We make the incarnation progressive, and it is only as it is progressive that it is intelligible. It cannot be confined to any one moment, or be identified with any one event. The choice seems to be inevitable between a theory of things, namely, naturalistic evolution, which being in effect atheistic makes incarnation itself impossible, and a theory which requires us to explain the Person of Christ not merely by the circumstances of the moment of his physical origin, but by an unusual mode of the divine activity throughout his entire earthly career and especially throughout his public ministry. Such a theory will not deny the congruity of Virgin Conception with the unique purpose and character of the career, only it will need *much more* supernatural action than is called for by the Conception alone. *Not less miracle but more miracle; not less of God but more of God; not a divine instantaneous event but a divine process*—this is what is demanded by a Christology which seeks to render a true account of all the facts in the case.¹²

NOTES ON CHAPTER XX

(1) The standard histories of doctrine, such as Dorner, *The Person of Christ* (Eng. trans. in 5 vols.), and Harnack, *History of Dogmas* (Eng. trans. in 7 vols.), are too comprehensive and detailed for the average student. Seeberg, *History of Doctrines* (2 vols.), is briefer, but is exceedingly technical. Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines* (2 vols.), is old, but is very valuable because of its copious quotations from the sources. Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine* (2 vols.), is as good as any for general purposes. Briefer treatments relative to the text are Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, lects. ii and iii, and Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, chaps. i and ii. Bk. ii, of Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, is an admirable sketch of "The History of Christological Doctrine."

(2) The gist of Anselm's argument is as follows: "The debt of sin is of such a character that only man can owe it, yet it is so great that only God can pay it. Therefore one must pay it who is both God and man: man, or he could not owe it; God, or he could not pay it." See Robert Mackintosh, *Historic Theories of Atonement*, chap. vii.

(3) Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pp. 396ff., gives a clear exposition of the Kenosis passage on the conservative side. For a liberal view, see Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. iii, § 10.

(4) For a statement of "the theological meaning" of the Kenosis passage, see Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, pp. 241ff.

(5) P. T. Forsyth is a conspicuous example of a modern thinker who states the case this way with compelling force. See especially *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, lect. xi, the closing chapter of the Yale Lectures on *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind*, and *The Cruciality of the Cross*. And if it be said that the very fact that the point of view lends itself to such graphic and moving presentation is strong evidence of its truth, reference may be made to the quality of other utterances, proceeding from a quite different point of view, e. g., Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, chap. xiv; King, *Reconstruction in Theology*, chap. x; Channing's discourse on *The Character of Christ*, from the text, "This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased"; and Enelow, *A Jewish View of Jesus*, the remarkable closing chapter on "The Modern Jewish Attitude to Jesus." "Who can compute," writes Enelow, a devout Jew, "all that Jesus has meant to humanity? The love he has inspired, the solace he has given, the good he has engendered, the hope and joy he has kindled—all that is unequaled in history. Among the great and the good that the human race has produced, none has even approached Jesus in universality of appeal and sway. He has become the most fascinating figure in history" (p. 181).

(6) On the religious significance of symbols, see the chapter by Miss Dougall, "The Language of the Soul," in the volume, *The Spirit*, ed. Streeter, and cf. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, chap. xi, on "Idea in Organic Union with Feeling."

(7) Useful criticisms of Kenoticism are as follows: Bruce, *ibid.*, lect. iv, a scholarly and comprehensive survey of modern Kenotic theories; Sanday, *ibid.*, pp. 71-78 (gives copious references to the literature); Sheldon, *System of Christian Doctrine*, pt. iv, chap. i, § 4; Drown, *Creative Christ*, pp. 144ff.; and Mackintosh, *ibid.*, bk. ii, chap. viii, § 4, bk. iii, chap. x. Mackintosh, however, while pointing out the difficulties, has the deepest appreciation of the truth the theories seek to conserve. Thus: "It will not do to reject as mythology an idea which, *in its inmost meaning*, is inseparable from the New Testament conception of our Lord—the idea, namely, that in whatever fashion, God in Christ brought his Divine being down to the measure of our life, and became poor for our sake" (pp. 271-272). For recent statements of the theory, see Forsyth (as referred to in note 5 above); Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, pp. 237-253; Gore, *Belief in Christ*, interesting as maintaining the position taken in the Bampton Lecture of 1891, on *The Incarnation of the Son of God*; and Garvie, *Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, chap. vi, § iii, the conclusion of his *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, and *The Christian Certainty*, chap. xii. In his *Ritschlian Theology*, however Garvie appears to be much less sympathetic with the Kenotic theories, which he regards as "commendable as attempts to do justice to the historical personality of Jesus while assuming the ecclesiastical dogma [of the two natures]; but as unsatisfactory in putting an undue strain on the passages of the New Testament which are supposed to teach the doctrine, and in venturing on bold assertions about the constitution of Deity which go far beyond the legitimate compass of our intelligence in these high matters" (p. 271, footnote).

(8) Thus Bruce: "The hypotheses of a *double life*, of a *gradual incarnation*, and of a *depotentiated Logos*, are all legitimate enough as tentative solutions of a hard problem; and those who require their aid may use any one of them as a prop around which faith may twine. But it is not necessary to adopt any one of them; we are not obliged to choose between them; we may stand aloof from them all; and it may be best when faith can afford to dispense with their services. For it is not good that the certainties of faith should lean too heavily upon uncertain and questionable theories" (*ibid.*, pp. 191-192).

(9) "The self-consciousness of the Son of God is now in total eclipse, but he himself is still organic in the Godhead and has still all the inherent divine capacity. Not one divine attribute has he lost out of his nature," etc. (Curtis, *ibid.*, p. 246).

(10) One of the best recent theistic interpretations of evolution is by Henry Drummond's successor, J. Y. Simpson, in *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*. See especially chap. xii.

(11) As, e. g., in Walter, *Genetics*, chap. ii, where it is said that "the determiners of the heritage, whatever they may be, are originally packed into the germ-cells" (p. 28). A much more cautious discussion is Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*.

(12) This is the view maintained in Drown, *ibid.*, chap. v. "The incarnation is not a physical event, but a moral and spiritual union" (p. 135). "In the whole development of the Person of Jesus we see the process of the Incarnate Life" (p. 136; see also footnote).

CHAPTER XXI

GOD MANIFEST IN THE FLESH

Basing on the historic record of Christ's life and death and resurrection, on the observation of his potent redeeming influence in promoting the ideal human society or kingdom of God, and on personal experience of his saving, sanctifying, hope-inspiring influence on our own lives, Christian faith is constrained to confess this Person to be none other than God in man, God manifest in human flesh, Immanuel, God with us, whose coming was predicted by the prophets of religion in past ages. The true deity of Jesus Christ is an article of faith which the Christian Church can never surrender without cutting itself off from the root principle of its life. But if so, this points to an eternal ground in the essential Being of God, a power, element, or aspect of the Divine Life which is capable of self-adaptation to human nature, capable of becoming man, and so manifesting the Divine Life in a human life.—ADAM, *Cardinal Elements of the Christian Faith* (George H. Doran Company. New York), pp. 152-153.

CHAPTER XXI

GOD MANIFEST IN THE FLESH

It is necessary to repeat again, that the criticism of the theory of Kenosis offered in the last chapter is not intended to call in question the facts with which the theory attempts to deal. The facts themselves must be jealously guarded, for a faith which has not its basis in fact cannot permanently endure. Christianity in its simplest form is the belief that God came to men in Jesus Christ for the purpose of accomplishing their salvation, and that the measure of any man's salvation is the degree in which by faith he appropriates God in Christ and shows his faith by his works. Any representation of Christianity which eliminates from the work and the Person of Christ the specific activity of the Divine cannot do justice to the total facts. That is why Unitarianism has persistently failed to satisfy the Christian consciousness except within quite limited range.¹ Unitarianism has been, in general, deductive rather than inductive. It has sought to understand Christ through a prior conception of God. The Christian idea of God can be reached only through the Christian history and experience. But Unitarianism has been hampered by its *a priori* theism, which in its older form was more or less deistic and in its modern form tends to an exclusive immanentism. If God is thought of as wholly separate from the world, or if he is thought of as wholly exhausted by the world, much that is distinctive of the New Testament and of the Christian experience is left unaccounted for. Christian theology owes a great debt to the Unitarians. They have repeatedly called attention to the simplicities of the Christian faith which were in danger of being lost sight of by those who were

absorbed in its complexities. They have been satisfied to confine themselves to those few plain truths which all Christian people the world over agree to. Unitarianism represents the minimum of belief: our first chapter is an attempt to show that. A Christian must at least believe in the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men and in Jesus as the Perfect Exemplar, and he must believe that there is no salvation where there is no goodness. Only, most Christians feel that they cannot stop with this bare minimum. The sense of sin, the conviction of moral helplessness, the inevitable discrepancy between the ideal and the actual, the need of something more than a perfect example, Christ's consciousness concerning himself and his Vocation to save, the enduring belief that the work of Christ, and especially his death, looked at one and the same time Godward and manward, and so possessed a certain universal significance—ideas and needs and beliefs such as these are held not to be adequately treated in Unitarianism. Any consideration of Christ must include his teaching and his example, but if it stops with that it is not complete. Christ is more than a Teacher, and Christianity is more than an ethic. It is a religion of redemption, and it is that because of what Christ was and because of what he did. But if what Christ was and did somehow constitutes him the world's Redeemer because he thereby accomplished a deliverance or made possible a deliverance in which all men may share, we must suppose that his action was more than the action of "a good man," and that in his Person he was more than simply one more member of the race. He must be related to God and God must be related to him in a way such as was never true in any other case.

There are those who will be satisfied to say this and no more. Either because they are not interested in a technical Christology, or because they are conscious of the difficulties of the Christology problem, or because there is no

theory to which they feel able to assent, or because they believe that we are here confronted with an antinomy which is insoluble to logic while yet it so perfectly responds to moral and religious need,² or for some other like reason, they are content to accept the historic statement as to the Person of our Lord and to rest in the experience to which their faith leads them. It is not necessary to be able to define God in order to believe in God. "What is it that I love when I love God?" The question is Augustine's:³ who can answer it with entire satisfaction even to himself? Who can state a theory of the atonement, and feel that he has included everything? Nevertheless, he still sings:

"Just as I am, without one plea
But that thy blood was shed for me."

Or who can set forth the complete rationale of "the gift of the Holy Spirit"—that gift for which, notwithstanding, he still continues to pray and in the experience of which he still continues to rejoice? Similar considerations hold with regard to the Person of Christ. At the risk of being tiresome, the writer must again affirm his conviction that the significance of Jesus Christ for the world's redemption, as this is attested in actual experience, is quite independent of all our theories about it, and infinitely greater than the greatest of them. Dissatisfaction with traditional theory is entirely compatible with the fullest acceptance of historic and experiential fact. Indeed, the numerous attempts in recent years to work out a new theory bear witness to how strong the hold of the fact is, and to how determined Christian men are not to allow the weakening of traditional theory to cause the history and the experience to lose their worth.

Although the Kenotic theory as usually stated is open to the objection that it supposes that the aspect under which a fact appears to us is also the aspect under which it appears

to God, a measure of this confusion must be allowed to be inevitable in any theory.⁴ Indeed, the statement of any great Christian truth can have real worth for us only as it utilizes the categories which are normal to finite and growing minds. We must suppose that there is a very real sense in which history and human experience involve the creating of new facts for God. Yet we have to add to that that nothing happens or can happen for which God has not already made provision. For that reason there can be no such thing for God as an absolute novelty.⁵ He can never be taken by surprise. He can never meet a situation the basis of which is not already in himself. Just because God is himself eternal, whatever is true in respect to his essential being and nature at one time is true in respect to him always. There can, therefore, be no merely temporary disruption of the fundamental condition of his existence such as is required by the Kenotic theory. We must regard as eternally true of God what was shown to be true of him in Jesus Christ. What appears in Christ as his temporal action must be taken as representing his eternal action. Then only do we grasp the real significance of Christ. He is not One who merely tells us something about God. He is not the Creator himself temporarily appearing as a part of his own creation. Neither the theory of a Spirit-endowed Man nor the theory of a depotentiated God is true to the facts. What we have in him, rather, is what the New Testament describes as a Divine Manifestation. In such a manifestation there is involved of necessity a double reality: the reality of *that which* is manifested—and this is the divine element—and the reality of *that by which* it is manifested—and this is the human element. We cannot escape the conclusion that when the Divine appears as Human there is forthwith an appearance of the Human as Divine.⁶ It is then no longer a question of two consciousnesses, any more than it is a question of two wills. There is one consciousness, but it is a

consciousness whose content in respect to God's innermost nature, in respect to his purpose for men, in respect to his attitude to sin, in respect to the moral necessities which his own nature creates, is identical with the content of the absolute Divine Consciousness itself. The absolute manifestation of the Divine in and to the human, and the absolute apprehension by the human of the Divine, are the two sides of the same process, and without the one the other could not be. In Jesus Christ we meet One who thought as God thought, who acted as God acted, who suffered as God suffered, and who therefore, in his thought and action and suffering, manifests God, or reveals God, or is the incarnation of God. But is that his own personal achievement exclusively? And we must answer that it is not and could not be. We simply use words to cover confusion of thought if we say that the human could wholly manifest the Divine, unless we add that at the same time the Divine was manifesting itself in the human. Not only do we need a special quality in that human instrument through which God manifests himself, but we need also special action—let us say supernatural action—on the part of God in his relation to the instrument and in his use of him. If Christ reveals God, it is because God is at the same time revealing himself through Christ.

The manifestation of God in Christ is therefore a Divine-human achievement. Very God manifests himself as Very Man, and Very Man appears as Very God. But Very God could not have done this independently of the will of Very Man, any more than Very Man could have done it independently of the will of Very God. The one absolutely perfect human life is by virtue of that perfection God manifest in the flesh. Conversely, the manifestation of God in the flesh is in his securing an absolutely perfect human life. The Son of Man is also Son of God, and he is the one because he is the other. The completely human is the Divine made manifest, and the Divine made manifest is the completely

human. Once and for always it stands revealed on the field of time and history—that man is essentially kin to God, that the law of the uncreated Divine is also the law of the created human, that even as God lives only through his eternal recognition of the principle of “otherness,” so also can man come to his true stature only as, paradoxical though it may seem to be, the center of his life is outside of himself. This revelation was made in Jesus Christ. *He incarnates and manifests that Eternal Other into which God is eternally passing because he is Eternal Father.*⁷ The drama of the interior life of “the steep and trifold God”—its holiness, its love, its sacrifice, its self-giving—is enacted on the stage of time that so God might reach man, that so man might reach God. Jesus Christ did this—but not alone: God did it with him. God did this—but not alone: Jesus Christ did it with him. There was a human life through which it could be done, and there was the Divine purpose to do it when the securing of such a life should denote that the fullness of the time had come. By the very necessities of the case, such a life is at once human and divine: its action is at once human and divine action, its experience is at once human and divine experience, its sacrifice is at once human and divine sacrifice, its death is at once human and divine death, its final triumph in resurrection is at once human and divine triumph. If all that is true, one more statement becomes inevitable: the consciousness of such a life is at once human and divine consciousness.

It is the writer's conviction that the view thus briefly sketched of the significance of the Person of Christ presupposes a truly Christian philosophy of the relation of God to the world and to human life, protects every essential feature of the Christian history and the Christian experience, and rings true both to Christ's own self-estimate and to that estimate of him which is characteristic of apostolic thought. In attempting in the following chapters to expand the view at somewhat greater length, the writer is deeply conscious

of his own limitations. It is often said that if one conceives clearly, one will state clearly. That, unfortunately, is not always true. "I know unless you ask me to tell it." One may see reaching out before one's mind this great truth of God manifest in Jesus Christ, and yet feel how poor is language to set forth the splendor of the vision. But however halting the representation may be, the writer can only say that he is seeking, by the help of a certain philosophical theory, to preserve the great historic emphases: the true humanity of our Lord, his Uniqueness, his Universality, his Timelessness, and therefore, his Deity. The last thought in his mind is that the statement is completely adequate. But then, if complete adequacy is the test of a theological statement, when was ever a statement made which met that test? One may well suspect that a Christian theology which claims to be final has attained its alleged finality by paring down the Christian facts. A Christology which has no ragged edges is faultily faultless. Better a complete testimony which plays havoc with logic than an exaltation of logic at the expense of the testimony. "Not that we have the lordship over your faith, but we are helpers of your joy."

NOTES ON CHAPTER XXI

(1) For authoritative statements of Unitarianism, each, however, showing marked differences, see James Drummond, *Via, Veritas, Vita*; Emerton, *Unitarian Thought*; Jacks, *Religious Perplexities*. For the history, see the article by J. E. Carpenter in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. xii. The searching criticism of humanitarian, i. e., Unitarian, Christologies, in Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, lect. v, is worth careful study. See also Garvie, *Christian Certainty*, chap. xviii; Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, bk. ii, chap. viii, § 8; Sanday, *Life of Christ in Recent Research*, chaps. vi and vii; Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, lect. ii; Faulkner, *Modernism and the Christian Faith*, chaps. iv, v, and vi.

(2) There is very great need for an adequate modern treatment, in connection with Christology, of the idea that the highest truth seems to have in it of necessity an "a-logical" element. Such a treatment would not be anti-intellectualistic: it would, rather, exalt the intellect, as Kant did, by employing it in self-criticism. Cf. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, chaps. iv and v. The idea is treated by Pringle-Pattison, in *The Idea of God*, lect. xvii, pp. 335ff., where he defends the position that in creation conceived as the purposive effort of a Perfect Being we meet the contradictions of purposive effort co-existing with its own fulfillment, and of a Perfect Being seeking something "more" for himself. He adds: "The paradox of religion may be truer, in short, than the dilemma, the 'Either-or,' of the logical understanding" (p. 338).

(3) *Confessions*, bk. x, ¶ 8, Pusey's translation.

(4) "The work of theology cannot be done without encountering antinomies at every point where we touch the relations of eternity and time." Mackintosh, *ibid.*, pp. 502-503.

(5) Cf. Pringle-Pattison's discussion of Royce's theory of the nature of the Eternal Consciousness, *ibid.*, pp. 354-356; and see the reference to Höffding, note 4, chap. xxiv, below.

(6) See the fine chapter on "What Is the Incarnation?" in Drown, *The Creative Christ*. "He is God giving himself to men. He is man receiving the fullness of God. . . . In the Incarnate Christ we see God giving himself in his fullness to man capable of receiving the fullness of God" (p. 100).

(7) Hegel has worked out the classic expression, in modern times, of the idea of Divine Otherness. See on this Sterrett, *Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, chap. iv, ¶ 3, "The Speculative Idea of Religion," and chaps. v and viii. The student who is interested is referred also to the idealistic philosophies of T. H. Green, John and Edward Caird, and Josiah Royce. Cf., however, Mackintosh, *ibid.*, bk. iii, pt. iii, chap. xii, ¶¶ (a), (b), (c), for a critical estimate of the theological worth of the idea.

CHAPTER XXII
THE SON OF MAN

To understand under the term *miracle* only what is unusual, but in its commencement calculable, is evidently to narrow too much the signification of the word; to find in it a complete setting aside of the laws of nature is to say more than one would care to do. The annulling of a law of nature, if it were to take place for a moment, would not only make possible the particular single event on behalf of which it was decreed, but at the same time set in confusion all the rest of the world, whose orderly and regular continued existence we presupposed as the foil for the luster of the single miracle. . . . The complete and unbending circle of mechanical necessity is not, and must not be, immediately accessible to the miracle-working command; but the inner nature of that which is subject to its laws is determined not by it, but only by the meaning of the universe. Here is the exposed part on which a power, ordaining in accordance with that meaning, can exert its influence; and if, in consequence of its ordinance, the internal states of the elements and the amount of their mutual affinity and antagonism undergo a change, the necessity of the mechanical course of the universe will have to produce from the altered state of the facts an external, miraculous phenomenon, not by setting aside but by strictly maintaining universal laws.—LOTZE, *Microcosmus* (Eng. trans. by Hamilton and Jones), Fourth Edition, vol. i, bk. iv, ch. iii, pp. 451-452.

There is a common superstition that the so-called "Law of Continuity" shuts out the idea of Creation, and negatives the possibility, for example, of the sudden appearance of new forms of Life. What it does negative, however, is not any appearance which is sudden, but only an appearance which has been unprepared. . . . Nothing can come to be without a long, even if it be a secret, history. . . . For every "leap," however wide, there has always been a long chain of predetermining causes.—DUKE OF ARGYLL, *The Unity of Nature*. Popular Edition, pp. 141-142.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SON OF MAN

WHAT value shall we assign to the circumstances of our Lord's birth? For many persons to-day that is a question of paramount importance. It cannot be ignored in a discussion of this kind.¹

The story is told in the first and third Gospels. There are no other clear allusions to the manner of the birth anywhere else in the New Testament. To make John's use of the term "only-begotten" (which, significantly enough in view of the cast of the fourth Gospel, is a Platonic term), and Paul's use of the phrase "born of a woman," explicit statements of Virgin Birth, is not really to strengthen the case. It is better that we restrain our imagination, and confine ourselves to the Gospel narratives, namely, those of Matthew and Luke.

As to the teaching of Matthew, there can be no doubt whatever. He makes plain enough his belief that the Child Jesus was Virgin-Born. He consistently maintains his point of view throughout the entire infancy narrative. His regular formula is: "Joseph . . . the young child and his mother." Moreover, he retains the atmosphere of supernaturalness by making Joseph four times the subject of a dream in which God told him what to do, namely, not to divorce Mary (1. 20), to flee into Egypt (2. 13), to leave Egypt (2. 19), and to take up his residence in Nazareth (2. 22). The source of Matthew's narrative is evidently Joseph himself, and the source of Joseph's resolutions and actions is a series of dreams. The fact has been used to impeach the worth of Matthew's account. But this aside, it is very plain what Matthew's own view is: that Joseph

was the natural guardian and protector of "the young child and his mother," but the Child himself was begotten not by Joseph but by the Holy Spirit.²

Whether the same clarity obtains in the case of the narrative of Luke is an open question. A careful reading of the first and second chapters, and of the genealogy in the third chapter, may well create a doubt as to their exact meaning, if there are laid aside for the time being the pre-suppositions that are naturally created in the mind by the Matthew account.

A recent suggestion is that the original Lukan narrative was frankly based on the supposition that Jesus was the child of Joseph.³ Later, Luke himself, having learned of the Virgin Birth, and having satisfied himself of its reliability, inserted 1. 34, 35, and the phrase "as was supposed," in the genealogy in 3.23, and perhaps the account of "the heavenly host" on the night of the birth in 2. 8-20. Perhaps the most serious objection to this suggestion is the fact that Luke is so obviously writing his story from the standpoint of Mary that it is incredible that the whole story is not of a piece.⁴

There are certain very significant facts, however, in the Lukan narrative: 1. 31 is a clear reference to a conception that has not yet taken place; 1. 35 and 2. 21 confirm this idea of futurity. The very fact that an indefinite period of time elapses between the annunciation and the conception would appear to provide for at least the possibility that the conception will follow the natural course (for whether or not Mary was the wife of Joseph in the complete legal sense at the time of the annunciation, she certainly appears to have been so at the time when they went up to Bethlehem for the purposes of the "enrollment"; and even Matt. 1. 25 suggests Joseph's possession of complete marital rights, held in abeyance though they were). This ambiguity is only emphasized by Luke's uniform way of referring to the parentage in the second chapter. Thus 2. 27, "the parents";

33, "his father and his mother"; 41, "his parents"; 43, "his parents"; 48, "thy father and I." The usual suggestion as to this custom of Luke is that he is adopting the point of view of an outsider. This, of course, is quite possible, although it might well be asked why Luke should so quickly shift his point of view. Why is Matthew consistent and Luke so inconsistent? It is also to be observed that in the third chapter Luke gives the genealogy of Joseph, but he nowhere gives the genealogy of Mary (neither, for that matter, does Matthew, whose genealogy, differing though it does from Luke's, purports to show the descent of Joseph). It is difficult to see why Luke should do this if he wants us to suppose that Joseph's relation to the events narrated is wholly external, and the parenthetical clause, "as was supposed" (3. 23), only increases the difficulty. We must note the fact also that Luke nowhere suggests that Joseph had any doubts concerning Mary which it was necessary to remove through a supernatural revelation.

These are the facts. Are they compatible with the supposition that Luke is describing a Virgin Birth, and that he means to describe such? The question, highly important as it is, admits of an affirmative answer. That is to say, persons fully aware of these facts may still insist that Luke, like Matthew, is witnessing to the belief that Jesus had no human father. But we still cannot get away from the facts just stated; and if we are entirely frank, we shall say that they appear to introduce ambiguity into the very heart of Luke's narrative. This being the case, we are entitled to ask why so careful a historian as Luke is known to be, and who appears to have had sources of information not accessible to Matthew, should so describe this great event of the birth of the Lord's Anointed as to create in the mind of the reader a doubt concerning the exact meaning of the description. The narrative as a whole does not support a categorical affirmation of purely natural conception. But neither does it as a whole support a categorical affirma-

tion of conception that dispensed with the natural means. Why, then, the ambiguity?

The question may be answered by the supposition that the ambiguity was deliberate on the part of Luke, either because he could not satisfy his own mind as to the belief in Mary's virginity, or because he feared the slanderous accusations that would follow on its being announced, or because these accusations were already being made and he desired to turn their edge.⁵ Many people, however, would regard such a supposition as an impeachment of Luke's veracity, and it need not be pressed.

What may appear as a more reasonable supposition is that if we knew Luke's entire mind in the matter, we should discover that *for him the ambiguity is not there at all*, since he is writing without the question of the specific method of the conception ever having occurred to him one way or the other, and therefore that the ambiguity is only created for us because of the fact that we possess Matthew's account as well, and read Luke's accordingly. In any event, what does seem to be beyond dispute is that Luke knew more about the circumstances of the birth than Matthew did, and yet does not give *unquestionable* support to Matthew's assertion of the absence of human paternity. The conclusion, therefore, ought not to be regarded as altogether without foundation, namely, that since Luke fails either explicitly to deny or explicitly to confirm the Matthew presentation, he must be understood as regarding the precise method of the conception as of only incidental importance. He may be taking it for granted that Jesus' life began in the usual way, and he may be taking it for granted that it did not. We simply cannot tell with absolute certainty which it is, and there is nothing to do but for each to decide for himself.

Whatever this suggestion may be worth—and it ought to be evident that it leaves wholly untouched the historic belief of the church in the *Virgin Birth*—it has a certain

apologetic force in the modern situation. There are many by whom the belief in the Virgin Birth is used to discredit the whole of Christianity. They refuse to accept the claims of Christ because those claims appear to rest on what is to them an incredible foundation. There are many others who sincerely want to accept the claims of Christ, but they find in the assertion of his Virgin Birth a very serious difficulty. If our suggestion as to Luke's account is at all sound, it means that in the thought of Luke himself the question of our Lord's Divine Sonship and Saviourhood was not absolutely dependent upon the manner of his birth, or at least that *faith in that Sonship and Saviourhood could be reached by some other avenue than this*.⁶ Luke's method supports us in saying to the scoffer: "You cannot evade the challenge of the Christ and the appeal of his total Person and message and work simply by flatly rejecting his Virgin Birth." And it supports us in saying to thousands of people, especially young people, in our churches to-day who frankly confess a difficulty at this point: "While the Virgin Birth is a part of historic Christianity, the unquestioning acceptance of it is not, if we take Luke for our guide, so wholly indispensable to Christian discipleship that those who reserve judgment on it must be denied membership in the church."

Luke's account has yet another value in the modern situation. Matthew makes the relation of Mary to Jesus almost impersonal. He describes Mary as simply a passive instrument through whom God wrought a great miracle. Any other woman whom God might have chosen would apparently have done equally well. Not once does Matthew describe Mary as being deeply concerned in her Child, either before or after his birth, or as being the subject of any special divine leading. This is far from being the case with Luke. It is Luke who tells of the Annunciation. It is Luke who tells that Mary was chosen because she was already fit to be chosen. It is Luke who suggests that she experienced

deeply spiritual preconception moods. It is Luke who gives us that wonderfully human touch—the young girl hastening to visit her aged kinswoman Elisabeth to unburden herself to one who could understand, and to tell her that she had had a vision that she was to be the mother of the Messiah—for this, surely, was the “salutation” (I. 40, 41) which so deeply moved Elisabeth. It is Luke who gives us the Magnificat with its note of triumphant assurance. Had the conception already taken place at the time of the visit? So far as Luke’s narrative is concerned, we cannot tell. But whether it had or not, here is a woman who, throughout her months of patient waiting, is going to make deep and permanent impressions on her unborn Child. Matthew appears not to have had the slightest interest in the solemn mysteries of prenatal life. With Luke that interest is paramount. That is why, for the modern student, Luke’s account is so much more deeply suggestive and so much more deeply satisfying than Matthew’s. We know that to a degree Jesus was the kind of Man he was because he had Mary for his mother—Mary, who prayed for him before he was conceived; Mary, who carried him not merely in her body but on her heart; Mary, who by her prayers and rapturous anticipations of future greatness for her Child cooperated with the Spirit of God to bring it to pass that that which was to be born of her should be called holy, the Son of God; Mary, who kept all these things and pondered them in her heart. The modern mind responds at once to the suggestion of deep mysterious spiritual relations between mother and unborn babe. But when, following Luke’s lead, we suppose such a relation between Mary and Jesus, there is emphasized for us, in an almost overwhelming way, the idea of true humanness and yet at the same time of true supernaturalness. It certainly cannot wholly account for Jesus, *but neither can Jesus be wholly accounted for in its absence*. If Mary had been a different kind of mother, Jesus would have been a different kind of Man. But if she had been a different kind

of mother, what guarantee have we—still following Luke's lead—that Jesus would have been born of her at all? In other words, what we have here is an exact coincidence of perfect human conditions with the divine purpose and necessity. *God would when he could*, for he never wills except as he also can.⁷ We keep the emphasis on the supernatural, but at the same time we condition it on the natural. Even though we may not be certain, therefore, that Luke is describing a Virgin Birth, we can never be uncertain that he is describing a birth in which God is especially implicated, therefore a supernatural birth. But his point of view is, unlike Matthew's, the psychological rather than the physiological, and for that reason it the more appeals to us.

All this only serves to emphasize the fact that our Lord's experience was controlled by the same laws that control our own. This is what we mean when we call him "Son of man."⁸ He was "made like unto his brethren." At no place does the record leave that in doubt. We do not proceed from his complete divineness to his complete humanness. It is much more nearly true to say that it is through his humanness that we reach his divineness. There was much more latent danger in those early theories which discounted his human nature than there was in the early humanitarian theories, and the same would be true to-day. What we are to begin with and never lose sight of throughout our speculations is the fact that Jesus Christ was a particular Man who lived at a particular time and place in the world's history. He came into the world as any other human being must come into it, that is, as a helpless Babe. He was as dependent on others as any other child must be. All that necessity of learning which belongs to human life and experience belonged to him. His body was in no discernible sense different from other bodies, and his mind functioned according to the same principles which control the functioning of all other minds. He went to school; he learned a trade; he lived in the fellowship of home and

friends; he was a member of a "church"; and he recognized and discharged the obligations of citizenship. He knew what it was to hunger and thirst, to weep and to rejoice. He knew that utter physical exhaustion which comes from long-continued toil. The hatred of enemies and the love of friends alike entered into his lot. He knew the meaning of disappointment, misunderstanding, and calumny. And that which is at once the pathos and the glory of human life, uncertainty as to the exact form under which to express devotion to the will of God, he felt on occasion up to almost the very last moment of his life. It cannot be said too often or with too great emphasis: Jesus Christ so exhibited the characteristic qualities of manhood that it seems never to have occurred to anyone who knew him to doubt that his manhood was real. No theory of his Person can be tolerated therefore which is in any wise incompatible with the frankest recognition of his true oneness with men. Whether what has been said about the possible meaning of Luke's story of the birth be acceptable or not, the fact that is perfectly obvious from the total gospel record is that the manner of our Lord's coming did not release him from the limitations of ordinary human experience. Certainly it did not guarantee him against physical suffering. Then why should it be thought to guarantee him against moral struggle? Or why should it be thought, in the event of moral struggle, to guarantee the outcome? Never for a moment must we suffer the glory of our Lord's utter holiness to be obscured, but we want a much profounder reason for it than that it was automatically determined by supernatural birth.

For the more we exalt the true humanity of our Lord, the more we throw into relief his sinlessness. We have already spoken of the necessity of protecting his moral freedom if his moral achievement is to have real worth for us. A being wholly divine, no matter under what mode he may choose for a time to exist, is unable to sin. Any definition

of God must include his holiness. But God is holy because it is his nature to be holy. He does not *choose* to be holy in the sense that he considers and then refuses the alternative. "God cannot be tempted of evil." That is why God's holiness, as respects its method, can never be an example for mankind. The exhortation that we be holy even as God is holy must be considered in the light of that. Holiness in God is an abiding fact, capable of no increase and of no decrease. With us, it is always an ideal, and we attain it only to discover that we have acquired the power and the obligation to attain more still. If the popular Kenotic explanation of our Lord is true, then we must give to his holiness a quite different meaning from what holiness could ever mean in our own case. On Kenotic presuppositions, the usual suggestion does not help us at all. The usual suggestion is that he was "able not to sin" rather than that he was "not able to sin." That he was "able not to sin" is, of course, the true statement—but *why was he thus able?* If the answer is that he was thus able because he was necessitated by the divine fundament that constituted his essential being, then his possession of that ability puts him outside the human category.⁹ We then have to say frankly, "He was not able to sin." But instantly we are faced with the facts of the record: "He was tempted, yet without sin." A temptation the outcome of which does not depend upon the free decision of the tempted is not a temptation in any sense that can be made intelligible to human beings. It has been suggested that the reality of temptation consists in "pressure in motive," and that Christ felt this pressure but without any disposition to yield to it.¹⁰ The suggestion implies a quite defective psychology. The "pressure" of any motive is determined exactly by the degree of personal interest in the proposal, and of the inclination to consider it. There is profound truth in Aristotle's claim that virtue won only through great effort betrays somewhere a lack.¹¹ Some motives never touch some

men because they are the kind of men they are. How could Jesus have been tempted to become a national political deliverer—and this, surely, is part of the meaning of his wilderness experience—unless to a degree he *wanted* to do it? If *he did not want* to do it, the temptation was mere surface play. If he *did want* to do it, the temptation was tragically real. But if he was one who pondered the possibility of doing less than the best, and who actually *could have done* less than the best, then his final triumph cannot be explained as a mechanical necessity springing from the peculiar constitution of his being. *We must save the reality of his humanity, and to do that we must save the reality of his moral trial.* But we cannot save the reality of his moral trial if he were not capable of being tempted, and he was not capable of being tempted unless he were also One who must “learn obedience by the things that he suffered.” Let us rejoice that he was “able not to sin,” for this revelation of holiness is an indispensable constituent element of his Saviourhood, but let us show also wherein the true ground of our rejoicing lay, namely, not in the impossible supposition that his sinlessness grew out of an automatic internal coercion, but, rather, in the fact of that divine intimacy which was his, and through which he at once learned the secret of holiness and found access to its one all-sufficient source. The holiness of Jesus Christ was truly divine in its quality, but it was as truly human in its method. He stood in such a relation to God that the quality was possible, just as he stood in such a relation to men that the method was inevitable. Holiness is natural to God as sinfulness is natural to man, and we are surprised by neither. But when we stand in the presence of a Man by whom holiness such as God’s is was achieved and maintained in conditions that did not guarantee it of themselves, then, indeed, is the Divine revealed. But it is revealed in the human because that human is itself divine.¹²

NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII

(1) For a discussion of the Virgin Birth from a frankly rationalistic standpoint, see Pfeleiderer, *Early Christian Conception of Christ*. Less rationalistic and more constructive, but still denying the Virgin Birth, is Lobstein, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*. Discussions on the other side are as follows: Orr, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*; L. M. Sweet, *The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*. More recent is the eminently dispassionate book by Vincent Taylor, *The Historical Evidence for the Virgin Birth*. The articles in the various Hastings' Dictionaries are, in general, conservative. The position of most modern evangelical scholarship is perhaps nowhere better expressed than in Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Appendix, "Jesus' Birth of a Virgin." Gore, *Belief in God*, pp. 274-282, is rather more dogmatic.

(2) Harnack adopts the theory that the origin of the Virgin-Birth story is in the Septuagint mistranslation of Isaiah 7. 14, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive." His claim is that "almah" (עַלְמָה) means simply "young woman," and should have been translated by the Greek *νεάνις* instead of by *παρθένος* ("virgin"). This question was raised very early. The second-century Greek translations of the Old Testament of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, all render this word *νεάνις* ("young woman"), but as these were prepared for the purposes of either Judaism or Ebionitism, this proves nothing. The truth is that there are several Hebrew words which may mean either "virgin" or "young woman," and that the Septuagint translates them sometimes by *παρθένος*, sometimes by *νεάνις* or related forms. E. g., in Deut. 22. 23, it translates נָעִר by *παρθένος*; in Prov. 30. 19, עַלְמָה by *νεότης*; in Song of Songs 6. 8, עַלְמָה by *νεάνις*. Yet in the prophecy of Isaiah 7. 14, עַלְמָה is rendered *παρθένος*, which is the usual Greek word for "virgin." It is true that the first-century Jews and Christians alike made extensive use of the Greek Old Testament, and it is true that Matthew has a fondness for discovering in the life of Christ exact fulfillments of ancient predictions. This lends some color to Harnack's theory, but the facts mentioned above show how precarious the linguistic argument must be. The argument also assumes that Matthew

originated the Virgin Birth story. This may be true, but then again he may be recording an extant tradition. See *History of Dogma*, vol. i, p. 100, footnote, and cf. for criticism (and, incidentally, a fantastic alternative theory), Cheyne, *Bible Problems*, pp. 177ff., and Note 1, pp. 191ff.

(3) In Taylor, *ibid.*, pp. 72-75, where the theory in question is outlined very clearly. There is no better book on the Virgin Birth than this short monograph. The scholarship is ample; the spirit is profoundly reverent; there is remarkable freedom from all prejudice; and the conclusion is that, on the whole, the weight of the evidence is in favor of the church tradition.

(4) "We cannot have Luke's picture of the growing of Christ without the Virgin Birth; for it is part of one and the same undivided testimony." Sweet, *ibid.*, p. 13.

(5) E. g., that repeated by Celsus (it is hardly probable that he invented it), namely, that Jesus was "born in a certain Jewish village, of a poor woman of the country, who gained her subsistence by spinning, and who was turned out of doors by her husband, a carpenter by trade, because she was convicted of adultery; that after being driven away by her husband, and wandering about for a time, she disgracefully gave birth to Jesus, an illegitimate child." Quoted in Origen, *Against Celsus*; bk. i, chap. xxviii. "When Mary was pregnant, she was turned out of doors by the carpenter to whom she had been betrothed, as having been guilty of adultery, and she bore a child to a certain soldier named Panthera." *Ibid.*, chap. xxxii. It is implied, of course, that "son of Panthera," became changed to "son of ἡ παρθένος" (*parthenos* = virgin) by the early Christians in the interests of their own cult. But what about the other alternative, that enemies corrupted "parthenos" to "Panthera"? It should be said that we know of Celsus' attack only through Origen's reply, and that we do not know when this slander originated. In view, however, of Matt. 28. 11-15, it is easy to believe that it appeared very soon after the Christians made public, i. e., in the written Gospels of Matthew and Luke, what had hitherto been a strictly private tradition (cf. Taylor, *ibid.*, chap. vi).

(6) This is even more evidently the case if Taylor's theory

be correct, namely, that Luke wrote his Gospel originally in ignorance of the Virgin-Birth tradition.

(7) This statement, of course, implies a whole philosophy. There are those to whom it is an intolerable notion that God cannot do anything conceivable at any moment he shall arbitrarily select. There are others to whom the very idea of God is that he is a God of order, and the objective order he has established is for them the expression of his absolute nature. From this point of view, God always works through prescribed conditions, but his "freedom" is protected by the claim that his nature just as truly determines these conditions as it does the ensuing action. God is free because he is true to himself, and it is because he is true to himself that he always waits for "the fullness of the time." If we accept this principle at all, then why not apply it thoroughly? If "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" be the nature of things, which is to say the nature of God, why should not incarnation itself also be "according to law"? Is God conceived as orderly any less great than God conceived as arbitrary? If the choice must be between a God "who can whenever he will" and a God "who will whenever he can," there ought to be no hesitation on the part of those who are committed to the doctrine of Divine Personality.

(8) It is not being claimed, however, that this was the original meaning of the term, which has apocalyptic associations. See Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, vol. i, bk. i, chap. iii, §§ 4, 5, 6; Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pt. i, chap. iv; Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, pp. 19-25.

(9) The chapter on "Christ the Subject of Temptation" in Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, fine as it is in many ways, shows the confusion that inevitably follows from holding the temptations to be real while yet so conceiving the nature of Christ as that a real temptation was impossible. There is much to be said for Drown's preference of the positive term "righteousness" as applied to Christ rather than the negative term "sinlessness" (*Creative Christ*, p. 156).

(10) Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 248.

(11) "It is necessary for a man to do all these things in a particular frame of mind, in order to be good: I mean, from

principle, and for the sake of the acts themselves" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. vi, chap. xii). "When the habit is of the same kind *with the natural tendency*, then it will be really virtue" (*ibid.*, chap. xiii).

(12) The student should ponder every line of the fine chapter in Mackintosh on "The Perfect Manhood of Christ," *ibid.*, bk. iii, chap. vi. "The holiness of Jesus was no automatic necessity of being. It was possessed only by being perpetually won anew, in a dependence of self-committal which had indeed no relation to a consciousness of sin, as with us, but which rested none the less on the felt need of an uninterrupted derivation of life and power from the Father" (p. 402).

CHAPTER XXIII

“THERE IS ONE MEDIATOR”

But if Christ's mediatorial office in the physical creation was the starting-point of the apostle's teaching [in Colossians], his mediatorial office in the spiritual creation is its principal theme. The cosmogonies of the false teachers [at Colossæ] were framed not so much in the interests of philosophy as in the interests of religion; and the apostle replies to them in the same spirit and with the same motive. If the function of Christ is unique in the universe, so is it also in the church. He is the sole and absolute link between God and humanity. Nothing short of his personality would suffice as a medium of reconciliation between the two. Nothing short of his life and work in the flesh, as consummated in his passion, would serve as an assurance of God's love and pardon. His cross is the atonement of mankind with God. He is the Head with whom all the living members of the body are in direct and immediate communication, who suggests their manifold activities to each, who directs their several functions in subordination to the healthy working of the whole, from whom they individually receive their inspiration and their strength. And being all this, he cannot consent to share his prerogative with others. He absorbs in himself the whole function of mediation. . . . The language of the New Testament writers is beset with difficulties, so long as we conceive of our Lord only in connection with the gospel revelation; but when with the apostles we realize in him the same Divine Word who is and ever has been the light of the whole world, . . . then all these difficulties fall away. . . . The exclusive claims advanced in Christ's name have their full and perfect justification in the doctrine of the Eternal Word.—LIGHTFOOT, *Commentary on Colossians and Philemon*, New Edition, 1879. Pp. 117 and 118.

CHAPTER XXIII

"THERE IS ONE MEDIATOR"

THE interpretation just offered of the circumstances attending the birth of our Lord, and the claim that although his holiness had a truly divine quality it was none the less a truly human achievement, must be borne in mind as we seek now to understand what has been meant by Christian thought when it has applied to him the terms "uniqueness" and "universality."

I. UNIQUENESS.¹ Writ large on every page of the New Testament is the belief that Jesus Christ is associated with God's gracious purpose to redeem mankind. This need not be taken as discounting the significance of other great religious leaders. That is an intolerably narrow view which cannot see a real divine activity in all those outstanding personalities through whom faith has been born for their followers. Their imperfections and failures are obvious to us because we judge them by the standard of Jesus Christ. But because God was not revealed wholly in, say, Moses or Zarathushtra or Gautama, it does not follow that he was not revealed at all. Because he had not secured in them the conditions to a complete self-manifestation, it does not follow that he did not use them to the measure of their capacity. It is a strange delusion to suppose that we cannot keep Jesus Christ in his rightful place except by ousting others from theirs. If God had no interest in human redemption until the birth of Jesus Christ, it will be difficult to find reasons for supposing that his interest began even then. To confine God's love to Christians would be to question if he loved men at all. "I took them on my arms; but they knew not that I healed them. I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love" (Hos. 11. 3, 4). "And Jehovah said, Thou hast had regard for the gourd,

for which thou hast not labored, neither madest it grow; which came up in a night, and perished in a night: and should not I have regard for Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand; and also much cattle?" (Jonah 4. 10, 11). The spirit of Jonah is not yet dead and the lesson God taught him we still have need to learn.

We do not, then, confine God's interest, or suppose that he arbitrarily limited his redeeming activity elsewhere, when we accept the New Testament teaching that Jesus Christ was associated with God's purpose to redeem mankind in a way such as no other ever has been. In no other way is it possible for us to understand him. We believe that he is the world's hope, the world's true Redeemer, because he represents in a unique way God's purpose of love and grace.

Historically, of course, the title "The Christ" means "The Anointed One," and it has the same root significance as the Hebrew word "The Messiah." But if we bear in mind the slow steps whereby Jesus came to his Messianic consciousness, we are met by the question whether or not we are justified in recognizing a distinction between that aspect of him whereby some knew him as "Jesus," and that other aspect of him whereby some knew him as "The Christ." This is not to imply that there were two persons, nor is it to forget that the name "Jesus" rests back on the older form "Joshua," and means "one who saves." Hence, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for it is he that shall save his people from their sins" (Matt. 1. 21; but cf. Luke 1. 31). None the less, there is no proper sense in which the Babe who lay in the arms of Mary, and to whom was given the name of Jesus, was *at that same time* also "The Christ." He was not then revealing God to men; he was not consciously suffering for men; he was not able to die for men. Where the power to do this was wanting, "The Christ" was not

yet present. The process was now begun through which *eventually* God would be manifest in the flesh, but we must not confuse the final result with the initial conditions. In him there came to an absolute expression under the conditions of a human life that eternal and integral reality in the Godhead which in the fourth Gospel is called "The Logos." But we do not find that expression at Bethlehem: we find it at Calvary. But for Bethlehem there had been no Calvary—that we can believe to be true. Yet Calvary is infinitely more than Bethlehem, as the tree is more than the seedling or the man more than the child. The Son of God was not the little Lad who played in the streets of Nazareth,² but the despised and rejected Man of Sorrows, who bowed his head before the furious onslaught of the world's sin because he saw that only as sin slew him could it break its own power by bringing to light the omnipotence of Holy Love. But until that was brought to light, God was not fully manifest, and the possibility of human redemption was not for all time secured. It is this fact which forces the distinction suggested above between Jesus in that aspect of him according to which he is Son of Mary, and which is basic to the other, and that aspect of him according to which he is the Word of the Father, the Bearer of Redemption, the Lamb of God, the Only-begotten Son full of Grace and Truth. He does not cease to be Jesus the Son of Mary because he has become "The Christ of God"—for he is "everlastingly one of us." But he certainly had to be born of a human mother before he could become to us as our Lord and Saviour. All of which means that the theory that incarnation necessarily involves an instantaneous and complete transfer by conception of a separate divine self-consciousness to human conditions is wholly indefensible. It has no support in a sound scriptural exegesis; it is psychologically inconceivable; it lays an impossible burden on philosophy; and it endangers the very foundations of the Christian faith by introducing into them what to clear

thought appears as an essential irrationality. What we will cling to at all costs is the historic Christian conviction that in Jesus Christ there took place a sacrificial divine invasion of the world for the express purpose of accomplishing human redemption. But we are modern men, meaning not that we claim any superiority over our predecessors, but simply that we live in the twentieth century and not in the thirteenth or the fifth. We claim the right to do for ourselves what our predecessors did for themselves, namely, sought by the use of familiar categories to render intelligible to their thought this great faith that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself.³ As modern men we must use modern categories, especially those categories which have grown out of what we must believe is a deeper study and a truer understanding of the processes of personality. Psychology to-day is simply unable to attach any meaning to the phrase, "an instantaneous and complete transfer of self-consciousness." To seek to render a truth intelligible by the use of the unintelligible accomplishes nothing. It is certain that Christian thought will not surrender the idea of a divine incarnation in Jesus Christ. But it is not a rash prediction, bearing in mind the domination of the concept of development in every sphere where "life" is the subject of study, to say that for at least some time to come men will construe the incarnation according to the category of *progress*. "The Word *became* flesh," and the Greek word rendered "became" (*γίνωμαι*) means "to come to be," and therefore indicates not a sudden act but a gradual process.

Certain ancient theories supposed that in Christ the human nature was incomplete, and that what was lacking was supplied by the divine element.⁴ This does not convince us. The divine invasion of the world can be made only through personality, but personality is not something manufactured by the assembling of separate parts: it is a living organic whole. Personality is not *made*: it *grows*. If one may be allowed the expression, God's problem in incarnation was **the**

problem of the personal instrument. "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son," and the fullness of the time was when the necessary conditions had been obtained. Even the incarnation, act of grace though it were and the supreme expression of God's personal freedom in the conduct of his own activity and the realization of his own purposes, was nevertheless according to law—his law. The Eternal would come into time through a human life: he could come in no other way. But that could only be as there was a life which made possible the divine purpose. Surely what Luke would have us see, and what John seems plainly to imply, is that the securing of such a life involved the unusual activity of the divine. This is only another way of saying that it involved the supernatural. One does not deny the supernatural because one makes all of God's action, even in its uttermost reach of grace for sinful man, essentially a law-abiding action. One only implies that the supernatural, like the natural, is rational, because God is a God of order. If God could save his order only by destroying it, we should have to question his original planning. Even when he was seeking a special instrument for a special purpose, he still chose to get it only through appropriate conditions—conditions that would lift into yet greater clarity the profound rationality of all his processes. It is perfectly permissible for us to say that God "chose" Mary, but he chose her because she was already fit to be chosen, and because she was so wholly responsive to the rich tutelage of the Holy Spirit throughout those waiting months. So also is it permissible for us to say that he "chose" Jesus, provided that we add that of all men who ever lived he only met the conditions of the choice, and he met them because God willed that he should and because he himself so perfectly responded to that will. Such a view of the matter retains the presence of the supernatural and the unique and at the same time accords with our deep-seated sense of order. It frankly recognizes special

divine action in a special situation for a special purpose, and it believes that the object having been attained, the special action will never be repeated. *What God has done once, and only once, is in the true sense unique, and a unique divine action constitutes a genuine supernatural.* He did that unique thing solely because of his purpose of grace for men. So the New Testament teaches; so the church has always believed; and so we believe to-day.

God, defined as the uncreated but creative Spirit of Perfect Holiness and Perfect Love, would reveal that love and holiness to men.⁵ We have already set forth the reasons why such a revelation was necessary from the divine side and why it was necessary from the human side. We have now claimed that the only way in which such a revelation could be made was through a human personality. It is the Christian belief that in Jesus Christ the necessity is met and the revelation made. In him, God broke into the stream of humanity as he had never done before and as he never needs to do again. A life which we can only believe had been especially prepared for that purpose—baffled though we may be to understand all its process—became a life of which God could say, "This is I." Not that *the whole of God* was there, but, rather, that constituent element of his Being which we can only designate, as it is thus manifest, the Eternal Christ, the Eternal Logos, the Eternal Son. There was accomplished such an intimacy of personal relationship between God and the man Jesus that from it there emerged an absolute revelation of the innermost meaning of God, of his innermost nature, and of his real purpose in the world. God had finally succeeded in "getting himself through." The truest divine achievement is always made through human life, and the life that is most like God is the life in which God most truly is. He had waited long for the appearing of the conditions, produced not by arbitrary and extraneous means but by inward and moral and, therefore, law-abiding means, whereby himself and a

human life could become a moral identity. Absolute God-consciousness and absolute man-consciousness found a common basis and had a common center of reference. God thought and felt as the Man, and the Man thought and felt as God. The Divine saw itself from the standpoint of the human, and the human saw itself from the standpoint of the Divine. There was an absolute involution of the process of holiness and love as that must go on in the Creator with the process of holiness and love as that must go on in the created. *The quality was identical although the process was different.* It is through this absolute divineness of moral quality in conjunction with this absolute humanness of the realizing conditions that we are to understand the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, his significance for our redemption, and the New Testament claim, maintained throughout Christian history, of his Sonship to God or his essential deity. There will never be another like him, because there is no need. The need for him was one of the conditions to his appearing, and the cessation of the need is a bar on duplication. The world that cannot be saved through Jesus Christ cannot be saved at all. If a man cannot see God in Christ, he will see him nowhere else. No one could possibly indulge in speculation on the possibility of "another Christ" who accepts the interpretation of him now being offered. The world does not need another Christ: rather does it need to submit itself to the one it already has. We say of Jesus of Nazareth, who after a brief career died on the cross at the hands of wicked men, that in respect to the world's redemption he is sole Saviour, sole High Priest, sole Sacrifice, sole Mediator, as solitary as the mysterious Melchisedec. Not by making ourselves to be all that he was are we saved: even to suppose that that were possible would be presumption indeed. But we are saved by faith—which is to say that we are saved according to the degree of our assent of heart and mind and will to that whole body of truth and reality of which "Jesus the Christ," in his ex-

perience, in his spirit, in his achievement, is the all-sufficient and everlasting attestation and guarantee.

2. UNIVERSALITY.⁶ Man is made in the image of God. In Jesus Christ we meet both God and man. He is the supreme evidence to the essential kinship of the human and the Divine. That same creative power and necessity which belong to God, and because of which there can be men, must be allowed to be present and operative, although in the superlative degree, in the production of the Ideal Man. The One Mediator must participate in the nature of those between whom he mediates—men and God. The marks of personality must be the same wherever it is found: the differences will be in the range of powers and in the quality and richness of the content. Any creative act is to a degree an incarnation. What God makes he thereby indwells: He may not separate himself from the work of his own hands. The degree of his manifestation is the degree in which what he makes is like unto himself. When God is confronted by an "Other" in which he recognizes his own absolute self, and when that "Other" appears under the form of a Man, and therefore as a part of God's own creation, then we have Immanuel—"God-with-us."

We believe that Jesus Christ is that "Other." In him God becomes objective to himself, so to speak, on the field of time and history. But such an objectivity is possible only as there is a corresponding subjectivity, and such a subjectivity could exist, and, as a matter of fact, did exist, apart from the objectivity. The very idea of revelation means that *before* the revelation God was all that he was seen to be *in* the revelation. Incarnation was not the introduction of a new element into the being of God, but the perfect expression of what was eternally there. The early stages of the creative process had reference to it, for it alone made them possible. The appearance of human personality had a much more intimate reference to it, and revealed more of that divine fact in which it was grounded. But it was when

Jesus Christ finished his work that the whole creation, which had been groaning and travailing in pain together until now, was—if the expression may be permitted—finally delivered of that Spirit which had been and still is and forever shall be the controlling and formative power within it. Then only did the world come to itself. Then only did life show all that it held. Then only did creation blossom—and the blossom hangs imperishable on its bough, "a Golden Bough" in very truth. For if Jesus Christ was truly Man, and if he is to be understood through human life and human life through him, then somewhere both have a common basis. If any life bespeaks the divine creativity, then the One True Life bespeaks it also, only more fully. If all creation involves a degree of incarnation, then the fact of creation of any sort argues the possibility of an absolute incarnation; and if an absolute incarnation be actually attained, its ultimate source will be that whence springs also the life of the most untutored savage or of the wisest sage. All that God does rests back upon a prior possibility in himself. He does this or that because, even before it is done, he is *able* to do it. The highest range of his self-expression is in human personality, and his highest self-expression in human personality is in Jesus Christ. On the one hand is human life, and on the other hand is the Eternal God whence it proceeds. Between them stands the One Mediator, who fulfills that office because he embodies at once the essential marks of the human and the essential marks of the Divine, and in his attainment of the perfectness of the one he at the same time manifests the perfectness of the other.

Man, then, is a clue to the meaning of God, but he does not fulfill the promise of his own nature. There are in him many plain indications of what God is *like*, but as to what God *is*—there he falls short. Man is the evidence to a divine reality, but the very law of his life prevents the complete manifestation of its full range and meaning. God must do something within human life which human life, by the very

idea of it, at once provides for and yet is not able of itself to accomplish. That were a miracle indeed, yet no "law" is either violated or suspended or cast aside. It would be God utilizing a possibility which had always existed, and which he would utilize the moment it was consonant with his whole method and plan and purpose to do so. In utilizing that possibility at its fullest range he becomes known to men for what he really is. The being of any life has its basis in a fact of the divine nature, and to a degree reveals that fact. The being of Jesus Christ has a like basis—it is impossible to escape that conclusion on any adequate theistic theory—but it is related to that basis in such a way as that the full meaning of it is seen in him alone. The basis of each is what in the fourth Gospel is called the Logos. The Divine Life is an eternal procession. It goes forth from itself as thought goes forth in a word. Thought unuttered is thought not yet complete. God unuttered is less than God uttered, wherefore God eternally self-uttering is the only true and perfect God. But between that which eternally proceeds from God and that whence it proceeds there is a difference not of essence but only of relation. The eternal Originator and the eternal Originated are equally necessary in the idea of the Perfect Being. They are to each other as the spoken word to the animating conception. The one is not the other, yet each needs the other, and each is equally necessary to the whole. God as eternal Originator differs from God as eternal Originated, yet God is neither the one nor the other but both. As Originator, he is Father; as Originated, he is Son or Logos. It will follow that all other origination in temporal creation will have its ground in that eternal Originated, even as the eternal Originated has its ground in the necessities of the eternal Originator.⁷

If we can justify this speculation that every human life is grounded in that same divine reality which got itself so fully and finally expressed in Jesus Christ, then we shall have justified the attitude of faith in regarding him as the

Universal Man. It is easy at this point, of course, to wander off into vague abstraction, and to use words without meaning. At the most we cannot avoid a touch of mysticism—but then, why should we try to avoid it? What Paul and John found to be inevitable may safely be supposed to belong to the facts. The apostolic interpretation of Jesus Christ leads into the region of the mystical, the region, that is, where our categories are true only so long as we do not assign to them a rigid, unimaginative, scientific exactness. The conception of Christ as the Universal Man, as the ideal self of every individual man, may be a mystical conception, and open to all the objections that go with that. It is nevertheless a conception that is capable of a sound religious and philosophical defense. The principle of racial solidarity may be easily misunderstood or abused, but the principle itself is undeniable, and here we have laid bare its ultimate basis. Every individual life possesses both a common feature and a unique feature. Its common feature is in the fact that it has its ground in one and the same aspect of Deity. Every life springs from a common root, and so far as it does that it possesses a common nature and the power of a common experience. But every life has a unique feature in the sense that it is a separate center of personal experience. Two persons may have a like experience, but they may not have an identical experience. An experience of the same object by two different persons means necessarily two different experiences. As between all classes and conditions of men there is at the same time likeness and difference. The likeness is what makes it possible for us to speak of "man." The difference is what makes it possible for us to speak of "men," meaning the individual persons, each with his own secret, each with one side of his life open to God alone:

"The hold that falls not when the town is got,
The heart's heart, whose immured plot
Hath keys yourself keep not!

"Its ports you cannot burst—you are withstood—
For him that to your listening blood
Sends precepts as he would.

"Its gates are deaf to Love, high summoner;
Yea, Love's great warrant runs not there:
You are your prisoner.

"Yourself are with yourself the sole consortress
In that unleaguerable fortress;
It knows you not for portress.

"Its keys are at the cincture hung of God;
Its gates are trepidant to his nod;
By him its floors are trod.

"And if his feet shall rock those floors in wrath,
Or blest aspersion sleek his path,
Is only choice it hath.

"Yea, in that ultimate heart's occult abode
To lie as in an oubliette of God;
Or in a bower untrod,

"Built by a secret Lover for his Spouse:—
Sole choice is this your life allows. . . ."⁸

It is this commonness and difference which is the source of that distinctively human trait whereby one man may act for another, or may think himself into another's place and experience. All vicarious suffering, and all other vicarious action, is possible because of this fundamental constitution of man. Nevertheless, of no particular man can it be said that he is at the same time universal. Every man expresses the same common divine fact, but no man expresses it wholly. What is now being claimed is that Jesus Christ, because he represents the expression under human terms of that total divine fact which other men express only in part, possesses a universal character. It is because of this uni-

versal character that he could act in a universal capacity and accomplish that which had universal significance.

More particularly, what we have here is the philosophical basis of that great act of faith which makes the full meaning of our Lord and his work practically available. For every man may know himself to be "in Christ." So also may he say with Paul, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." It is true that we may on occasion ascribe a certain representative character to any man, and feel that what he was or did is to a degree ours. But respecting our relation to Jesus Christ, this possibility takes on a character wholly unique. Of no other person can every man feel that he is at once "mine" and "yours," that he does not cease to be "mine" because he is "yours," or cease to be "yours" because he is "mine," that, indeed, it is only because he is "mine" that he can be "yours," only because he is "yours" that he can be "mine." To the "eyes of faith," his achievement was our achievement, his suffering was our suffering, his victory was our victory, his complete acceptance with God was our acceptance with God. A great deal that was philosophically and psychologically and ethically impossible has been said about the idea of substitution as applied to our Lord and his work, and some criticism of that has been offered in these pages. But in our reaction from a false conception we need to be very careful lest we go to the opposite extreme. If there be not a profound truth in the idea of substitution—a truth which Paul is struggling to express in the Epistle to the Romans—then are we indeed without hope in the world.⁹ Jesus Christ is set forth in the New Testament as possessing a universal and representative character. He possesses that character because that divine fact which is to some extent revealed by all human life is in him laid bare to its utmost range. There therefore exists between Jesus Christ, thus conceived, and every other man what theologians have been wont to call "an original relation."¹⁰ There can be finite personality

only because God is as he is, and all that God is from this point of view became objective in the experience of our Lord. In the Son of his love God saw also himself. *He saw there what he himself would choose to be and to do in the same circumstances.* Such patience as is here is God's own patience; such wisdom is his wisdom; such fortitude is his fortitude; such love is his love; such holiness is his holiness. Where God sees himself, where God declares himself to be wholly present and active, where God makes so utter an indorsement that he literally stakes his very being and purpose on the outcome, there we also see God—else are we blind indeed. The divine that is partial in every man is complete in the One Man, who is therefore himself approved divine, and whose achievement thereupon takes on a universal character. Deity is there, and humanity is there, and who shall say which is which?¹¹ What unholy hands are these which seek to find seams in a seamless robe! What passion for microscopic unimaginative investigation is that which would take what was so manifestly a living organic whole, and insist on finding divisions where all was unity, and on introducing confusion where confusion never was! "Here the man speaks; there God speaks. Here the man acts; there God acts. This part is human; that part is divine." Who, confronted with the total fact of our Lord, dare say that! How blind is he to the truth who seeks to reduce any life, much less a Life such as this, to a bloodless dance of logical categories! To take a hypothetical "substance," and attach to it so many divine "attributes" and so many human, and to designate this manufactured article "God manifest in the flesh," would be blasphemous if it were not so sincerely proposed. We may not be able to reach a theory wholly true, but we can at least refuse a theory that is obviously false. And if, having refused the false, we continue in our patient search for the true, what we shall search for will be such an understanding of Jesus Christ as makes intelligible to us the fact that concerning him every

man may say, whatsoever his time or place or nation, "I am his, and he is mine, for ever!"

NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII

(1) The interest in Drown's chapter on "The Uniqueness of Christ," in *The Creative Christ*, is chiefly in the *religious* uniqueness of our Lord. The present discussion, while properly keeping this in the foremost place, is an attempt to find also the metaphysical basis. Cf. Beyschlag's discussion of "Jesus the Son of God" in the Johannine writings, *New Testament Theology*, vol. ii, bk. v, pt. iii, chap. ii, § 3. The Greek *μονογενής*, rendered usually "only-begotten" (John i. 14; 3. 16), means strictly "the only one of the kind," hence "unique" in the proper sense. Beyschlag says: "This uniqueness is to John a moral one, lying in Christ's perfect sinlessness" (*ibid.*, p. 416).

(2) Kenoticism, of course, must and does maintain the reverse. Curtis, *Christian Faith*, p. 246, says: "That babe was as truly God as when he was absolute in the glory of God the Father."

(3) The case is stated convincingly by King, *Reconstruction in Theology*, chaps. i and ii; Drown, *ibid.*, chap. i; and Gordon, *The Christ of To-day*, chap. i.

(4) Apollinaris first brought the theory into prominence. Other theories were thereupon suggested, which gave rise to the various controversies known as Nestorian, Eutychian, Monophysite, Monothelite, etc. See Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, bk. ii, chap. v; Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, pp. 49ff; Orr, *Progress of Dogma*, lect. vi; Gore, *Belief in Christ*, chap. vii.

(5) It is precisely at the point of definitions such as this that we find the modern mind departing from the traditional Christologies. In the creed-making period, the dominant categories in theistic discussion were Hellenistic, e. g., "hypostasis" (substance), "ousia" (being), "physis" (nature). This was a distinct departure from the Hebrew prophets' way of thinking about God, namely, as Ethical Personality, and from the early Christian way, namely, as the Heavenly Father.

Modern theism, with its tendency to conceive God as the Creative Good Will, will prove a strong ally of Christology in the effort to escape the domination of outworn categories. See Drown, *ibid.*, chap. ii, on "Divine and Human," and cf. Beckwith, *The Idea of God*, chap. xiii, on "The Living God."

(6) Cf. Mackintosh, *ibid.*, pp. 387-394; Drown, *ibid.*, pp. 114-117; and, for Paul's teaching on Christ as the Second Adam, Beyschlag, *ibid.*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. iii, § 7. It need hardly be said that "universal" as applied to Christ in the text does not mean the logical universal.

(7) This, of course, is simply an attempt to explicate the Logos-doctrine of the fourth Gospel. Cf. Beyschlag, *ibid.*, vol. ii, bk. v, chap. iii, § 4; Stevens, *Theology of New Testament*, pt. vii, chap. iii. On the history of the Logos-idea, see Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Thinkers*, vol. ii (use in Philo); Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*; article by Dean Inge, in vol. viii of Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. On the later development of the idea in Christian theology, see, besides the larger histories of doctrine, Sanday, *ibid.*, pp. 14-21; Orr, *ibid.*, pp. 78ff.; Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, chapter on "The Greek Theology." For a good monograph on Origen, who used the idea extensively, see Fairweather, *Origen and Greek Patristic Theology*.

(8) Francis Thompson, *The Fallen Yew*.

(9) Stevens' exegesis of Paul's teaching on the Death of Christ is unusually clear and sympathetic. *Ibid.*, pt. iv, chaps. vii and viii. Beyschlag treats the subject with his accustomed brilliance and exhaustiveness, but he strongly opposes the traditional interpretation. *Ibid.*, vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. v.

(10) Dale, *Atonement*, lect. x; Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, chap. vii; Walker, *Christ the Creative Ideal*, chap. v.

(11) "There are not two existences, either of or within the incarnate, side by side with one another. If it is all divine, it is all human too. We are to study the divine in and through the human. By looking for the divine side by side with the human, instead of discerning the divine within the human, we miss the significance of them both." Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 97.

CHAPTER XXIV
THE SON OF GOD

Here, then [in the Apocalypse], we have essentially the same idea of preexistence as we have in Paul and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the application of the idea of the eternal self-revelation of God to the person of the Messiah. But there as here we have a gap in thought; by personifying an idea we may hide from ourselves the fact that, in recognizing that idea in the person of Jesus, a historical person is coordinated with something which—however realistically conceived—is not a person, but an idea. That this Logos-Christology should be found in the writer of the Apocalypse can no longer surprise us after the precedent of Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews; it only shows how strong the tendency was in the apostolic age to conceive the mystery of Christ's person as far greater than the Jewish idea of Messiah, and so to place him in an essential relation to humanity, to the universe, and to God. Manifestly, we have this formula before us here, not as one newly found or in process of development, but as one that was current and familiar to the readers. . . . We must not ask how it agrees with the account of the twelfth chapter, in which Christ is the Child of the Theocracy, born in the fullness of time. Formally it agrees as little, and substantially as much, as Paul's one phrase, "born of a woman," agrees with the other, "the first-born of every creature." The heavenly reality, in which Christ is *ὁ πρῶτος* and *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως*, is different from the earthly and historical; and just as in our book, the heavenly Jerusalem comes down from heaven to earth, and yet at bottom is the realization of the ideal of God's church accomplished on earth, so also is it with the apocalyptic Christ.—BEYSCHLAG, *New Testament Theology* (Eng. trans.), Vol. II, pp. 382, 383.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE SON OF GOD

Is it possible for us, following the tenor of our previous discussion, to render intelligible to ourselves the idea of our Lord's *timelessness*? We are met at the outset, of course, by a difficulty which belongs to the very nature of our mind—the difficulty, namely, of conceiving anything save under a temporal point of view. It is one of the curious twists in speculation, that while men have believed that God is eternal in the sense that he is in himself independent of the time-process, when they have sought to describe his eternity they have generally done so under the terms of that very time they have sought to escape. That is, they have equated “eternal” with “timeless,” and then have defined timelessness as time that never began and that will never end. When the effort is made to conceive this unending succession of moments, the imagination stumbles, for the reason that it is a necessity of our mind to think of any series as closed—while yet this series of moments which by the hypothesis runs parallel with the being of God is supposed to be open at both ends. This is not the place to discuss this most difficult of all metaphysical problems. But it would greatly help toward clarity if we would bear in mind two facts: one, that when we regard the eternal or the timeless as a succession of moments to which is neither beginning nor ending, we are indulging in picture-thinking, which is legitimate and helpful enough unless we harden it down into ontological fact; the other, that the most helpful understanding of the matter, at least for the purposes of religious thought, comes to us out of the Johannine theology, which treats “eternal” as a qualitative rather than as a quantitative

conception.¹ Quality of being is infinitely more important than mere time-duration. The question is less, How long? than What? When we meet that quality of being whose worth we judge to be absolute because we can neither desire nor think of anything higher, then we meet a quality of being concerning which we can say, "This is why all else is; this is its enduring ground and reason; this is before it and in it all things consist." Wherever it be that we find that of which all this may be truly said, we stand there in the presence of the Eternal. The true Eternal is that from which nothing can be taken and to which nothing can be added. The temporal "becomes"; the Eternal "is." The temporal changes—that is why it is temporal; the Eternal changes not—that is why it is eternal. The Eternal is therefore that according to which the pattern and the purpose of the temporal proceed. Man has desired nothing higher than to see the Eternal break through into time. To that point of emergence he will go with his gifts of gold, and frankincense, and myrrh, and he will worship there his God. The present discussion is an attempt to reach a helpful understanding of the deity of the Lord Jesus Christ by means of a qualitative interpretation of that timelessness which faith has never failed to discern in him.

A good deal of traditional Christology has become unsatisfactory to thinking men just because it builds on the unphilosophical supposition that God's relation to the time-process is identical with our own. There are two figures under which we may seek to represent the relation of time and eternity. One is a straight line which has neither beginning nor ending, and along a portion of which the facts of the time-order are thought of as being strung in succession. The other is a circle within which the total process and, therefore, the total facts are thought of as being included. We, being involved in the order, and under necessity to have and to conceive our experience as successive, must think of ourselves as occupying a point along the line

or within the circle. But it is a piece of sheer anthropomorphism when we take the necessary conditions of our own experience and apply them to the divine experience. God is not confined, as we are, to a given point on the line, or to a given point in the circle: the very contrast of his infiniteness and our finiteness precludes that. If he were so confined, that principle of continuity which gives us a genuine time-order in place of a congeries of isolated time-facts would be unaccounted for. In other words, the very fact of succession requires not merely a perceiving mind whose perception, being necessarily synthetic, establishes succession, but a God who is himself not involved in the succession in the same sense that we are. But if we cannot think of God as occupying a given point on the line, neither can we think of him as occupying simultaneously every point of that line. If we try to do that, we are guilty of using and rejecting the same principle at the same time; that is to say, we try to use succession and we try to dispense with it. If we are to retain the figure of the straight line at all, we must be content with saying merely that God himself establishes it. The figure is confusing, however, and it is better to fall back on that of the circle and to think of God not as pretemporal and posttemporal but as embracing *or providing for* the total content of the circle within the content of his own experience.² But then, just because he embraces it he transcends it. He is not to be identified with the content, for that is in substance pantheism, but the content is to be thought of as having its abiding ground in him. *It* could not be but for *him*, but he is not it, and he is greater than it. Most advocates of the traditional Christology would probably agree to this, but they quite ignore it in their method of presenting the Christian facts, or at least in their method of relating those facts to God. They, in effect, adopt the old device of treating the philosophically false as religiously true. No one now wants to identify philosophy and religion: that would be fatal for

each. No one now questions that religion must deal with ultimate facts in its own peculiar way, namely, by emphasizing their "feeling-value," and by giving them pictorial and symbolic representation.³ But when clear thinking is the desideratum—and what is a Christology but "a particularly stubborn attempt to think clearly" about Jesus Christ?—a protest must be entered against regarding as exact philosophical statement language that is useful and perhaps inevitable for the purposes of religious faith.

Take, for example, the traditional supposition that one of the Divine Persons is literally lifted out of the Divine Society and rendered practically a nonentity, so that something that was never before true of God in the essential structure of his being is true now. This period of absence from the Godhead is supposed to have been at one time a divine *anticipation* just as it is now a divine *memory*. But, surely, we are adopting a very definitely human point of view when we speak of God either as anticipating or as remembering a state of his own being. When the sacrifice of incarnation is represented as a temporary experience in the life of God, the idea, while it is religiously defensible, must also be philosophically construed. To identify the representation of the fact for the purposes of religion with the philosophy of the fact, is, after all, not to give the fact a philosophical construction. If God is eternal in the sense that in him the time-order finds its cause and its ground, then there can be for him no absolute beginnings and no absolute endings.⁴ In other words, there could be no specific moment when a divine sacrifice began, and another specific moment, later in time, when that same divine sacrifice ended. Let it be said again that we may properly state the fact in that way when, for the purposes of religious faith, we are thinking of God as the heavenly Father seeking through great self-cost the well-being of his children. But let this also be said: that when we seek to transcend the point of view of the temporal and envisage, haltingly enough

though it may be, the eternal, we learn that what is manifested in Jesus Christ is a reality that is coextensive with the very being of God. We may well believe that the reality was *revealed* within the limits of an earthly career. What we can never believe is that an earthly career, be it never so exalted, could mark at once the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of that reality. What is eternally true of God may be expressed in time: this, indeed, is the very significance of creation. But in the nature of the case an eternal reality cannot be confined to a temporal expression nor can it be exhausted by it. God, manifesting himself as to his essential nature in Jesus Christ, says to men: "Behold me: this is what I am." But what he manifests himself to be, he is eternally. The manifestation rests back upon the prior fact, so that the fact becomes the explanation of the manifestation. It is impossible that the manifestation should create the fact. Which is to say that what God appeared to be in Christ, self-giving and self-sacrificing, he always was and always will be. Incarnation was the supreme exhibition of divine self-giving, but divine self-giving neither began nor ended with incarnation. It is just the completeness of his self-giving that makes God to be God, and it is just the completeness of Christ's self-giving that makes him the perfect revelation of God. When our Lord, in utter fidelity of his vocation, went to the cross, and when God *as utterly indorsed the cross by abandoning him to it*, the great fact came to light that the cross was symbolic not only of the condition of human blessedness but of the condition of divine blessedness as well. Even God must surrender himself in order to realize himself. But he did not do it just once. How God is at one time he is always. Christ is the supreme evidence that God is fundamentally sacrificial. What is fundamental in the Godhead cannot be confined to a term of years or to a specific event. The event may completely exhibit it—we believe that it did—but it can never exhaust it.

In the noise and confusion of bitter controversy, this great truth for which we are feeling has been again and again endangered. Christian piety, however, has always sufficed to save the truth, often enough in spite of the arid metaphysics which was offered in its support—and even, so the suspicion goes, offered as a substitute. There is a sound Christian instinct for the vital needs of faith, and that instinct may be trusted to be true in the future as it has been in the past. So when the Arians said, "There was a time when the Son was not," and the Athanasians replied, "The Son is coeternal and consubstantial with the Father, begotten, not made," there was in each case a Christian feeling that we can appreciate. Arius would protect the unity and the integrity of the Godhead—and why should he not? Athanasius would preserve the full divine quality of that which had come to men in Christ. Where Athanasius won his great victory was in the fact that he appeared by means of his metaphysics to save both the unity of the Godhead and the divine quality of the Christian redemption. Fortunately, we do not have to retain his metaphysics as a condition to retaining the truth which at that time rendered such metaphysics necessary and, indeed, inevitable. That God is truly One, and that Jesus Christ is truly divine—these are our facts; and if necessary, we will "take the facts and let the theory go."

We shall never come to a helpful understanding of our Lord's timelessness if we seek first of all to visualize him as he was in the days of his flesh, and then to take him in imagination and set him down at any point we choose along the time-succession.⁵ Just so long as we falsely conceive eternity as the time-process infinitely extended by the simple device of omitting the beginning and the end, we shall be caught in a trap of our own making when we try to fit Jesus of Nazareth into our clumsy schematism. In the very nature of the case, the eternal cannot be construed save in the present tense: it neither "has been" nor "shall

be," but simply "is." Remembering that, remembering also the essentially Platonic cast of the fourth Gospel, we shall glimpse something of the profound truth in the cryptic answer: "Before Abraham was born, I am." It is every way credible that Jesus said that, or words similar to it, and that he meant what he said. What is not credible is that he meant what his interrogators thought he meant, and which in our dull unimaginativeness we have been satisfied ourselves to suppose that he meant. Where he was thinking of the absolute worth of what he was conveying to men, and therefore of the absolute significance of himself as its vehicle, the bystanders thought he was affirming a mere temporal priority—and we have been guilty of taking our clue from them rather than from him. *We have cast the icy chill of our logic over the suggestive symbols and the mystical utterances of the fourth Gospel, until we have frozen the very life out of them, and have transformed the most beautiful book in the world into a table of logarithms—a convenient device for help in the solution of our metaphysical puzzles.* That there were moments when all else dropped away from our Lord except the consciousness of what he meant for the redemption of the world—this is every way credible. That at such moments he was overwhelmed with the thought that he it was for whom the ages had been waiting and the worlds had been born—this also is credible. That at such moments he spoke of himself from the standpoint of this his absolute significance, from the standpoint, indeed, of the eternal God with whom he knew himself to be so wholly one—this also is credible. What is not credible is that he was asking men to suppose that he, born of a human mother, had a detailed recollection of events and experiences that took place before he was thus born. Let us say it frankly—that to affirm that that consciousness which gradually became self-aware under the fostering care of a pious village-home was *at the same time* the consciousness of a being who of his own right, native or

bestowed, was knowingly coexistent with eternity taken in the crude sense of time endlessly extended backward and forward—to affirm this is to go far beyond the warrant of any facts, and to lay on the faith of many Christian men a burden they are increasingly unwilling to bear. The timelessness of Jesus Christ is the timelessness of all that which is revealed in him, and because the revelation was made *in himself*, in what he was, in the actual living Personality, the timelessness of the revelation belongs equally to the Revealer. He is eternal, because there never was a time in the past and there never will be a time in the future when God was or will be any other than as he appeared in him. The timelessness of Jesus Christ is the timelessness of the Underived, whose truth and reality are not contingent but absolute, dependent not on something else but on itself alone. In him we meet that which is the contemporary of every age and of every man. It was true when the first man lifted his face to the skies and responded to their suggestion of infinite mystery, and it will be no less true when those same skies shall wither as a parched scroll. “God in Christ” is not an evolution from something less than itself. Instead, it is the fundamental fact. It is the ultimate reality whence all else is derived, which, therefore, makes all else possible, and which all else, therefore, does but illustrate, explicate, and confirm. “There never was a time when he was not.” True. “There never will be a time when he will not be.” True. But why is it true? Not because he is himself infinitely extended, occupying the whole of time at every moment of time: to say that means nothing at all. But it is true because in the farthest ranges of our thought we can reach no place or time wherein what we know to be so as we stand in his presence, ceases to be so. We unhood our imagination and with swift strokes it wings its way into the blue. League after league the horizon goes back, but we know that beyond that thin line where earth and sky seem to meet there are still more leagues,

and that beyond those leagues "there is still more sea." And then the question as the vision strains itself toward the dark backward and abysm of time: "Was he there?" And a like question, as it peers into the infinite beyond: "Will he be there?" And then the unerring intuition of the soul that has understood: "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever!" The Timeless Christ!—timeless because he is the inevitable contemporary of the human soul, every man's ideal "Other," who is none the less there that he is so often not recognized, in whom alone the man attains completeness and finds the life that is life indeed.⁶

With this understanding of the matter, therefore, we reaffirm the Christian faith that Jesus Christ is the Eternal Son of God. The traditional Christology confused itself by trying to conceive God as having at last made a sacrifice that he had been forever anticipating and which, having been made, he will forever remember. The truth, rather, is that the sacrificial act and spirit is integral to God's very nature, and is eternally present there. What we for practical purposes represent to ourselves under the form of a temporary experience in the Godhead is not temporary but eternal. The impulse to self-giving is the deepest thing in God, and without it he would not be God. Calvary is not a last desperate effort on his part to save a situation. Calvary is, rather, the exhibition on the field of time and history, and in the only way in which we can adequately conceive it, of the truth that sacrifice is inseparable from life. *The law by which creation itself is constituted is the law of God's own being.* God could not be God and not give himself. In him there is perpetual self-realization through perpetual self-giving. The doctrine of Divine Triunity, under severe criticism as it is to-day, is, after all, an attempt to state that fact—the fact that personality can maintain itself at its highest level only as it is willing to include within itself that which is not itself—its own "other." The question

cannot be discussed here, but it is the writer's conviction that the much-needed restatement of the idea of Triunity may be reached by the help of the philosophy here being indicated. What traditional Trinitarianism is an attempt to state on the subjective side, the traditional Christology, at least in its Kenotic form, is an attempt to state on the objective side, namely, God voluntarily undergoing self-limitation for the sake of the other-than-self. The vital truth in it all is that there is no life where there is no cross, and that the cross is not a divine invention for others or a temporary experience for God himself. No. The cross is the laying bare of the heart of God. It is the revelation of the innermost secret of Eternal Being. It is the Father in action at the highest reach of his Fatherly capacity—and the necessary counterpart of such perfect Fatherhood is perfect Sonship. God cannot be less than himself: that is why he can never be self-contained. Wherever the principle of the cross is, there to a greater or lesser degree God is. If anywhere on the field of time the principle of the cross has received an absolute manifestation, there God is absolutely present. It is absolutely manifested at that place where the utterly good consents to be treated as the utterly evil—where One who knew no sin consents on behalf of others to be made sin—where that for which there was no jot or tittle of justification is accepted as in itself a righteous judgment. Jesus Christ is Incarnate Deity because in him and through him God gave supreme expression to that fact in which God's Godhood consists, which is the basic characteristic of all life, and by the surrender to which alone human life can realize its own possibilities, and in the profound Christian sense be redeemed. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." But God did not do it alone: Christ did it. And Christ did not do it alone: God did it. It was not a human deed only: it was a divine deed. It was not a divine deed only: it was a human deed. It was an action involving essential humanity and essential

deity, and neither could have done it but for the fact of the other.

All this has been written because of a felt necessity to distinguish between the presentation of a divine fact under a form suitable to our human apprehension, and the construing of that fact according to its significance for God. Thus construed, Christ—so it is being suggested—is not to be thought of as literally a separate Divine Being temporarily absent from the Godhead, temporarily suffering, and soon to return with nothing but memory to remind him of what he had endured. *The God who appeared in Christ was never otherwise and never will be otherwise than as he appeared in Christ.* That is the very significance of the appearing. God's self-offering is eternal; it is the basic condition of his existence: ever to proceed from within himself to otherness is, therefore, as truly God's "nature" as it is the nature of the tree to lift its leafy arms to pray, or as it is the nature of the skylark to pour forth its soul in profuse strains of unpremeditated art. In Christ, God does not merely announce that fact impersonally: He acts it out, because only so can he reach us, and only so can he satisfy himself. But he thus presents himself to us in the time-process in order that we might advance from the temporal representation to the eternal reality.⁷ What is that reality? It is that God is in his innermost nature sacrificial love; that sacrificial love involves his self-giving; that One who eternally gives himself can never be solitary, since what he gives constitutes an "Other" whose nature is identical with the nature of the Giver; and that, therefore, God, as the Original Life, is himself the type according to which are determined the conditions of the highest blessedness of the men made in his image. Perhaps we begin to discern something of the majestic sweep of that truth which these pages are an imperfect enough attempt to elucidate, the truth, namely, that the self-giving of Holy Love which, when accepted as basic in the constitution of the Godhead, suggests

that the divine nature is complex rather than simple, triune rather than solitary, and which, when accepted as equally basic in the external activity of God, suggests irresistibly his self-giving in incarnation because he cannot give less than his all—that this truth of necessity establishes the method according to which alone there can take place the reconciliation of God with man and of man with man.

It is with no apology, therefore, that we need to stand before the world to-day, and reaffirm the ancient yet self-rejuvenating Christian faith. We have a reason for the faith that is in us, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. We can do no other than say that "God was in Christ," that "the Word became flesh," that the Father "loved him before the foundation of the world," that he is "the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end," that "he is the Head of the Body, the church, the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in all things he might have the preeminence." In reverent adoration we turn our thoughts toward him by whose side no other can stand, and with a conviction that we cannot escape, and which the ripening experience of life only serves to make stronger, we exclaim: "HERE is that Sonship that is 'coeternal and consubstantial with the Father.' HERE is that truth and grace, that love and holiness, which is enshrined in the very heart of Eternal Being. HERE is the reason for things. HERE is the Light that lighteth every man coming into the world. HERE is what men have ever groped for, and concerning which God has nowhere left himself wholly without witness. HERE is the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. HERE is the promise and power of human redemption—the earnest that struggling and disrupted humanity shall finally become One Family, moved by One Spirit, and forever bearing One Name."⁸

What we see in Jesus that makes him at once solitary and universal is not something created and temporal, but some-

thing uncreated and eternal. That only we worship, for it is Divine. In that only we trust, for it can never fail. If God is not such as meets us in him, then God 'cannot greatly concern us at all. If he is not this, then he is less than this, for he cannot be more. But more we do not need, and with less we cannot be content. God is, then, here or nowhere. He was always this, or he was never this. We reach out uncertain and trembling hands to touch him. What we touch is no wild fancy of a fevered brain: it is a Living Reality, a veritable Presence, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. So, "MY LORD—AND MY GOD!"⁹

NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV

(1) Cf. Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament*, pt. ii, chap. vi. "Eternal life is simply *the life*—the life which is truly such—life after the divine ideal. . . . It has nothing to do with time or place. . . . 'Eternal life,' as used in [the Fourth Gospel] represents an ethical or qualitative conception. . . . This blessed life which is realized in fellowship with God is eternal, not merely in the sense of imperishable or endless, but in the higher sense of the true Godlike life, which by reason of its kinship to God is raised above all limits of time and place" (p. 231). . . . So far as there is any 'time-element' in the word 'eternal,' as used in these discourses, it seems to be this, that the true, spiritual, divine life, being grounded in the very nature of God, is independent of all limitations of time or place" (p. 232).

(2) Reference should be made again to the two lectures in Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, on "The Idea of Creation" (especially pp. 303-309), and "Time and Eternity" (especially pp. 345-349).

(3) See Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, chaps. iii, viii, and ix, for a discussion of the origin, nature, and validity of religious truth or knowledge.

(4) Cf. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, §§ 10, 17, 18.

(5) "The doctrine of the Kenosis confuses these two things,

the preexistence of the Divine Logos or divine nature of Christ with the preexistence of the total divine-human Personality, that of the God-Man, Jesus Christ. It thinks of Jesus of Nazareth in his total personality as preexisting in heaven, and then simply coming to earth" (Drown, *The Creative Christ*, p. 145). Even so thoroughgoing a defender of traditional theories as L. M. Sweet is constrained to take issue with Gore at this point. Sweet writes: "The special implication of these documents is that the human nature of Jesus was a special divine creation mediated through the maternal agency of Mary. It is certainly true that Matthew and Luke held to a belief in a real birth and beginning of life to the historical Being whom they knew as Jesus the Christ. They must have done so, for whatever theory one holds as to the Person of Christ, it is historically true that the person known as Jesus Christ began to be in embryo at his conception and actually at his birth" (*The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, Note E, p. 352). So Mackintosh: "Who preexists? Not the historic Jesus, exactly as he is known in the Gospels. The church has never affirmed that the humanity of Christ was real prior to the birth in Bethlehem" (*Person of Christ*, p. 457).

(6) The treatment in Drown, *ibid.*, is somewhat similar to that in the text. See his chapter on "The Incarnate Life," especially the summary statement on pp. 151, 152. The entire chapter in Mackintosh, *ibid.*, bk. iii, pt. iii, chap. ix, in which he deals with the subject with his accustomed clarity, deserves careful study. After frankly stating some of the difficulties connected with the idea of Christ's preexistence, he says: "We have, then, to concede that the idea of preexistence is an imperfect means of representing eternity in forms of time" (p. 458). But he adds: "It is, I believe, a thought of which fully conscious Christian belief will not consent to be deprived, but at least theology cannot start from it." For an uncompromising treatment from the traditional standpoint, see Forsyth, *Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, lect. x, and cf. Gore, *Belief in Christ*, chap. iii, § 2.

(7) "The passage from the one statement [that creation was accomplished once for all in the past] to the other [that creation is a continually repeated act] represents the effort of the mind

to emancipate itself from the spatialized form of time. To place the creative act in the past is rightly felt to be making it a mere event in time; to treat it as the present act which sustains the universe is felt, with equal right, to lift it out of the temporal sequence and so to justify the predicate eternal. Every statement of religious truth must undergo the same transformation. Christ must die daily; the world is redeemed as well as created continually, and the whole life of God is poured into what we call our human 'Now.'" Pringle-Pattison, *ibid.*, p. 370. Is not this "transformation of religious truth" exactly what is being attempted in the Epistle to the Hebrews? For a criticism of Pringle-Pattison, see Gore, *Belief in God*, appendix to chap. iii, and chap. vi, § II, pp. 144ff.

(8) Cf. Cross, *Creative Christianity*, the last chapter, on "The Power of Cosmic Interpretation." The presuppositions of the chapter appear to be quite different from those of the present discussion, but the conclusions are similar. "Apart from the Christian faith, I do not see how the universe can ever have a meaning that will satisfy our deepest longing. For, though we should succeed, independently of this faith, in answering the question of the *how* or even the *whence* of this complex of things we call the world, the question of the *whereunto* must remain unanswered unless one can find the way to turn its tragedies into triumphs and all its evil into good. This is the great bestowment of the Crucified. He has discovered to us *personality* finding its perfection ministered unto by the agonies as well as by the experiences of bliss that come to our spirits through the inseparability of our destiny from the natural constitution of the cosmos" (p. 162).

(9) The following sections in Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, bear on the biblical teaching: vol. i, bk. i, chap. iii, § 12; bk. ii, chap. iii, §§ 6, 7, 8; vol. ii, bk. iv, chap. iii, §§ 10, 11, 12; bk. v, pt. i, chap. iii, §§ 3, 4, 5; pt. ii, chap. iii, § 4; pt. iii, chap. ii, § 5. See Bacon, *Jesus and Paul*, lect. v, for an illuminating discussion of the backgrounds of the relevant Pauline terminology. Is it possible that we have treated as essential and final what for Paul was merely casual and instrumental?

CHAPTER XXV

“ALL THINGS ARE YOURS”

Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ; and to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ: to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord: in whom we have boldness and access with confidence by the faith of him. Wherefore I desire that ye faint not at my tribulations for you, which is your glory. For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named, that he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God.—SAINT PAUL, *Ephesians* 3. 8-19.

All things were created by him, and for him: and he is before all things, and by him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the church: who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead; that in all things he might have the pre-eminence.—SAINT PAUL, *Colossians* 1. 16-18.

All things are yours; . . . and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's.—SAINT PAUL, *1 Corinthians* 3. 21 and 23.

CHAPTER XXV

"ALL THINGS ARE YOURS"

MAN is an incomplete and growing creature who exists in order that he may realize an end, and in realizing that end fulfill himself. The nature and the end are each determined and constituted with reference to the other. They are therefore correlates, necessary parts of a whole. An end appears as rational only when it is seen to be possible to and required by antecedent conditions. Conditions can properly be called conditions only as they are related to an end: otherwise they are not conditions, but a mere aggregate of isolated facts, to which no meaning can be assigned. Man exists in a certain way. Analyzing that, we conclude that he exists that way because that is a necessary condition to a certain end. Assuming such an ideal end, we affirm that it would be impossible of realization except man were constituted the way he is.

This view of the matter requires that not one single fact or possibility be detached from human life as entirely lacking in significance. "The Truth is in the Whole." Such a comprehension is possible only through an end. Parts presuppose a whole of which they are the parts, and a whole without parts would be nothing but an empty form—a barren abstraction. What we need is that with reference to which life appears as a whole. That which gives to life this aspect of completeness is that for which life finally is. That from whose control nothing can escape takes on the character of absolute value.

Philosophy, ethics, and religion have ever been concerned, each in its own way, with the discovery of such a value or end. In our discussion, we have concluded that since the world comes to its supreme expression in man, and since

man comes to his supreme expression in moral goodness, and since there is nothing that happens to a man or that is done by him which may not be used to promote moral goodness, therefore moral goodness in personality is the highest conceivable value and as such is the clue to the meaning of existence. The problem, therefore, became the problem of defining the character of that goodness. It was here that we found the significance of Jesus Christ. In what he was and in what he taught and in what he did, he gave absolute expression within human limitations to that moral goodness which is the fundamental thing in God and the *raison d'être* of man and his world, at the same time that he revealed the secret of its increasing possession and expression by every human life.

What remains to be done is but to reaffirm that the acceptance of this interpretation of the significance of Christ and his work does indeed make for the enrichment of life, for its deliverance from oppressive bondage, and for its true progress in the quest for enduring satisfactions.

For what men want is fullness of life. They seek satisfaction, and that which urges them to the quest they can never escape because they can never escape themselves. The bases of the quest are immovably laid in elemental human nature. The Epicurean or hedonistic theory as it is usually stated is very far from being acceptable, but what the theory is concerned with—man's inextinguishable desire for happiness—must never be lost sight of by those who would lead men by a truer way. Tirades of the better-favored against those not so well favored are as cruel as they are selfish, for what is unrest but a sign of dissatisfaction, and what is dissatisfaction, the wholly indispensable spur to endeavor, but a sign of the felt inadequacy of what has hitherto sufficed? Complete satisfaction could very well be taken to indicate complete stagnation. Men grow because they want something better than what they have, and they would never grow otherwise. Life grows by creation from

within, not by accretions from without. Not as a mason builds a wall by adding brick to brick do we grow. Rather do we grow by discovering our own hidden powers and subjecting to them more and more the given conditions of life.

Does the Christian way lead to happiness? Does it provide for that more life and fuller that all men want? Is it available only for times and seasons, or is its availability universal? Has it a word of hope for every child of man wherever found? Can it give meaning to every area of life, touching it all with its glory? Is it helpless before no single obstacle? On whatever can be judged to be desirable, no matter what the point of view, can it also place a value? Art, science, knowledge; commerce, social organization, government—these are perennial human interests and perennial human needs. Is the criticism just, that the Christian way ignores or even condemns these, or does it instead call for their preservation and cultivation and sanctification? In a word, does "redemption" concern only "one's own soul," conceived as a self-contained isolated unit, or does it include the world and all that is therein?

This book has been written to justify an affirmative answer to such questions. But we should be very sure that we realize what the affirmative answer signifies, and what the acceptance of it commits us to.

We meet at once the problem of reconciling two terms, both of which occur in the New Testament, yet each of which appears to destroy the other. The two terms are self-denial and self-discovery. "Deny yourself." So Jesus taught. But why deny yourself? "Because only thus can you find yourself." It follows, therefore, that in the thought of Jesus self-denial is never an end, but a means, and that the end to which it is the means is the discovery of the true self. That is to say, he justifies us in our claim that self-discovery, or self-fulfillment, or self-realization is a legitimate object of quest.

It is necessary to consider with this the meaning of his other word, namely, that even as he himself had "overcome the world," so are his followers to overcome it. But what is it to overcome the world? The usual answer is, of course, the ascetic answer. "The world" is looked upon as an enemy to be slain. The natural instincts, and the impulses to which they give rise, are regarded as emissaries of the Evil One. There is, it is believed, a great hierarchy of wicked spirits carrying on a warfare against God, and using the world and human life as a battle ground. Everything that is of the world is, therefore, not of God. Although he is the Creator of the world, there is much that he did not create! Although all things depend upon the word of his power, there is much that does not! We are called upon to stand with him on one side of his creation to help him destroy another part of his creation which, by the premises, must be his, but which, according to the appeal, cannot be his!

The extravagance of this way of stating the case is deliberate, for only thus is it possible to call attention to the obscurity that marks so much of our thinking and of our expression. That the will of God does not everywhere prevail in his own creation—this is every way evident. That he calls men to a life of earnest effort to the end that his will shall be done in all the earth—this also is evident. But God makes nothing evil. Evil, nevertheless, abounds. We therefore can explain evil only on the ground that something not evil in itself is out of its place, or is being used in the wrong way, or is not being used to its fullest extent, or is being directed to other than its proper end. It follows that the warfare that God calls us to is not a warfare of destruction in any absolute sense but a warfare of salvation or redemption. We therefore get our definition of what it means to overcome the world. It means that the forces of life, the fundamental needs and interests of men, the peculiar gifts and talents of the individual, the inexhaustible

variety of the possible content of experience, shall be our servants rather than our masters. *We overcome a thing, not by destroying it, but by discovering its proper function in relation to a comprehensive purpose, and then utilizing it to promote that purpose.*

Lifting Christ, as we have done, to the place of supremacy, conceiving him as the Central Fact around which life may grow with ever-increasing richness, we here claim that the true way to overcome the world is to subject it to the control of his Spirit. If "the world" is to be saved, if human life is to be saved, if all that enters into human life to make it so varied is to be saved, it can only be as the world, and life, and the conditions of life, and the content of life, are Christianized. Nothing that is really fundamental needs to be destroyed, but everything that is really fundamental needs to be saved. It is saved according as it is brought into helpful relation to the process of man's self-realization. And because man is meant for divine sonship, and because he comes to divine sonship through whole-hearted submission to God as revealed in Jesus Christ, because, therefore, Jesus Christ is the clue to the meaning and purpose of the human race—because of this, the salvation of things, and the salvation of the life of which things are a part, and the salvation of all the potentialities and expressions of life, is precisely in the degree in which they are captured for the cause of Christ.

(1) In our analysis of human nature, we emphasized the fact of individuality, meaning that there are in every life distinctive traits and qualities. Is it not a part of the glory of the Christian way that it shows how these traits and qualities may be given their true significance? How many men and women have been driven away from Christ through a false supposition that there was no place in his service for the thing about which they supremely cared because it was so indestructibly a part of their very being? There is the instinct of the dramatist, of the artist, of the

musician, of the teacher. We speak of the political instinct, the financial instinct, the commercial instinct, the editorial instinct. There is that fundamental quality which makes, each in his own way, the orator, the inventor, the scientist, the administrator, the agriculturist, the nurse, the physician. Whence comes it all? And any man who has caught but a glimmer of the meaning of the theistic faith is impelled to answer that it is all, equally with the instinct for love and friendship and self-sacrifice, an expression of the inexhaustible fertility of the being of God. And *why* comes it all? To be destroyed? To be hid in a napkin? To be regarded as a strictly personal possession? To be subverted to merely selfish ends? Rather it comes to men from God that it may be used by men for God, and in being used by men for God, may be found to be the fullest of meaning and value for men. What is there about Christ and his purpose, when truly understood, that bans the dramatic instinct, or the artistic instinct, or the musical instinct? By what process of reasoning have men reached the conclusion that the scientist's passion for truth, or the administrator's passion for detail, or the agriculturist's passion for making things grow, lie wholly outside the range of the Christian purpose—that, indeed, there may be even an essential antagonism between them? The humble Austrian monk, Mendel, experimenting with peas in his monastery garden, discovered the revolutionary law now called by his name. Was he not expressing his devotion to God just as truly when he was handling his peas and separating the "pures" from the "impures," as he was when he was counting his beads? Let him who answers "No" beware lest he be classed with the profane! Is not God in the melody of that voice? Then why should not the song be his song? Is not God in the closely-knit processes of that intellect? Then why should not the thoughts be his thoughts? Is not God in the cunning turn of that hand? Then why should not the beauty be his beauty? The cause of Christ has suf-

ferred immeasurably from the false supposition that it means for men nothing but gloom, sacrifice, rigorous stoicism. There isn't anything that anybody possesses but Christ says to him, "Cultivate it to the fullest possible extent consonant with the whole purpose of your life." The question may appear to be fantastic, nevertheless we ask it: What would happen if the dramatic instinct of American youth, or if the political instinct of a certain national group of our countrymen, or if the financial instinct of yet another group, could be captured for the kingdom of our Lord? No. Christ stops not at the word "self-denial" but at the word "self-discovery." He does not call us to lose but to find. He opens a door not into a wilderness but into green pastures. There is a principle of order in personality, and he proclaims it. Every gift and experience he sanctifies by revealing the law of its use.

(2) We emphasized, too, the feature of sociality, meaning that a man is inextricably bound up with men, and holds his life on that condition. The barest social unit is two—husband and wife, or parent and child, or friend and friend. But it cannot be held at two. Every individual requires two others in order to account for him, and exactly what he receives from them, and from others through them, in addition to life, never has been determined and never can be. It is this principle of dependence which gives us kindred, friendships, organized groups as brotherhoods and societies, political units as communities, states, and nations, eventually the entire human race. The world can never be saved while the social forces that hold men together, and without which men could not continue to live, are not controlled and utilized in the interests of the purpose of Christ. As our economic order is at present constituted, the merchant, the employer, the investor, the promoter, the capitalist, are necessities. It is possible, of course, to insist that the economic order which makes these necessary is in itself wrong and must be transformed. But waiving that,

and assuming that they are necessary for at least some time to come, we ask whether it is possible for these necessities to be controlled by the Spirit of Christ? The question is apt to be greeted either by sardonic laughter or by the assertion that such things as these lie wholly without the range of religion. Does not much of the tragedy of the situation lie in the fact of just such responses? Why this distinction between religion and the necessary conditions of life? Why this supposition that a man cannot take his business to God just as much as he can the welfare of his children? Is it quite certain—until we have much more proof than we now possess—that a community could not be successfully governed if those who governed it thought never of their own pockets or the purposes of a party, but always of the best interests of the community? Is it quite certain that the American nation would first go bankrupt and then become the prey of the spoiler if it should announce to the world that henceforth its foreign policy would be determined with reference to say, the Golden Rule? It must needs be that we have a foreign policy, but woe unto that nation whose foreign policy is—*Christian*? But who says that? Have unchristian foreign policies in the long run vindicated themselves? Fortunately, men can still be Christian even although the social order is not Christian; but after all, in so far as Christian men passively acquiesce in such an order they are disloyal to their Lord, since he calls them to capture for him and his Cause not only life but all the complex conditions of life as well.

Among such conditions are to be included what are called the social heredity and the principles that control it. The claim that we are advocating must extend even to this. We have said that everything that enters into human experience can be made available for the true end of life. But it is hardly a fair corollary of this to say that therefore we need not try to improve the conditions of life for other people, because no matter how difficult their conditions they can

be used for good. It is true that we may capture even the hardest conditions for our Lord and ourselves. But back of the hard conditions are the causes that produce them, *and it is a greater Christian achievement to control the causes than it is to utilize for so-called spiritual purposes the harsh conditions that may be their result.* That is to say, it is a truly Christian deed to build a home for the care of cripple children, and to bring to bear upon them influences that will help them to find the joy of life. It is a greater Christian deed to ascertain the social and biological causes which give us cripple or otherwise defective children, and, so far as we may (absolute control being admittedly impossible), see to it that every child enjoys his rightful heritage of at least being well born. It is better to caulk the seams than continually to be bailing out the boat. The sympathy of the good Samaritan is classical, but one would like to know whether, having left the helpless traveler at the inn, he proceeded to importune the authorities to clean out the nests of highwaymen along the Jericho road so that it could be traveled without danger. "The social nature of personality!" "The dependence of the one on the many!" How glibly the phrases run off our tongue! How much of the multiform expression of the social nature, even where it entails suffering and loss, we take for granted! How much culpable indifference we hide under the pious phrase, "Thy will be done"! How blindly we read John's vision of the Holy City, which we suppose to be in heaven, but which he says came down from heaven to earth to make earth new! "Nothing to do but to save souls." True: but what is a soul? Is it not a focal point of the universal life? And its "salvation"—does it not involve infinitely more than a personal insurance policy taken out as a protection against possible future emergencies?

(3) And we emphasized man's inborn religiousness, whose crudest expression is the evidence to his connection with a greater world, described as the supernatural. There may

be forms of the idealizing process which we hesitate to call religious, but certainly all religion involves ideality. In his religion man always goes beyond himself. He is seeking "Something More," which will respond to that within him about whose reality he has no doubt. What it is that he seeks he may be wholly unable to represent to himself in any clear way. On the other hand, he may attempt to describe it in great detail, whence arises the common charge that religion is anthropomorphic—the charge, that is, that man creates God in his own image. But the charge, both true and false as it is, overlooks many things: in particular, it overlooks the fact that man's effort to conceive or represent what to him is the divine bears witness at once to a need and a power. He *wants*, and he is *able*. All the extravagances that mark the history of religious expression sink into insignificance when considered in the light of what it is all *for* and what it all *means*. Think of the indescribable pathos of a pagan festival, in its mingled cruelty, superstition, and grandeur! But think also of the vast sincerity that perpetuates it—of the inextinguishable spark in the devotee's soul which becomes fanned into a blaze of holy rapture—of the ideal world lifted above the accidents of time and place which for the time being is made so utterly real! Think of what men will do because of their religion! It can inspire the most unbelievable austerities. It can arouse the most savage passions. It can inspire the most grandiose schemes. It can take the pain from torture and the sting from death. The passion for the Highest, the desire to find the Highest, the belief that the Highest is known and possessed—this is the mark of man. Finite though he be, he is by this charged with infinitude. Linked though he be with the transient, he is by this attested as imperishable.

Can we capture religion and God for that same Christ for whom we would fain capture all else? The question is not intended to be blasphemous. It is not too much to

say that it is the most solemn and urgent question that to-day is confronting Christian men. Men will never cease to be religious: the guarantee of that they carry with them. Men will never cease to express their religion, and for the same reason. Men will never cease to feel after God, that haply they may find him. The final test of the significance that has been assigned to Jesus Christ throughout this book is whether every form of religious expression that is incompatible with his Spirit can be eliminated and the needs that that expression testifies to still be satisfied by expressions that are not thus incompatible; whether the different religious conceptions of God which men have held can be surrendered so far as they are alien to Christ at the same time that the need from which they spring can be satisfied by a conception which Christ himself inspires and determines. The basic need and the real purpose of the ritualist, the mystic, the evangelical, the pragmatist, the intellectualist, finds no least antagonism in the true Christ-Spirit. The choice, as respects religion, is not between the ritualist and no ritualist, the mystic and no mystic, the intellectualist and no intellectualist. Rather is the choice between the mere ritualist and the Christian ritualist, the mere mystic and the Christian mystic, the mere intellectualist and the Christian intellectualist. GOD! We utter the majestic word, and then we go on to ask where he is, what he is, who has seen him, who has known him. *Power* is he? But to what end is his power? *Wisdom* is he? But in what respect is he wise? *Love* is he? But what is love when stripped of finiteness? And then the great New-Testament affirmation: "No man hath seen God at any time: the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." God has been conceived in all sorts of ways. Attributes have been assigned to him which, if they represented the fact, would mean that he was a monster. Little children have been frightened by stories of his vindictiveness. Gentle women have trembled in mortal fear as they thought of

him. Fearless men have, like Prometheus, expressed their purpose to defy so inhuman a Being, though they be enchained for it everlastingly. The joy has been banished from many a life in response to what was believed to be his will. All manner of devices have been invented to save wretched men from his insatiable passion for his just due. The death which necessarily inheres in the gift of life has been regarded as the supreme expression of his wrath. There he sits in the skies: an object of dread to unhappy mortals; hurling his thunderbolts in utter disregard of where or whom they strike; willing to be pacified for a consideration; one whose delight is to command and demand rather than to strengthen and to help. All that must go—and God forgive us that it has not gone before! In the name of Him who died on the cross, all that must go! In the name of Him who revealed the Eternal Father suffering to save, all that must go! In the name of Him who was himself Incarnate Love, and who called men to make love supreme because God is love, all that must go! Let this be said: *If God came to us in Christ, then God must be himself Christlike, and only as there is the Christlike God, and only as men can be brought to believe in the Christlike God, is there hope for the salvation of the world.* Not that the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is a mere good natured Philanthropist. Not that the moral verities are to lose their dread sanctions. Not that we are bidden to make life “a moral holiday.” The Son who died for sin revealed thereby the Father’s uncompromising attitude to sin—but he revealed it also as the attitude of One who would save at the uttermost personal cost and sacrifice. There are necessarily other aspects of Deity than those revealed in Jesus Christ—aspects which answer to other than our purely religious needs. But those aspects, speculative as they are, must be not incompatible with that aspect of which we have been made morally certain by a “revelation.” The God with whom in the end we have to

deal is such a God as meets us in Jesus Christ. And the God who meets us in him is adequate to all that diverse need because of which we believe in a God at all.

In Christ Jesus then, thus understood, every man may find himself ; he may find his fellows ; he may find the world ; he may find God. For the pilgrim whose Guide is that Christ who in the gospel brought life and immortality to light, the human quest, ancient as time, endless as life, becomes a perpetual discovery of new experiences, new meanings, new horizons. It becomes a growing apprehension of that great truth that there is One Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all.

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

WE have raised the question of man's ideal nature—the fundamental meaning of him—the why and the wherefore of his existence and of all that befalls him. We have asked, "Why is a man?" Under the illumination of the Christian revelation, we have answered that man is for divine sonship. We have asked the related question, "Why is the world?" and we have answered that since the world is constituted in and through man, the reason why the world is is the same reason why man is. That is to say, the world finds *its* meaning and reason in that in which man finds *his* meaning and reason, namely, in that peculiar quality of moral goodness, defined in terms of sonship, of which Jesus the Christ is at once the type, the promise, and the power.

The fundamental principles, therefore, by means of which it has been suggested that we may approach to an adequate philosophy of the Work and Person of Christ are as follows:

(1) We interpret the world through man since it is in man, conceived as at once rational and ethical, that the world comes to its supreme expression, and since, in its turn, man's world becomes the total body of his experience and what is objectively needed to account for it.

(2) Man thus conceived appears as an incomplete and growing creature, in whose nature are constitutive needs which impel him to seek ends in which those needs will be satisfied and his true nature self-fulfilled.

(3) The interpretation of man's true nature is reached through Christ, since he revealed that one thing—a certain quality of moral goodness—which truly discovers man to himself and gives meaning to every possible experience.

(4) An additional significance is then given to the world,

namely, as comprising that body of conditions through which, under the control of this goodness as the postulated Supreme End, man is to bring forth a new creation, a moral universe, or the kingdom of God.

(5) Finally, we interpret God in the light of the world understood as the body of conditions with this purpose; in the light of man as the potential organizer of these conditions; in the light of Christ as affording the clue to how the conditions shall be organized as God intends: and in this threefold light we conceive God as a Holy Father seeking to realize in the world a family of holy sons.

Thus the conception of the world, the conception of man, the conception of Christ, and the conception of God, appear as interrelated parts of the one vast coherent whole of being.

A WORKING BIBLIOGRAPHY

"A preacher in days like ours must needs be a thinker. I do not say that he must be an original thinker, for originality is the rarest of all gifts. But he must have trodden the great highways of thought familiar to intelligent men; he must have worked out conclusions for himself; he must be in a position to guide the mind as well as arouse the conscience. This clearly means that he must be a student."—W. J. DAWSON.

" . . . Books, we know,
Are a substantial world, both pure and good;
Round these, with tendrils strong as flesh and blood,
Our pastime and our happiness will grow."

—WORDSWORTH.

"God offers to every mind its choice between truth and repose. Take which you please,—you can never have both. Between these, as a pendulum, man oscillates. He in whom the love of repose predominates will accept the first creed, the first philosophy, the first political party, he meets,—most likely his father's. He gets rest, commodity, and reputation: but he shuts the door of truth."—EMERSON.

A WORKING BIBLIOGRAPHY

(See also index, under "Bibliographies")

BIBLIOGRAPHIES are too often either so extensive that the student is discouraged, or the bare titles alone are given and he has no means of knowing which to select. The bibliography given here has been planned with a view to practical usefulness. Brief annotations on many of these as well as on other books not listed here may also be found in the notes and references.

CHRISTOLOGY: H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* (Scribners). This is the book to which references are most frequently made, and should be in the hands of everyone who wishes to make a careful study of the subject. It is equally good in its history, its reviews and criticisms, and its positive constructions.

Mackintosh could well be supplemented by two or three of the following: Glover, *Jesus in the Experience of Men* (Association Press); Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern* (Oxford University Press); Drown, *The Creative Christ* (Macmillan); Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ* (Doran); Lofthouse, *Altar, Cross, and Community* (London: The Epworth Press). Glover makes Christ intensely real, both in relation to the life of the first century and in relation to the life of to-day, and is full of suggestiveness. Sanday gives a brief but clear account of the history, discusses modern theories, and expounds the theory that the Deity of Christ is to be understood from the standpoint of his subconscious life. Drown is a small book, recently issued, and sets forth a conception of Christ very similar to the one found in these pages. Bruce belongs to the past generation, and is rather overweighted with scholarship, but

it is especially good in its treatment of the Kenotic theories. Lofthouse is the Fernley Lecture for 1920, and deserves close attention, particularly as respects its discussion of the history of sacrifice and its interpretation of the sense in which Jesus thought of himself in sacrificial terms.

THE ATONEMENT: Mozley, *The Doctrine of Atonement* (Scribners); Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement* (Methodist Book Concern); D. Smith, *The Atonement in the Light of History and the Modern Spirit* (Doran); R. Mackintosh, *Historic Theories of Atonement* (Doran); Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (Macmillan). Mozley is brief but comprehensive, is chiefly historical, and leans to the Satisfaction theory. Lidgett is an able attempt to retain both the objective and subjective aspects, and was one of the first books to consider the Atonement in the light of the purposes of Divine Fatherhood. Smith is a remarkable reaction to the so-called Moral Influence Theory on the part of one who had previously advocated an almost bald Substitutionism. Mackintosh is a good survey of the various historic and modern theories, in places difficult as to style, but almost always sound in its criticisms. Rashdall is the best of them all for the student who wishes to make a really thorough study, but it is not to be recommended to the beginner.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY: No interpretation of the Person and Work of Christ can be satisfactory which does not ring true to the New Testament. Either of the following books on the biblical material may be recommended. Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, 2 vols., Eng. trans. (Scribners); Stevens, *Theology of the New Testament* (Scribners); Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel* (Doran). Beyschlag is an exceedingly able and brilliant piece of work, is well arranged, leaves no question untouched, but is in places arbitrary and rationalistic. Stevens is more readable, and is a fine example of the combination of ample scholarship and evangelical interpretation. Denney is quite conservative, but not un-

duly so, and confines itself to the testimony of the Synoptic Gospels. It could very well be supplemented with either his *Death of Christ* (Doran), or Garvie, *Studies of Paul and His Gospel* (Methodist Book Concern).

The student who is limited in time and resources, and who in conjunction with the discussion in the present text will work through a selection from the above books, will find that he has made a substantial advance in the study of this all-important question.

The following may be recommended of the innumerable books that deal with related fields. Practically all of these are referred to in the notes in the text.

THEISM: Beckwith, *The Idea of God* (Macmillan); Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (Oxford University Press); Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (Putnams); Micou, *Basic Ideas in Religion* (Association Press). Beckwith is much the simplest of the four, and is an excellent survey of the history of the changes which have come about in men's idea of God. Pringle-Pattison is remarkable for its clear and lucid expositions and criticisms, but is not to be recommended to those who have not done considerable reading in philosophy, or at least in philosophical theism. Sorley does not contain much history, but it is the best modern approach to the problem in the Kantian spirit—the spirit which emphasizes the normative and interpretive significance of the moral. Micou is to be strongly recommended to any student who wants to know what may still be said, claiming the support of modern science, for the traditional theistic arguments.

BIBLICAL CRITICISM: Peake, *The Bible, its Origin, its Significance, and Its Abiding Worth* (Doran); Moffatt, *The Approach to the New Testament* (Doran). The two men are among the best qualified in the field. The first covers the ground exhaustively, dealing with almost every phase of the question, and makes it plain how much the Bible owes to

intelligent consecrated scholarship. The second is frank and entirely modern, but it is nowhere destructive, and it can be safely followed in most of its findings

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, new and revised edition (Yale University); Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness* (Macmillan); Steven, *The Psychology of the Christian Soul* (Doran); Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (Macmillan). Hocking represents the plea of a philosopher for the necessity of genuine religious conversion. Pratt shows much more sympathy for the evangelical emphases than is usual among psychologists. Steven is very simply written, and is one of the best books to begin with. Thouless is the most recent of the four, and is eminently sane and judicious, especially in its treatment of the sex-instinct and mysticism.

ETHICS: Seth, *Ethical Principles* (Scribners); Everett, *Moral Values* (Henry Holt). Seth has been a standard for many years; it is attractively written, and it looks in the Christian direction. Everett is more technical and covers more ground, but it is written with sympathy for a personalistic philosophy, and is everywhere positive and constructive. Two simple treatments of CHRISTIAN ETHICS are Alexander, *Christianity and Ethics* (Scribners), and King, *The Ethics of Jesus* (Macmillan). The first is clearly arranged, quite comprehensive, and is an admirable general introduction; the second is one of the best brief expositions that we have of the ethical bearings of the Sayings of Jesus.

APOLOGETICS: Garvie, *Handbook of Christian Apologetics* (Scribners); H. R. Mackintosh, *The Originality of the Christian Message* (Scribners); Simpson, *Man and the Attainment of Immortality* (Doran); Peake, *Christianity, Its Nature and Its Truth* (Doran); Faulkner, *Modernism and the Christian Faith* (Methodist Book Concern). Garvie covers the field from an entirely modern but evangelical standpoint. Mackintosh is especially good as a clear and convincing statement of the chief characteristics of Chris-

tianity and their distinction from and superiority to all other faiths. Simpson is perhaps not an apologetic in the usual sense, but it is an interpretation of evolution from an avowedly Christian point of view by the successor of Henry Drummond. Peake is the oldest book of the group, but it has a firm hold on what is really permanent in Christianity and expounds and defends this with equal skill and clarity. Faulkner is concerned with the effect of certain modern tendencies on evangelical Christianity, and is sympathetic wherever nothing essential is thought to be in danger.

Finally, not the superficial reading of many books, but the patient pondering and mastery of a few that are dependable, is the way to the acquisition of that power which comes only of knowledge and understanding.

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